1.7 Cybersecurity of Power Facilities: Past, Present, and Future
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about global stability, then it is appropriate to elaborate and approve an international
convention which would tackle at global level the issues of cyberterrorism
Presently no reliable procedures and tools exist able to identify the personalities
of creators of malicious program or even their geographical location (the so-called
attribution problem). Thus the first software virus which was able to go beyond the
digital “world” and to put out of operation real facilities as it is assumed, may be
created by a group of highly competent pros whose activities are sponsored and
approved by a sovereign state. By experts’ estimation development of such virus
being done by a team composing of 5–10 pros will take around 6 months. Besides,
identification of the persons employed at the companies of nuclear industry of Iran
and subsequent contacting them to gain access to control systems of the facilities
were patronized perhaps by security services. Also the experts are of the opinion
that the virus created prior to its operational employment should have been tested at
a kind of specially made test area where systems and conditions in use specifically
at Natanz enrichment complex and/or some fictitious Siemens-based Technological
Process Automated Control were simulated. Within such test area, there could have
been fabricated basically identical copies of Iranian spinners the parameters of which
the virus was adapted to.
Emerging of Stuxnet has marked a new epoch of cyberarms race and gadgeteers
who were making viruses just for fun, and then cybercriminals extorting or
stealing money have been replaced by folks perceiving any information systems as
battlefields.
Considering deployment of information systems in everyday human activities
constantly increases, total computerization of the control at various facilities of the
infrastructure (including critical facilities of nuclear industry), similar cyberstrikes
in the near future are inevitably going to become quite dangerous and commonplace.
Spectrum of cyberthreats jeopardizing the facilities of critical infrastructure of
nuclear industry is rather broad and may incorporate:
• Sabotage, i.e., exposure of Automated Process Control System with introduction
of alterations to immediate running of the facility with bringing it out of the
operation;
• Espionage activities, i.e., intrusion into corporate networks of the companies and
stealth of the sensitive documents constituting commercial\state secrets with their
further use or extortion of ransom for waiver of their use;
• Simulation of cyberattack with simultaneous latent impact at the facility of critical
infrastructure;
• Terrorist attack (or hostile act on the part of the state) pertinent to damaging not
only the facility, but to surrounding area and/or local community.
The list as above is limited only by level of understanding of technical processes
and impact methods to influence them on the part of the violators or a gang of
violators and also amounts of sponsorships and dates of cyberattack preparation and
therefore it makes very much sense to be prepared for uncommon and sophisticated
threats and challenges.
79
about global stability, then it is appropriate to elaborate and approve an international
convention which would tackle at global level the issues of cyberterrorism
Presently no reliable procedures and tools exist able to identify the personalities
of creators of malicious program or even their geographical location (the so-called
attribution problem). Thus the first software virus which was able to go beyond the
digital “world” and to put out of operation real facilities as it is assumed, may be
created by a group of highly competent pros whose activities are sponsored and
approved by a sovereign state. By experts’ estimation development of such virus
being done by a team composing of 5–10 pros will take around 6 months. Besides,
identification of the persons employed at the companies of nuclear industry of Iran
and subsequent contacting them to gain access to control systems of the facilities
were patronized perhaps by security services. Also the experts are of the opinion
that the virus created prior to its operational employment should have been tested at
a kind of specially made test area where systems and conditions in use specifically
at Natanz enrichment complex and/or some fictitious Siemens-based Technological
Process Automated Control were simulated. Within such test area, there could have
been fabricated basically identical copies of Iranian spinners the parameters of which
the virus was adapted to.
Emerging of Stuxnet has marked a new epoch of cyberarms race and gadgeteers
who were making viruses just for fun, and then cybercriminals extorting or
stealing money have been replaced by folks perceiving any information systems as
battlefields.
Considering deployment of information systems in everyday human activities
constantly increases, total computerization of the control at various facilities of the
infrastructure (including critical facilities of nuclear industry), similar cyberstrikes
in the near future are inevitably going to become quite dangerous and commonplace.
Spectrum of cyberthreats jeopardizing the facilities of critical infrastructure of
nuclear industry is rather broad and may incorporate:
• Sabotage, i.e., exposure of Automated Process Control System with introduction
of alterations to immediate running of the facility with bringing it out of the
operation;
• Espionage activities, i.e., intrusion into corporate networks of the companies and
stealth of the sensitive documents constituting commercial\state secrets with their
further use or extortion of ransom for waiver of their use;
• Simulation of cyberattack with simultaneous latent impact at the facility of critical
infrastructure;
• Terrorist attack (or hostile act on the part of the state) pertinent to damaging not
only the facility, but to surrounding area and/or local community.
The list as above is limited only by level of understanding of technical processes
and impact methods to influence them on the part of the violators or a gang of
violators and also amounts of sponsorships and dates of cyberattack preparation and
therefore it makes very much sense to be prepared for uncommon and sophisticated
threats and challenges.