4.7 Case Study of the Development …
373
Indeed, in order to heat up the FPGA, a significant heat output is required. But in
the end, the digital data streams for each of the considered designs of microcircuits,
which increased due to the operation of the Trojans, absolutely corresponded to the
power values for the original reference design, and each Trojan was very well hidden
from “hunter” researchers in both the source code and the test check of the device in
operation.
Perhaps that is why this team of researchers [156] placed first in the competition
(CSAW 2008).
Summarizing this section, it is necessary to note the obvious fact that various
security vulnerabilities in the IC supply chain keep increasing as average consumers
and government organizations, including NASA and the US Department of Defense,
increase their dependence on foreign ICs. The above separate results of the competition at the CSAW 2008 conference at the NYU Polytechnical Institute considered
such hazards by analyzing possible hardware hacking methods of any system that
clearly showed the obvious security defects of such an IC supply chain system.
4.8 Peculiarities of the Introduction of Hardware Trojans
in Passive Radio Frequency Identification Tags
4.8.1 Introduction to the Problem
The dangers of introducing Trojans today are confirmed not only by “military,” but
by “non-military” microcircuits.
Let’s consider the main problems associated with the hardware Trojan in commercial passive radio frequency (RFID) tags EPC C1G2, namely, we study the features
of the process of inserting a malicious circuit into RFID tags EPC GEN2. To do this,
you need to implement several different hardware Trojans and evaluate the features
of their behavior in the EPC GEN2 environment using a custom tag emulator based
on a gate matrix programmed by a user (FPGA).
In recent years, the use of EPC C1G2 tags has increased significantly. This technology is used in such popular applications as control of access to buildings (personal
identification systems, electronic passes); collection of fees for services, facilities,
and components of air liners; and identification of people and animals. Malicious
circuits in such devices can act like a time-delay bomb that can be activated at any
time to neutralize any RFID-based system. Hardware Trojans are malicious hardware
components, embedded by attackers into a chip in order to block or destroy a system
at some future point in time or to organize the leakage of confidential information.
Such a malicious circuit can be a big threat to government, commercial, financial, or
military institutions. Hardware Trojans are characterized by the triggering (i.e., the
mechanism that activates the circuit), useful load (i.e., the circuit operation), and the
insertion phase (at which point in the manufacture of an IC an additional feature is
installed).
373
Indeed, in order to heat up the FPGA, a significant heat output is required. But in
the end, the digital data streams for each of the considered designs of microcircuits,
which increased due to the operation of the Trojans, absolutely corresponded to the
power values for the original reference design, and each Trojan was very well hidden
from “hunter” researchers in both the source code and the test check of the device in
operation.
Perhaps that is why this team of researchers [156] placed first in the competition
(CSAW 2008).
Summarizing this section, it is necessary to note the obvious fact that various
security vulnerabilities in the IC supply chain keep increasing as average consumers
and government organizations, including NASA and the US Department of Defense,
increase their dependence on foreign ICs. The above separate results of the competition at the CSAW 2008 conference at the NYU Polytechnical Institute considered
such hazards by analyzing possible hardware hacking methods of any system that
clearly showed the obvious security defects of such an IC supply chain system.
4.8 Peculiarities of the Introduction of Hardware Trojans
in Passive Radio Frequency Identification Tags
4.8.1 Introduction to the Problem
The dangers of introducing Trojans today are confirmed not only by “military,” but
by “non-military” microcircuits.
Let’s consider the main problems associated with the hardware Trojan in commercial passive radio frequency (RFID) tags EPC C1G2, namely, we study the features
of the process of inserting a malicious circuit into RFID tags EPC GEN2. To do this,
you need to implement several different hardware Trojans and evaluate the features
of their behavior in the EPC GEN2 environment using a custom tag emulator based
on a gate matrix programmed by a user (FPGA).
In recent years, the use of EPC C1G2 tags has increased significantly. This technology is used in such popular applications as control of access to buildings (personal
identification systems, electronic passes); collection of fees for services, facilities,
and components of air liners; and identification of people and animals. Malicious
circuits in such devices can act like a time-delay bomb that can be activated at any
time to neutralize any RFID-based system. Hardware Trojans are malicious hardware
components, embedded by attackers into a chip in order to block or destroy a system
at some future point in time or to organize the leakage of confidential information.
Such a malicious circuit can be a big threat to government, commercial, financial, or
military institutions. Hardware Trojans are characterized by the triggering (i.e., the
mechanism that activates the circuit), useful load (i.e., the circuit operation), and the
insertion phase (at which point in the manufacture of an IC an additional feature is
installed).