284
4 Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
North Korean “military hackers” picked from students of technical universities of
North Korea.
In one of the further sections of this chapter, we will focus on the specifics of this
contest and the technical results obtained by the winning teams.
4.1.2 Evaluation of Security of the Microcircuit Design Flow
Stages
Figure 4.6 shows the standard sequence (chain) of stages of creating prototypes of
modern microcircuits. This chain can be regionally distributed across the world [8,
13]; in this case, due to global trends of changes in IC design, production, and delivery,
this chain will be more exposed to emergence of new security problems of the end
equipment. IC design includes the use of IP-cores development by third-party design
centers, independent development of certain components by the company itself,
integration of both components into a single system, and creation of the IC topology.
The design project (written, for example, in the GDSII language of the topological
format) is then sent to the semiconductor production, which develops a costly mask
and manufactures the IC. This resulting IC is then often tested at the production site
of the manufacturer, frequently using third-party measuring equipment. During the
final stage, serviceable ICs are assembled in packages and soldered to boards. This
chain includes too many vulnerable points where something can go wrong.
There are various possible hardware-based hazard levels.
First of all, this includes system design: forged and low-quality components can
be introduced in the design cycle [14, 54, 61, 90].
Analysis of the sequential chain of design and manufacturing shows the following
options for possible actions by the intruder:
• Hardware Trojans: The intruder’s agent, being located either in the design center
or at the semiconductor production facility, can easily introduce separate malicious
elements into the IC design or arbitrarily modify the existing original functional
circuits.
• Violation of IP copyrights and fraud and speculative activities involving ICs: The
user of IP blocks or the fraudulent semiconductor production plant can illegally
violate IP copyright without knowledge of or consent from the developer. In
particular, such fraudulent semiconductor plant can manufacture more ICs than
required and sell the excess ICs in the gray market.
• Reverse engineering: The attacker can perform reverse engineering of the IC
structure or a separate IP block at any desired abstraction level. After that, the
intruder can use the modified IP again or even improve it on condition of sufficient
qualification.
• Analysis of side channels (technical channels of data leakage): The intruder can
extract secret information using measured physical parameters of microcircuits
(power consumption or electromagnetic radiation).
4 Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
North Korean “military hackers” picked from students of technical universities of
North Korea.
In one of the further sections of this chapter, we will focus on the specifics of this
contest and the technical results obtained by the winning teams.
4.1.2 Evaluation of Security of the Microcircuit Design Flow
Stages
Figure 4.6 shows the standard sequence (chain) of stages of creating prototypes of
modern microcircuits. This chain can be regionally distributed across the world [8,
13]; in this case, due to global trends of changes in IC design, production, and delivery,
this chain will be more exposed to emergence of new security problems of the end
equipment. IC design includes the use of IP-cores development by third-party design
centers, independent development of certain components by the company itself,
integration of both components into a single system, and creation of the IC topology.
The design project (written, for example, in the GDSII language of the topological
format) is then sent to the semiconductor production, which develops a costly mask
and manufactures the IC. This resulting IC is then often tested at the production site
of the manufacturer, frequently using third-party measuring equipment. During the
final stage, serviceable ICs are assembled in packages and soldered to boards. This
chain includes too many vulnerable points where something can go wrong.
There are various possible hardware-based hazard levels.
First of all, this includes system design: forged and low-quality components can
be introduced in the design cycle [14, 54, 61, 90].
Analysis of the sequential chain of design and manufacturing shows the following
options for possible actions by the intruder:
• Hardware Trojans: The intruder’s agent, being located either in the design center
or at the semiconductor production facility, can easily introduce separate malicious
elements into the IC design or arbitrarily modify the existing original functional
circuits.
• Violation of IP copyrights and fraud and speculative activities involving ICs: The
user of IP blocks or the fraudulent semiconductor production plant can illegally
violate IP copyright without knowledge of or consent from the developer. In
particular, such fraudulent semiconductor plant can manufacture more ICs than
required and sell the excess ICs in the gray market.
• Reverse engineering: The attacker can perform reverse engineering of the IC
structure or a separate IP block at any desired abstraction level. After that, the
intruder can use the modified IP again or even improve it on condition of sufficient
qualification.
• Analysis of side channels (technical channels of data leakage): The intruder can
extract secret information using measured physical parameters of microcircuits
(power consumption or electromagnetic radiation).