1.7 Cybersecurity of Power Facilities: Past, Present, and Future
85
process control system. Obviously, such prohibition never confuses a violator as the
abovementioned operation “Olympic Games” demonstrates.
“Dual control” is arranged: one and the same function is being performed by
two methods. For example, if violators manage to overcome protection at microcontrollers level, there is anticipated complementary emergency disaster protection at
“unconditional logic” level.
At critically essential technological equipment there is mechanical protection
anticipated: should electronic protection systems fail then mechanics shall operate.
There are also monitored control activities passing from microcontrollers to detectors.
As it was noted hereinbefore, the major objective to assuring safety of nuclear
power plant is taking efficient measures targeted at preventing severe accidents and
protecting of the staff and human population at the cost of preventing radioactive
substances release into environment under all circumstances.
Presently general term “security” applies mainly to safety of nuclear installations,
radiation security, safety at handling radioactive wastes, freighting of radioactive
substances, and does not involve safety aspects not related directly to radiation [4–7].
Meanwhile in modern energy industry protection and control of nuclear power
plant are provided due to the advanced information technologies created on the basis
of digital computer hardware. Computerized systems, smart devices, programmable
controllers appear to replace analogue systems and mechanical switches involved in
the major technological processes of nuclear power plants’ monitoring and control,
management of physical protection systems, management of nuclear radiation
operation medium state and environment, etc.
Acute importance of computer systems to control processes at nuclear power
plants calls for appropriates approaches to organizing their protection which is
strengthened in connection with sensible increase in the number of cyberattacks
and severity of their consequences at these systems.
To assure secure operation of and reliable operation of nuclear power plant, it
essential to detect in due time manner followed with prevention of subversions
and stealth in relation to crucial facilities of nuclear power plants which may be
perpetrated by a person (violator) or a group of persons using the information
about crucially relevant assets of a nuclear power plant. In compliance with the
data obtained there are planned time and possibility of attacks which appear to be
practically unpredictable.
Here the main sources of hazards and threats in relation to the facilities of nuclear
power plants shall be the following factors of anthropogenic nature:
– Criminal activities by terrorists, subversion groups, special services of potential
adversary, and individuals against facilities of nuclear power plant (NPP) and
staff;
– Activities of foreign intelligence and special services on acquisition of the relevant
data in the sphere of nuclear energy;
– Violation of fixed routine regulation for data gathering, processing, and transmission;
– Hazardous improper activities and unintentional mistakes of the personnel;
85
process control system. Obviously, such prohibition never confuses a violator as the
abovementioned operation “Olympic Games” demonstrates.
“Dual control” is arranged: one and the same function is being performed by
two methods. For example, if violators manage to overcome protection at microcontrollers level, there is anticipated complementary emergency disaster protection at
“unconditional logic” level.
At critically essential technological equipment there is mechanical protection
anticipated: should electronic protection systems fail then mechanics shall operate.
There are also monitored control activities passing from microcontrollers to detectors.
As it was noted hereinbefore, the major objective to assuring safety of nuclear
power plant is taking efficient measures targeted at preventing severe accidents and
protecting of the staff and human population at the cost of preventing radioactive
substances release into environment under all circumstances.
Presently general term “security” applies mainly to safety of nuclear installations,
radiation security, safety at handling radioactive wastes, freighting of radioactive
substances, and does not involve safety aspects not related directly to radiation [4–7].
Meanwhile in modern energy industry protection and control of nuclear power
plant are provided due to the advanced information technologies created on the basis
of digital computer hardware. Computerized systems, smart devices, programmable
controllers appear to replace analogue systems and mechanical switches involved in
the major technological processes of nuclear power plants’ monitoring and control,
management of physical protection systems, management of nuclear radiation
operation medium state and environment, etc.
Acute importance of computer systems to control processes at nuclear power
plants calls for appropriates approaches to organizing their protection which is
strengthened in connection with sensible increase in the number of cyberattacks
and severity of their consequences at these systems.
To assure secure operation of and reliable operation of nuclear power plant, it
essential to detect in due time manner followed with prevention of subversions
and stealth in relation to crucial facilities of nuclear power plants which may be
perpetrated by a person (violator) or a group of persons using the information
about crucially relevant assets of a nuclear power plant. In compliance with the
data obtained there are planned time and possibility of attacks which appear to be
practically unpredictable.
Here the main sources of hazards and threats in relation to the facilities of nuclear
power plants shall be the following factors of anthropogenic nature:
– Criminal activities by terrorists, subversion groups, special services of potential
adversary, and individuals against facilities of nuclear power plant (NPP) and
staff;
– Activities of foreign intelligence and special services on acquisition of the relevant
data in the sphere of nuclear energy;
– Violation of fixed routine regulation for data gathering, processing, and transmission;
– Hazardous improper activities and unintentional mistakes of the personnel;