flying the revolutionary de Havilland Mosquito. John Augustin must have
been a skilful airman. The Intruder operation was a specialist exercise
requiring keen eyesight, cool nerves, patience, and the ability to ‘hide in the
skies’ to seize a chance that would often only last for seconds.
50 The tactics
taught at 60 OTU had been perfected over occupied France, Belgium and
Holland during the previous year and were used over Germany and Poland as
aircraft with greater range became available. They were also deployed in
North Africa, Italy and southern France in support of the desert and Italian
campaigns. But wherever it was flown, the Intruder operation was risky
because it involved a lone aircraft over enemy airfields at night often attacking
bombers at their most vulnerable viz., landing or taking-off. The risk was even
greater when single engined aircraft were used. These pilots not only had to
be a ‘one-man band’, flying/navigating/observing, but if badly damaged or if
their engine failed there was simply nowhere to go. When twin engined
aircraft such as the Mosquito were introduced the situation improved because
the remaining engine was capable of bringing the aircraft home, and a second
crew-man shared the burden of his pilot.
‘Intruding’ also took a number of forms. In one form, ground observers
would report enemy bombers reaching the English coast. A few aircraft would
then set off singly and head for the continent, guessing from the direction of the
bombers which airfields were being used and laying in wait for them to return.
When the bombers came back, they were at their most vulnerable: low on fuel,
ammunition expended, crews tired and unsuspecting. Runway lights were
briefly flicked on and off and this, together with the slow speed of the bombers
as they descended, helped the Intruder pilot locate his target. Bombers were
regarded as ‘dead meat’ at the point where the undercarriage was about to meet
the runway and this was the perfect time for an Intruder to attack. Another
form of Intruder operation took the initiative, flying to occupied territory early
in the night and looking for bombers as they took off. This was much riskier;
the German crews were alert and the ammunition racks were stocked. Yet it
had the advantage that, if successful, the sortie not only destroyed the aircraft
but also its bomb load. A third form came into play when the Intruder couldn’t
find any aircraft to hit. Rather than return with the rubber sheaths still over the
protruding cannon barrels and the bomb rack intact, they resorted to ‘beat ‘em
up’, the most obvious targets being trains, although anything military was fair
game. Even with these tactics, the chances of finding German aircraft were low.
Luftwaffe pilots often returned to a different airfield from the one on which
they had taken off and they had many from which to choose. Night after night,
many Intruder pilots would not even see an enemy aircraft, let alone engage or
destroy one. Some pilots survived the whole war without ever engaging the
17 The GEC Laboratories 1939–1949
431
been a skilful airman. The Intruder operation was a specialist exercise
requiring keen eyesight, cool nerves, patience, and the ability to ‘hide in the
skies’ to seize a chance that would often only last for seconds.
50 The tactics
taught at 60 OTU had been perfected over occupied France, Belgium and
Holland during the previous year and were used over Germany and Poland as
aircraft with greater range became available. They were also deployed in
North Africa, Italy and southern France in support of the desert and Italian
campaigns. But wherever it was flown, the Intruder operation was risky
because it involved a lone aircraft over enemy airfields at night often attacking
bombers at their most vulnerable viz., landing or taking-off. The risk was even
greater when single engined aircraft were used. These pilots not only had to
be a ‘one-man band’, flying/navigating/observing, but if badly damaged or if
their engine failed there was simply nowhere to go. When twin engined
aircraft such as the Mosquito were introduced the situation improved because
the remaining engine was capable of bringing the aircraft home, and a second
crew-man shared the burden of his pilot.
‘Intruding’ also took a number of forms. In one form, ground observers
would report enemy bombers reaching the English coast. A few aircraft would
then set off singly and head for the continent, guessing from the direction of the
bombers which airfields were being used and laying in wait for them to return.
When the bombers came back, they were at their most vulnerable: low on fuel,
ammunition expended, crews tired and unsuspecting. Runway lights were
briefly flicked on and off and this, together with the slow speed of the bombers
as they descended, helped the Intruder pilot locate his target. Bombers were
regarded as ‘dead meat’ at the point where the undercarriage was about to meet
the runway and this was the perfect time for an Intruder to attack. Another
form of Intruder operation took the initiative, flying to occupied territory early
in the night and looking for bombers as they took off. This was much riskier;
the German crews were alert and the ammunition racks were stocked. Yet it
had the advantage that, if successful, the sortie not only destroyed the aircraft
but also its bomb load. A third form came into play when the Intruder couldn’t
find any aircraft to hit. Rather than return with the rubber sheaths still over the
protruding cannon barrels and the bomb rack intact, they resorted to ‘beat ‘em
up’, the most obvious targets being trains, although anything military was fair
game. Even with these tactics, the chances of finding German aircraft were low.
Luftwaffe pilots often returned to a different airfield from the one on which
they had taken off and they had many from which to choose. Night after night,
many Intruder pilots would not even see an enemy aircraft, let alone engage or
destroy one. Some pilots survived the whole war without ever engaging the
17 The GEC Laboratories 1939–1949
431