be used to solve environmental challenges? To answer these questions, we have to
evaluate rules.
If one wants to justify one’s actions one has to rely on the quality of the used
means. If a policy-making agent should use the right or good rules, then the agent has
to know what the right or good rules are. And if the agent knows what the right or
good rules are and sets these rules, she can justify her use of the rules accordingly.
Because we very often want a justification before acting we want to know whether
the means we can use are good. So, while one can measure the success of
implemented rule systems, we often want to know beforehand whether a rule system
satisfies the criteria and so could be used justifiably.
Since we have to evaluate rules for policy-making we need a theory of evaluation.
If rules are tools (von Hayek 2013), they will be evaluated like other tools, instruments or artefacts. So, we will use different criteria and for these criteria we will
consider the possible uses of the tools. The criteria for good or right rules can vary
enormously. And even if the criteria are fixed, a lot of effort is invested in the
question whether they are fulfilled by the rules. If the process of evaluation is
considered as a reasoning process, one can identify different criteria-related arguments. In these arguments we often rely on evidence for supporting the claim of the
argument. So, because our main evaluation objects are rules, we have specific
problems getting the needed evidence.
When we talk about evidence in the context of policy-making, we have to achieve
a better understanding of rules and rule uses. This seems accepted by social scientists
who worked on public policy and is mentioned by (Brennan and Buchanan 1985,
xv): “We play socioeconomic-legal-political games that can be described empirically only by their rules. But most of us play without an understanding or appreciation of the rules, how they came into being, how they are enforced, how they can be
changed, and, most important, how they can be normatively evaluated.” And
(Ostrom 2005, 17 f.) wrote 20 years later: “Until recently, rules have not been a
central focus of most of the social sciences [. . .] there has not been much interest in
examining where rules come from or how they change. [. . .] we have to dig below
and learn how rules create the set being analysed.” A theory of rules and rule uses is
not only central, because policy-making is very often a choice of rules within rules
(Brennan and Buchanan 1985; Vanberg 1994), but because for the evaluation of
rules we need evidence about the functions of rules and the possible uses of rules.
But because people use rules differently it is sometimes difficult to predict the
possible effects of the rule uses.
110
K. C. Reinmuth
evaluate rules.
If one wants to justify one’s actions one has to rely on the quality of the used
means. If a policy-making agent should use the right or good rules, then the agent has
to know what the right or good rules are. And if the agent knows what the right or
good rules are and sets these rules, she can justify her use of the rules accordingly.
Because we very often want a justification before acting we want to know whether
the means we can use are good. So, while one can measure the success of
implemented rule systems, we often want to know beforehand whether a rule system
satisfies the criteria and so could be used justifiably.
Since we have to evaluate rules for policy-making we need a theory of evaluation.
If rules are tools (von Hayek 2013), they will be evaluated like other tools, instruments or artefacts. So, we will use different criteria and for these criteria we will
consider the possible uses of the tools. The criteria for good or right rules can vary
enormously. And even if the criteria are fixed, a lot of effort is invested in the
question whether they are fulfilled by the rules. If the process of evaluation is
considered as a reasoning process, one can identify different criteria-related arguments. In these arguments we often rely on evidence for supporting the claim of the
argument. So, because our main evaluation objects are rules, we have specific
problems getting the needed evidence.
When we talk about evidence in the context of policy-making, we have to achieve
a better understanding of rules and rule uses. This seems accepted by social scientists
who worked on public policy and is mentioned by (Brennan and Buchanan 1985,
xv): “We play socioeconomic-legal-political games that can be described empirically only by their rules. But most of us play without an understanding or appreciation of the rules, how they came into being, how they are enforced, how they can be
changed, and, most important, how they can be normatively evaluated.” And
(Ostrom 2005, 17 f.) wrote 20 years later: “Until recently, rules have not been a
central focus of most of the social sciences [. . .] there has not been much interest in
examining where rules come from or how they change. [. . .] we have to dig below
and learn how rules create the set being analysed.” A theory of rules and rule uses is
not only central, because policy-making is very often a choice of rules within rules
(Brennan and Buchanan 1985; Vanberg 1994), but because for the evaluation of
rules we need evidence about the functions of rules and the possible uses of rules.
But because people use rules differently it is sometimes difficult to predict the
possible effects of the rule uses.
110
K. C. Reinmuth