436
4 Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
fabrication stage. There are few papers that discuss cases when Trojans are inserted
during the specification design, electronic design automation tools, and packaging
process.
Researchers have proposed several new, previously unknown types of hardware
Trojans. Special attention should be paid to a new type of Trojans, which we called
“technological Trojans.” For example, Trojans which radically accelerate aging of
one or a few IC components were described [262]. Such Trojans created with additional doping of one of the areas of the fabricated die surface are more invisible since
they do not introduce additional circuitry into the original structure. As of the date
of publication of this book, it is not possible to detect such “technological Trojans.”
As is known, the desire to use a larger number of transistors, as well as to unite a
larger number of functions in the IC, leads to the adoption of 3D integrated circuit
technology. New 3D ICs can change the current circuit architecture and IC supply
chain and can result in emergence of new threats related to hardware Trojans. Thus,
additional attack models should be developed for 3D ICs. We assume that the countermeasures known for two-dimensional ICs can also be adapted for three-dimensional
ICs.
The authors [259] believe that the Trojan detection approaches based on functional
tests must be considered at two levels: before and after die bonding into the package,
and the existing functional test methods are quite applicable to testing before integration (checking directly on the wafer). The test after die bonding into the package
are needed to detect potential hardware Trojans .
In conclusion, hardware Trojans is a relevant research topic that has gained considerable attention over the last decade and allowed the researches to make a significant
progress in this area. However, in the course of this research, many unstudied problems were identified, on which the work of scientists and security professionals
should be intensified.
References
1. M. Rostami, F. Koushanfar, R. Karri, A primer on hardware security: models. Methods Metr.
102(8), 1283–1287 (2014)
2. S. Skorobogatov, Hardware assurance and its importance to national security (2012), http://
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/sps32/secnews.html
3. A.I. Belous, V.A. Solodukha, S.V. Shvedov, Software and hardware Trojans—implementation methods and methods of counteraction, in The First Technical Encyclopedia, vol. 2.
(TECHNOSPHERE, Moscow, 2018), 688 p. ISBN 978-5-94836-524-4
4. 112th Congress, Inquiry into counterfeit electronic parts in the department of defense supply
chain, Senate Report of the Committee on Armed Services (2012)
5. J. Grand, J. Applebaum, C. Tarnovsky. «Smart» parking meter implementations, globalism,
you aka meter maids eat their young (2009), https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-17/dc17-presentations/defcon-17-grandappelbaum-tarnovsky-smart_parking.pdf
6. My Arduino can beat up your hotel room lock (2012), http://demoseen.com/bhpaper.html
7. A. Huang Hacking the PIC 18F1320 (2007), http://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?page_i
d=40
4 Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
fabrication stage. There are few papers that discuss cases when Trojans are inserted
during the specification design, electronic design automation tools, and packaging
process.
Researchers have proposed several new, previously unknown types of hardware
Trojans. Special attention should be paid to a new type of Trojans, which we called
“technological Trojans.” For example, Trojans which radically accelerate aging of
one or a few IC components were described [262]. Such Trojans created with additional doping of one of the areas of the fabricated die surface are more invisible since
they do not introduce additional circuitry into the original structure. As of the date
of publication of this book, it is not possible to detect such “technological Trojans.”
As is known, the desire to use a larger number of transistors, as well as to unite a
larger number of functions in the IC, leads to the adoption of 3D integrated circuit
technology. New 3D ICs can change the current circuit architecture and IC supply
chain and can result in emergence of new threats related to hardware Trojans. Thus,
additional attack models should be developed for 3D ICs. We assume that the countermeasures known for two-dimensional ICs can also be adapted for three-dimensional
ICs.
The authors [259] believe that the Trojan detection approaches based on functional
tests must be considered at two levels: before and after die bonding into the package,
and the existing functional test methods are quite applicable to testing before integration (checking directly on the wafer). The test after die bonding into the package
are needed to detect potential hardware Trojans .
In conclusion, hardware Trojans is a relevant research topic that has gained considerable attention over the last decade and allowed the researches to make a significant
progress in this area. However, in the course of this research, many unstudied problems were identified, on which the work of scientists and security professionals
should be intensified.
References
1. M. Rostami, F. Koushanfar, R. Karri, A primer on hardware security: models. Methods Metr.
102(8), 1283–1287 (2014)
2. S. Skorobogatov, Hardware assurance and its importance to national security (2012), http://
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/sps32/secnews.html
3. A.I. Belous, V.A. Solodukha, S.V. Shvedov, Software and hardware Trojans—implementation methods and methods of counteraction, in The First Technical Encyclopedia, vol. 2.
(TECHNOSPHERE, Moscow, 2018), 688 p. ISBN 978-5-94836-524-4
4. 112th Congress, Inquiry into counterfeit electronic parts in the department of defense supply
chain, Senate Report of the Committee on Armed Services (2012)
5. J. Grand, J. Applebaum, C. Tarnovsky. «Smart» parking meter implementations, globalism,
you aka meter maids eat their young (2009), https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-17/dc17-presentations/defcon-17-grandappelbaum-tarnovsky-smart_parking.pdf
6. My Arduino can beat up your hotel room lock (2012), http://demoseen.com/bhpaper.html
7. A. Huang Hacking the PIC 18F1320 (2007), http://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?page_i
d=40