430
4 Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
4.11.5 Hardware Trojan Detection Techniques
for Commercial Chips
4.11.5.1 Hardware Trojan Detection in Commercial Chips
The threat model for commercially available components (model D) is presented
in Sect. 4.11.4. Cheaper commercial components have also been deployed in many
critical systems for military, financial, and transportation applications. As governments of countries around the world attempt to cut costs, the defense budget is
decreasing too. This was reflected in electronic components [309]. So, one article
from CISCO Systems reports that “the frequency of use of commercial off-the-shelf
components, rather than highly specialized military components, has increased.”
This article also gave some examples of the procurement of such components for
military equipment. In 2004, the torpedo-boat destroyer Pinckney (USA) became the
first Aegis class destroyer to be completely outfitted with COTS-based technology,
replacing all military-specific computers used previously [310]. The Royal Netherlands Army was the first to employ the Theatre Independent Tactical Army and Air
Force Network (TITAAN) that is completely based on COTS software and hardware
components [310]. Koch and Rodosek [311] highlight not only the tendency of using
COTS products in recent armament projects but also the security of COTS components including the problem of Trojan insertion. The Australian Military Forces are
planned to procure and use a large number of COTS electronic components within
their systems [Beaumont et al. 312]. This situation also happens in other countries.
Ten years ago, only 20% of components in a military system are commercial off-theshelf components, but nowadays, the situation has changed significantly. At the end
of 2016, around 80% of components were COTS, and the percentage can approach
100% in the near future. The commercial off-the-shelf components are widely used
in today’s systems for several reasons:
• Lower cost because of massive production;
• Higher in quality and performance due to pressure of competition in the market;
• They are often viewed as more reliable when compared to custom-built chips due
to their massive production;
• Easier replacement due to their availability in the market.
Although commercial off-the-shelf components have apparent advantages and
they can meet rigorous qualification requirements and prove their reliability under
harsh environmental conditions, security of the COTS component is still a major
concern, especially for security-critical applications. As a rule, commercial off-theshelf components are procured in a global market. The presence of a large number of
manufacturers makes it almost impossible to obtain information about the features
of their design and manufacture. Therefore, the users should take into account the
risks of hardware Trojan attacks if they use commercial off-the-shelf components in
their critical systems.
4 Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
4.11.5 Hardware Trojan Detection Techniques
for Commercial Chips
4.11.5.1 Hardware Trojan Detection in Commercial Chips
The threat model for commercially available components (model D) is presented
in Sect. 4.11.4. Cheaper commercial components have also been deployed in many
critical systems for military, financial, and transportation applications. As governments of countries around the world attempt to cut costs, the defense budget is
decreasing too. This was reflected in electronic components [309]. So, one article
from CISCO Systems reports that “the frequency of use of commercial off-the-shelf
components, rather than highly specialized military components, has increased.”
This article also gave some examples of the procurement of such components for
military equipment. In 2004, the torpedo-boat destroyer Pinckney (USA) became the
first Aegis class destroyer to be completely outfitted with COTS-based technology,
replacing all military-specific computers used previously [310]. The Royal Netherlands Army was the first to employ the Theatre Independent Tactical Army and Air
Force Network (TITAAN) that is completely based on COTS software and hardware
components [310]. Koch and Rodosek [311] highlight not only the tendency of using
COTS products in recent armament projects but also the security of COTS components including the problem of Trojan insertion. The Australian Military Forces are
planned to procure and use a large number of COTS electronic components within
their systems [Beaumont et al. 312]. This situation also happens in other countries.
Ten years ago, only 20% of components in a military system are commercial off-theshelf components, but nowadays, the situation has changed significantly. At the end
of 2016, around 80% of components were COTS, and the percentage can approach
100% in the near future. The commercial off-the-shelf components are widely used
in today’s systems for several reasons:
• Lower cost because of massive production;
• Higher in quality and performance due to pressure of competition in the market;
• They are often viewed as more reliable when compared to custom-built chips due
to their massive production;
• Easier replacement due to their availability in the market.
Although commercial off-the-shelf components have apparent advantages and
they can meet rigorous qualification requirements and prove their reliability under
harsh environmental conditions, security of the COTS component is still a major
concern, especially for security-critical applications. As a rule, commercial off-theshelf components are procured in a global market. The presence of a large number of
manufacturers makes it almost impossible to obtain information about the features
of their design and manufacture. Therefore, the users should take into account the
risks of hardware Trojan attacks if they use commercial off-the-shelf components in
their critical systems.