anthropocentrism should shape one’s own set of environmental virtues. The spiralshaped combination of eudemonic-cultural values, strong sustainability, environmental virtues ethics and the recognition of unscientific, spiritual encounters with
nature could be described as “deep anthropocentrism”, being augmented by some
reasonable solution of the demarcation problem. Both TEV and ESS abstract away
the problem of virtues, but grounding existence value, cultural services, and bequest
value has to remove such abstraction.
6 Synthesis of Approaches: Between Cynicism
and Sentimentality
In this final section, the briefly presented value systems are examined under philosophical guidance. In particular, we will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of
the ESS and TEV with respect to axiological discourse about
environmental evaluations.
In the first instance, TEV and ESS open eyes for values and services of nature
which are hard to ignore by policy-makers. ESS values can be combined with TEV
values: The combination of provisioning services (ESS) with option value (TEV)
gives reason to conserve genes “in situ” (or as second-best solution in seed banks). In
such ways, ESS and TEV can enrich and refine the ethical pattern of arguments. TEV
and ESS can determine through opinion polls how groups of people actually benefit
from natural capital, and they can say this in the language of preferences, interests,
trade-offs and opportunity costs. Such parlance is “lingua Franca” in our commercialized world. TEV and ESS can also point to the many trade-offs in human-nature
interactions. Both TEV and ESS can be useful schematic tools designed to make the
values of nature visible to people with economic mindsets. However, people who
use these TEV and ESS tools should realize that such tools can also conceal and hide
deeper philosophical problems if they are regarded as ultimate ethical wisdom.
Deeper philosophical problems, such as (a) attribution and grounding of evaluations,
(b) the demarcation problem, (c) problems of distributive environmental justice
(comparative and absolute standard), (d) the problem of virtuous attitudes towards
nature are neither resolved by TEV nor by ESS. Both TEV and ESS point to the
interfaces between environmental ethics and environmental economics. Environmental ethics can and should learn from economic theory (and vice versa). Debates
at the interfaces are about discounting, compensation, replacement costs, replacement of functions and (“de re”) uniqueness of some special natural monuments (such
as Grand Canyon, Wadden Sea, Great Barrier Reef, Hardanger Vidda, Ladakalnis
and others). The TEV categories “option value” and “existence value” can and
should be implemented in the ethical argumentation patterns. The existence value
falls into the category of eudemonic values and also touches on the virtue-ethical
question of what kind of person one wants to be. In reflection, a preference for
existence of natural beings opens a path of deep questioning (sensu Naess) about
Environmental Evaluation between Economics and Ethics: An Argument for. . .
151
nature could be described as “deep anthropocentrism”, being augmented by some
reasonable solution of the demarcation problem. Both TEV and ESS abstract away
the problem of virtues, but grounding existence value, cultural services, and bequest
value has to remove such abstraction.
6 Synthesis of Approaches: Between Cynicism
and Sentimentality
In this final section, the briefly presented value systems are examined under philosophical guidance. In particular, we will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of
the ESS and TEV with respect to axiological discourse about
environmental evaluations.
In the first instance, TEV and ESS open eyes for values and services of nature
which are hard to ignore by policy-makers. ESS values can be combined with TEV
values: The combination of provisioning services (ESS) with option value (TEV)
gives reason to conserve genes “in situ” (or as second-best solution in seed banks). In
such ways, ESS and TEV can enrich and refine the ethical pattern of arguments. TEV
and ESS can determine through opinion polls how groups of people actually benefit
from natural capital, and they can say this in the language of preferences, interests,
trade-offs and opportunity costs. Such parlance is “lingua Franca” in our commercialized world. TEV and ESS can also point to the many trade-offs in human-nature
interactions. Both TEV and ESS can be useful schematic tools designed to make the
values of nature visible to people with economic mindsets. However, people who
use these TEV and ESS tools should realize that such tools can also conceal and hide
deeper philosophical problems if they are regarded as ultimate ethical wisdom.
Deeper philosophical problems, such as (a) attribution and grounding of evaluations,
(b) the demarcation problem, (c) problems of distributive environmental justice
(comparative and absolute standard), (d) the problem of virtuous attitudes towards
nature are neither resolved by TEV nor by ESS. Both TEV and ESS point to the
interfaces between environmental ethics and environmental economics. Environmental ethics can and should learn from economic theory (and vice versa). Debates
at the interfaces are about discounting, compensation, replacement costs, replacement of functions and (“de re”) uniqueness of some special natural monuments (such
as Grand Canyon, Wadden Sea, Great Barrier Reef, Hardanger Vidda, Ladakalnis
and others). The TEV categories “option value” and “existence value” can and
should be implemented in the ethical argumentation patterns. The existence value
falls into the category of eudemonic values and also touches on the virtue-ethical
question of what kind of person one wants to be. In reflection, a preference for
existence of natural beings opens a path of deep questioning (sensu Naess) about
Environmental Evaluation between Economics and Ethics: An Argument for. . .
151