A central rule of the sustainability theory is the so-called Constant Nature Capital
Rule. The rules of the sustainability theory further consist of an investment rule,
which requires an investment in the improvement of scarce natural capital, and usage
rules, which concern the use of natural resources. The rules must be linked to
appropriate prescriptive guidelines (Ott and Döring 2008, 170). These serve as
bridging principles for the further specification of the CNCR and the other sustainability rules and can thus be interpreted as application principles: “These management rules can be used, albeit not in the sense of a strict derivation, to develop further
concretisations, such as quantified environmental targets. It is precisely from the fact
that evaluations are necessarily incorporated into the concretisation of the sustainability principle that the demand is justified for objectives and strategies to be
developed in transparent and open procedures” (SRU 2002, 67; translation by KCR).
In order to use the theory of strong sustainability to formulate the criteria for
moral evaluation, not only must the rules be formulated in such a way that further
rules can be inferred from them, but it must also be pointed out what are desirable
consequences and undesirable effects with respect to the theory. The rules of the
theory are not only a guide for action but also carry some notions about sustainability
targets, i.e. the targets which can be subsumed under the conservation-target.
Furthermore, the values of the theory are also relevant for the question as to what
ends are morally desired or what ends are morally good. As mentioned, if one
chooses such a moral system, one of the further problems is the problem of deriving
subgoals or specific ends from the moral system. One needs this step, since if one
wants to evaluate specific rule systems like an environmental code one can hardly
use a rough criterion with a demand for conserving biodiversity. Rather the criterion
needs a specification about what counts as ‘conserving biodiversity’ in the context of
the rule system at hand. But there are many indicators or so-called success criteria
and the discussion about the design and choice of adequate indicators is rather vivid.
I leave the problems of operationalisation of sustainability goals aside. Along with
that goes the problem of value clashing since often one has to satisfy different wishes
and one has to establish a hierarchical order of values. Rules fulfil a bridging
function (Baurmann et al. 2010). They provide guidance for actions that attempt to
integrate diverse values and to do justice to different values (see Ott/Reinmuth in this
volume for the role of values and norms in environmental evaluations). This also
makes it clear that the establishment of rules is associated with compromises and
trade-offs.
The evaluation of the moral quality of environmental regulations will be illustrated using an example: The German Fertiliser Ordinance (‘Düngeverordnung’).
The question of the section in its specific version is: How can the moral quality of the
German Fertiliser Ordinance be evaluated using the strong sustainability theory?
The Fertiliser Ordinance regulates fertilisation on agricultural land in Germany.
In Germany, fertilisation is regulated by a number of regulations, but the Fertiliser
Ordinance is particularly important. The Ordinance regulates when, where, what and
how fertilisers may be applied. Fertilisers are applied to about 50% of Germany’s
surface area. The requirements of the ordinance depend on the type of operation, the
type of fertiliser and the characteristics of the arable land. In principle, fertilisation
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K. C. Reinmuth
Rule. The rules of the sustainability theory further consist of an investment rule,
which requires an investment in the improvement of scarce natural capital, and usage
rules, which concern the use of natural resources. The rules must be linked to
appropriate prescriptive guidelines (Ott and Döring 2008, 170). These serve as
bridging principles for the further specification of the CNCR and the other sustainability rules and can thus be interpreted as application principles: “These management rules can be used, albeit not in the sense of a strict derivation, to develop further
concretisations, such as quantified environmental targets. It is precisely from the fact
that evaluations are necessarily incorporated into the concretisation of the sustainability principle that the demand is justified for objectives and strategies to be
developed in transparent and open procedures” (SRU 2002, 67; translation by KCR).
In order to use the theory of strong sustainability to formulate the criteria for
moral evaluation, not only must the rules be formulated in such a way that further
rules can be inferred from them, but it must also be pointed out what are desirable
consequences and undesirable effects with respect to the theory. The rules of the
theory are not only a guide for action but also carry some notions about sustainability
targets, i.e. the targets which can be subsumed under the conservation-target.
Furthermore, the values of the theory are also relevant for the question as to what
ends are morally desired or what ends are morally good. As mentioned, if one
chooses such a moral system, one of the further problems is the problem of deriving
subgoals or specific ends from the moral system. One needs this step, since if one
wants to evaluate specific rule systems like an environmental code one can hardly
use a rough criterion with a demand for conserving biodiversity. Rather the criterion
needs a specification about what counts as ‘conserving biodiversity’ in the context of
the rule system at hand. But there are many indicators or so-called success criteria
and the discussion about the design and choice of adequate indicators is rather vivid.
I leave the problems of operationalisation of sustainability goals aside. Along with
that goes the problem of value clashing since often one has to satisfy different wishes
and one has to establish a hierarchical order of values. Rules fulfil a bridging
function (Baurmann et al. 2010). They provide guidance for actions that attempt to
integrate diverse values and to do justice to different values (see Ott/Reinmuth in this
volume for the role of values and norms in environmental evaluations). This also
makes it clear that the establishment of rules is associated with compromises and
trade-offs.
The evaluation of the moral quality of environmental regulations will be illustrated using an example: The German Fertiliser Ordinance (‘Düngeverordnung’).
The question of the section in its specific version is: How can the moral quality of the
German Fertiliser Ordinance be evaluated using the strong sustainability theory?
The Fertiliser Ordinance regulates fertilisation on agricultural land in Germany.
In Germany, fertilisation is regulated by a number of regulations, but the Fertiliser
Ordinance is particularly important. The Ordinance regulates when, where, what and
how fertilisers may be applied. Fertilisers are applied to about 50% of Germany’s
surface area. The requirements of the ordinance depend on the type of operation, the
type of fertiliser and the characteristics of the arable land. In principle, fertilisation
120
K. C. Reinmuth