4.6 Methods of Detecting Hardware Trojans …
339
processor, for example, into a router, will lead to the modification of the infrastructure
itself, which will later serve as the basis for attacks at the network level.
It is obvious that hardware Trojans have become a serious problem for the security
of information systems. Below we describe the brief evolutionary history of Trojans
since 2005, when the US Department of Defense published the first report on the
supply of unreliable semiconductors [162], until today.
For example, in 2005, the US Department of Defense published one of the first
reports on the security of high-performance integrated circuit supplies [162]. In this
report, ministry experts analyzed the concept of a vertical business model used to
meet the ever-increasing demand for safe and genuine reliable hardware. This report
stated that the microcircuit production for purely financial reasons at the beginning
of the twenty-first century was moved to low-salary countries. There was, therefore,
a risk for manufacturers to introduce additional functions not provided for by the
developer in microcircuits at the production stage. In the context of the safety report,
this was worded as follows:
“Reliability (credibility) includes the belief that secret or critical information for
the final mission will not be disclosed, reliability will not be reduced, and undesirable structural elements will not be introduced into microcircuits as a result of
development or manufacture in conditions of potential vulnerability to hostile agents.
The confidence in the safe condition of integrated circuits after production cannot
be ensured; electrical tests and even their reproduction (re-engineering) cannot
guarantee the detection of undesirable changes in military integrated circuits.”
Since the production was moved to the territory of “potential adversaries,” the US
Department of Defense considered that in the event of war it would be impossible to
ensure the supply of necessary semiconductors. In this regard, in 2007, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched the first research project
on the reliability of integrated circuits (TIC) [160]. The task of TIC was to develop
such innovative technologies that could ensure the reliability of microcircuits in the
absence of a trusted manufacturer. The TIC project dealt exclusively with technical
activities related to the production of application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)
by enterprises not considered reliable, as well as software application of custom
hardware, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).
Work [22] was the impetus for the emergence of this stream of publications,
although it only mentioned the threat of hardware Trojans.
From the analysis of literature data, it follows that 2008 was the year when this
topic heightened interest of the academic community. The Australian Ministry of
Defense was one of the first to consider this issue and published a report on methods
to combat hardware Trojans, assessing the effectiveness of such a combat [192].
339
processor, for example, into a router, will lead to the modification of the infrastructure
itself, which will later serve as the basis for attacks at the network level.
It is obvious that hardware Trojans have become a serious problem for the security
of information systems. Below we describe the brief evolutionary history of Trojans
since 2005, when the US Department of Defense published the first report on the
supply of unreliable semiconductors [162], until today.
For example, in 2005, the US Department of Defense published one of the first
reports on the security of high-performance integrated circuit supplies [162]. In this
report, ministry experts analyzed the concept of a vertical business model used to
meet the ever-increasing demand for safe and genuine reliable hardware. This report
stated that the microcircuit production for purely financial reasons at the beginning
of the twenty-first century was moved to low-salary countries. There was, therefore,
a risk for manufacturers to introduce additional functions not provided for by the
developer in microcircuits at the production stage. In the context of the safety report,
this was worded as follows:
“Reliability (credibility) includes the belief that secret or critical information for
the final mission will not be disclosed, reliability will not be reduced, and undesirable structural elements will not be introduced into microcircuits as a result of
development or manufacture in conditions of potential vulnerability to hostile agents.
The confidence in the safe condition of integrated circuits after production cannot
be ensured; electrical tests and even their reproduction (re-engineering) cannot
guarantee the detection of undesirable changes in military integrated circuits.”
Since the production was moved to the territory of “potential adversaries,” the US
Department of Defense considered that in the event of war it would be impossible to
ensure the supply of necessary semiconductors. In this regard, in 2007, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched the first research project
on the reliability of integrated circuits (TIC) [160]. The task of TIC was to develop
such innovative technologies that could ensure the reliability of microcircuits in the
absence of a trusted manufacturer. The TIC project dealt exclusively with technical
activities related to the production of application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)
by enterprises not considered reliable, as well as software application of custom
hardware, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).
Work [22] was the impetus for the emergence of this stream of publications,
although it only mentioned the threat of hardware Trojans.
From the analysis of literature data, it follows that 2008 was the year when this
topic heightened interest of the academic community. The Australian Ministry of
Defense was one of the first to consider this issue and published a report on methods
to combat hardware Trojans, assessing the effectiveness of such a combat [192].