4.11 Analytical Review of Basic Techniques …
433
4.11.5.3 Hardware Trojans in Three-Dimensional Integrated Circuits
As demands accelerate for increasing density, higher bandwidths, and lower power,
many IC developers are gradually adopting a technology of three-dimensional integrated circuits with through-silicon vias (TSVs). Developers of 3D ICs promise to
combine not only CMOS components in one chip, but also elements that perform nonstandard functions (more than Moore principle). The multitude of functional elements
with a small area provides simultaneous increase in productivity and cost reduction. Three-dimensional IC packages may accommodate multiple dies of different
materials (silicon and helium arsenide) at different process nodes [313].
From a security standpoint, the new development flow for 3D ICs requires a new
supply chain ecosystem, which also provides new opportunities for hardware Trojan
attacks. Since this technology provides for integration of multiple dies fabricated
at different foundries integrated into one package, trusted and untrusted foundries
are involved in the 3D IC manufacturing process. As a result, there are new threat
models for 3D IC Trojan insertion: some dies are from trusted foundries, while
some are not. A complete threat model for hardware Trojan attack is required to
include the Trojan insertion in such 3D IC. Additionally, the integration process
of multiple dies introduces many more intermediate steps, such as die stacking and
TVS bonding, compared to conventional single-die IC fabrication. This also provides
new opportunities for an attacker to insert hardware Trojans. For example, a totally
new phenomenon is a malicious modification of TSV. Recently, Hasan et al. [314]
proposed a kind of hardware Trojan that utilizes the unique structure of 3D ICs.
Three-dimensional ICs suffer from high temperatures in their middle tiers due to a
long heat dissipation path, which can result in significant delays. This feature can
easily be used to trigger the relevant Trojan. The proposed technique just uses the
thermal effect of middle tiers in 3D ICs to trigger a Trojan. It can be eliminated with
the progress of heat dissipation in such 3D ICs. Apart from research of this Trojan
trigger, more research on hardware Trojans in 3D ICs is needed.
4.11.6 Prospects for the Development of Trojan Detection
Methods
In this section, we consider the main directions for further research of hardware
Trojans, proposed in [259].
4.11.6.1 Authentication of Commercial Chips Purchased at the Market
The commercial off-the-shelf components (COTS) become a significant threat to
many critical systems, but as of the moment of publication of this book, unfortunately,
very few papers focus on this issue. Basically, there might be two possible ways to
433
4.11.5.3 Hardware Trojans in Three-Dimensional Integrated Circuits
As demands accelerate for increasing density, higher bandwidths, and lower power,
many IC developers are gradually adopting a technology of three-dimensional integrated circuits with through-silicon vias (TSVs). Developers of 3D ICs promise to
combine not only CMOS components in one chip, but also elements that perform nonstandard functions (more than Moore principle). The multitude of functional elements
with a small area provides simultaneous increase in productivity and cost reduction. Three-dimensional IC packages may accommodate multiple dies of different
materials (silicon and helium arsenide) at different process nodes [313].
From a security standpoint, the new development flow for 3D ICs requires a new
supply chain ecosystem, which also provides new opportunities for hardware Trojan
attacks. Since this technology provides for integration of multiple dies fabricated
at different foundries integrated into one package, trusted and untrusted foundries
are involved in the 3D IC manufacturing process. As a result, there are new threat
models for 3D IC Trojan insertion: some dies are from trusted foundries, while
some are not. A complete threat model for hardware Trojan attack is required to
include the Trojan insertion in such 3D IC. Additionally, the integration process
of multiple dies introduces many more intermediate steps, such as die stacking and
TVS bonding, compared to conventional single-die IC fabrication. This also provides
new opportunities for an attacker to insert hardware Trojans. For example, a totally
new phenomenon is a malicious modification of TSV. Recently, Hasan et al. [314]
proposed a kind of hardware Trojan that utilizes the unique structure of 3D ICs.
Three-dimensional ICs suffer from high temperatures in their middle tiers due to a
long heat dissipation path, which can result in significant delays. This feature can
easily be used to trigger the relevant Trojan. The proposed technique just uses the
thermal effect of middle tiers in 3D ICs to trigger a Trojan. It can be eliminated with
the progress of heat dissipation in such 3D ICs. Apart from research of this Trojan
trigger, more research on hardware Trojans in 3D ICs is needed.
4.11.6 Prospects for the Development of Trojan Detection
Methods
In this section, we consider the main directions for further research of hardware
Trojans, proposed in [259].
4.11.6.1 Authentication of Commercial Chips Purchased at the Market
The commercial off-the-shelf components (COTS) become a significant threat to
many critical systems, but as of the moment of publication of this book, unfortunately,
very few papers focus on this issue. Basically, there might be two possible ways to