1 Introduction
There is no lack of approaches to the valuation of natural and semi-natural entities in
the context of environmental protection issues, especially with regard to biodiversity
on the different levels of genomes, populations, species, and ecosystems. With
reference to valuations, arguments are made for and against conservation, restoration, sustainable utilization, access and benefit sharing, and other ways of dealing
with such entities. Different, sometimes competing value systems are used, which
are based on different presuppositions, but nevertheless can overlap. In the following
article, some value systems (¼ schematized orderings of types of values) will be
subjected to a philosophical analysis, since the lack of systematic unification is a
deficit, and an analysis can contribute to a well-founded choice of a value system. A
systematic theoretical step towards conceptual unity and the clarification of the
respective presuppositions helps constructive exchange and can open the view to
more urgent political questions. This article is dedicated to a discussion of existing
approaches to valuation and evaluation and identifies avenues for possible synthesis.
The basic idea can be formulated as follows: Value systems are important tools
for the evaluative classification of complex issues. They are also part of a scientific
ideal of operationalizing concepts and often quantify value questions. Philosophical
considerations, however, have deeper questions of evaluation in mind and a desired
conceptual unity must systematically combine both practical considerations and
reflections on (sometimes oversimplified) presuppositions. In particular, philosophical reflections about the role of values in argumentation, judgement and decisionmaking, about different types of values and their relation to norms can provide
information about which functions value systems must be able to fulfil and which
criteria they should fulfil. This article analyses approaches to environmental evaluation and presents a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. It argues that a
comprehensive and integrated synthesis of existing approaches is within reach if
solutions to difficult philosophical problems related to valuation issues are
considered.
This article is structured as follows. In the first part, we discuss the axiological
concept of value and highlight the role of value systems in valuations and evaluations (Sect. 2). We then analyse various value systems that have been proposed in
various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences for mapping environmental
values. There is the Total Economic Value (TEV) scheme, the Ecosystem Service
(ESS) approach and various value systems designed in environmental ethics
(Rolston 1988; Kellert 1997; Krebs 1999; Muraca 2011; Ott 2010). TEV and ESS
are often seen as economic schemes, which gives them the general suspicion of
“neoliberal thinking” and the repugnant commercialisation of nature on the part of
some environmentalists. We will see under which conditions such accusations are
justified. While the TEV is clearly economic in scope and method (Sect. 3), the case
is more complex with regard to the ESS (Sect. 4). Both TEV and ESS are anthropocentric, while all value systems in environmental ethics pay attention to the
demarcation problem, considering inherent moral value for natural beings (Sect.
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K. Ott and K. C. Reinmuth
There is no lack of approaches to the valuation of natural and semi-natural entities in
the context of environmental protection issues, especially with regard to biodiversity
on the different levels of genomes, populations, species, and ecosystems. With
reference to valuations, arguments are made for and against conservation, restoration, sustainable utilization, access and benefit sharing, and other ways of dealing
with such entities. Different, sometimes competing value systems are used, which
are based on different presuppositions, but nevertheless can overlap. In the following
article, some value systems (¼ schematized orderings of types of values) will be
subjected to a philosophical analysis, since the lack of systematic unification is a
deficit, and an analysis can contribute to a well-founded choice of a value system. A
systematic theoretical step towards conceptual unity and the clarification of the
respective presuppositions helps constructive exchange and can open the view to
more urgent political questions. This article is dedicated to a discussion of existing
approaches to valuation and evaluation and identifies avenues for possible synthesis.
The basic idea can be formulated as follows: Value systems are important tools
for the evaluative classification of complex issues. They are also part of a scientific
ideal of operationalizing concepts and often quantify value questions. Philosophical
considerations, however, have deeper questions of evaluation in mind and a desired
conceptual unity must systematically combine both practical considerations and
reflections on (sometimes oversimplified) presuppositions. In particular, philosophical reflections about the role of values in argumentation, judgement and decisionmaking, about different types of values and their relation to norms can provide
information about which functions value systems must be able to fulfil and which
criteria they should fulfil. This article analyses approaches to environmental evaluation and presents a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. It argues that a
comprehensive and integrated synthesis of existing approaches is within reach if
solutions to difficult philosophical problems related to valuation issues are
considered.
This article is structured as follows. In the first part, we discuss the axiological
concept of value and highlight the role of value systems in valuations and evaluations (Sect. 2). We then analyse various value systems that have been proposed in
various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences for mapping environmental
values. There is the Total Economic Value (TEV) scheme, the Ecosystem Service
(ESS) approach and various value systems designed in environmental ethics
(Rolston 1988; Kellert 1997; Krebs 1999; Muraca 2011; Ott 2010). TEV and ESS
are often seen as economic schemes, which gives them the general suspicion of
“neoliberal thinking” and the repugnant commercialisation of nature on the part of
some environmentalists. We will see under which conditions such accusations are
justified. While the TEV is clearly economic in scope and method (Sect. 3), the case
is more complex with regard to the ESS (Sect. 4). Both TEV and ESS are anthropocentric, while all value systems in environmental ethics pay attention to the
demarcation problem, considering inherent moral value for natural beings (Sect.
130
K. Ott and K. C. Reinmuth