evolve to a degree it can compete with the decentralized economic powers unleashed
by a globalized market—and if yes, whether it can do so in time (for a critique on
case study evidence for Ecological Modernization Theory see for example York
2004; for empirical findings that contradict assumptions of Modernization Theory
see York et al. 2003).
In contrast to Modernization Theory, Political Economy assesses economic
growth spawned by a competitive economy generally as harmful for the environment, which is regarded as a common good rather than a luxury good. From this
perspective, there are no sufficient incentives for private enterprises, dedicated
completely to the maximization of profits, to take care of the preservation of nature.
To stay competitive, they need to reinvest their returns as efficiently as possible,
which usually means to further expand business. An investment in sustainable
economic activities would lead to short-term market disadvantages, even if it
would pay off in the long term. This is why “firms tend to minimize, or even
undermine, progress on ecological goals” (Schnaiberg et al. 2000: 1). National
institutions are also interested in further economic growth as an increasing GDP
also means increasing income for the government, and therefore are unwilling or
unable to enforce striking regulations upon the private economy (Schnaiberg and
Gould 1994; Schnaiberg et al. 2000). Instead, they are expected to enact environmental laws of “primarily symbolic quality” (Newig 2007: 276) to serve civic
demands that may arise along with growing affluence which actually “manage rather
than resolve environmental problems” (ibid: 291, emphases in original).
We here have the opposite of classic Modernization Theory. Political Economy
assumes growth as generally problematic and is critical of the trusting idea that an
economy slanted towards expansion will develop sufficient protection features for its
nature, may it be alone or under the lead of political institutionalization. From this
perspective, the originators of environmental problems should be held accountable
for their actions. The hope that this will actually happen under the current political
circumstances is low, though.
However, Political Economy does not always impute to those in charge that they
do not realize or that they ignore the issue that increasing devastation of the
environment has negative effects on the well-being of mankind. In fact, some
theorists even impute something worse to them: To source out the local risks of
economic growth to lower-developed countries. Foster (2002: 60ff) shows some
evidence that such a process must not be understood as a sole side-effect of power
relations, but may be processed even on purpose.
According to the World System Theory, three types of countries exist: (1) Core
countries, which control the markets in this globalized world and use their power to
exploit the rest of the world (e.g. by importing resources while exporting waste or by
sourcing out the production of goods with a highly negative impact on nature when
not equipped with costly preservation arrangements), (2) semi-periphery countries,
which seek to catch up with those on top and therefore accept their rules, while
exploiting those countries with the least power in the global system themselves,
which are (3) the periphery countries that have no power and hence are forced to play
along with the economic rules that are imposed on them in the context of
Economy on Top, Nature on the Brink? A Closer Look on the Relationship Between. . .
203
by a globalized market—and if yes, whether it can do so in time (for a critique on
case study evidence for Ecological Modernization Theory see for example York
2004; for empirical findings that contradict assumptions of Modernization Theory
see York et al. 2003).
In contrast to Modernization Theory, Political Economy assesses economic
growth spawned by a competitive economy generally as harmful for the environment, which is regarded as a common good rather than a luxury good. From this
perspective, there are no sufficient incentives for private enterprises, dedicated
completely to the maximization of profits, to take care of the preservation of nature.
To stay competitive, they need to reinvest their returns as efficiently as possible,
which usually means to further expand business. An investment in sustainable
economic activities would lead to short-term market disadvantages, even if it
would pay off in the long term. This is why “firms tend to minimize, or even
undermine, progress on ecological goals” (Schnaiberg et al. 2000: 1). National
institutions are also interested in further economic growth as an increasing GDP
also means increasing income for the government, and therefore are unwilling or
unable to enforce striking regulations upon the private economy (Schnaiberg and
Gould 1994; Schnaiberg et al. 2000). Instead, they are expected to enact environmental laws of “primarily symbolic quality” (Newig 2007: 276) to serve civic
demands that may arise along with growing affluence which actually “manage rather
than resolve environmental problems” (ibid: 291, emphases in original).
We here have the opposite of classic Modernization Theory. Political Economy
assumes growth as generally problematic and is critical of the trusting idea that an
economy slanted towards expansion will develop sufficient protection features for its
nature, may it be alone or under the lead of political institutionalization. From this
perspective, the originators of environmental problems should be held accountable
for their actions. The hope that this will actually happen under the current political
circumstances is low, though.
However, Political Economy does not always impute to those in charge that they
do not realize or that they ignore the issue that increasing devastation of the
environment has negative effects on the well-being of mankind. In fact, some
theorists even impute something worse to them: To source out the local risks of
economic growth to lower-developed countries. Foster (2002: 60ff) shows some
evidence that such a process must not be understood as a sole side-effect of power
relations, but may be processed even on purpose.
According to the World System Theory, three types of countries exist: (1) Core
countries, which control the markets in this globalized world and use their power to
exploit the rest of the world (e.g. by importing resources while exporting waste or by
sourcing out the production of goods with a highly negative impact on nature when
not equipped with costly preservation arrangements), (2) semi-periphery countries,
which seek to catch up with those on top and therefore accept their rules, while
exploiting those countries with the least power in the global system themselves,
which are (3) the periphery countries that have no power and hence are forced to play
along with the economic rules that are imposed on them in the context of
Economy on Top, Nature on the Brink? A Closer Look on the Relationship Between. . .
203