‘partnership’. Haber, he felt, must have a prize regardless of the lack of
external nominations. Klason received some support from a committee
member who called for a joint award to Haber and Bosch, but Klason suggested both nominations should go to Haber. Committee chairman
Hammarsten was concerned about the secrecy of the ‘Haber-Bosch’ process
and suggested that Sweden’s neutrality might be compromised by awarding a
prize for a process that prolonged the war. Over Klason’s protests, the
Academy sided with Hammarsten and reserved the prize for 1916.
However, Haber returned to the nominations list in 1918, receiving just a
single endorsement from a Munich chemist (Wilhelm Prandtl) amongst a
meager 11 nominations that year spread across eight candidates. Klason seized
his chance again, but by now there was ‘blood on Haber’s hands’, for by 1918
almost half of all German artillery shells fired on the Western Front were
filled with ‘his’ gas. Additionally, with such few nominations Haber was not
felt to be representative of the international chemical communities’ opinions,
although of course circumstances were far from ‘normal’. Even so, Klason’s
report in the spring of 1918 once again singled out Haber. Yes, he argued, the
process had been used to produce munitions, but the Americans had used it
too, so one was not favouring Germany here. Instead, emphasis should be on
the use of the process in agriculture and its ‘benefit for mankind’. During the
summer a preliminary vote produced three members who backed Haber’s
nomination, Klason, Ǻke Ekstrand and H.G. Söderbaum. But because the
process was still secret, the motion was opposed and failed. At a full committee meeting on 02 September 1918, disagreement regarding Haber continued. Hammarsten argued that sufficient information to make a sound
decision was simply not available to the committee. Klason’s argument that
an award to Haber would be politically neutral because the process had
helped both sides was rightly rejected because in truth it hadn’t. And as far as
agriculture was concerned the case was hardly proven, the evidence so far
suggested all it had done was to prolong the horrors of war. For ‘reasons of
expediency’ therefore, and with no mention of gas warfare, Hammarsten
recommended against awarding the 1918 prize to Haber. But his reasoning
failed to gain support and other members—all of whom had close ties to
German science—voted with Klason to propose Haber. The final vote was
seven to Haber, two against and one absentee. The Academy met on 12
November 1918, the day after the sudden signing of the Armistice.
Hammarsten as chairman of the Chemistry Committee was entrusted by the
Academy to guarantee impartiality and to observe its statutes. He deemed
that the time was not yet politically right to award the prize to Haber and his
voice had to be respected above the majority vote of his committee. Because
14 Robert’s War 1914–1918
309
external nominations. Klason received some support from a committee
member who called for a joint award to Haber and Bosch, but Klason suggested both nominations should go to Haber. Committee chairman
Hammarsten was concerned about the secrecy of the ‘Haber-Bosch’ process
and suggested that Sweden’s neutrality might be compromised by awarding a
prize for a process that prolonged the war. Over Klason’s protests, the
Academy sided with Hammarsten and reserved the prize for 1916.
However, Haber returned to the nominations list in 1918, receiving just a
single endorsement from a Munich chemist (Wilhelm Prandtl) amongst a
meager 11 nominations that year spread across eight candidates. Klason seized
his chance again, but by now there was ‘blood on Haber’s hands’, for by 1918
almost half of all German artillery shells fired on the Western Front were
filled with ‘his’ gas. Additionally, with such few nominations Haber was not
felt to be representative of the international chemical communities’ opinions,
although of course circumstances were far from ‘normal’. Even so, Klason’s
report in the spring of 1918 once again singled out Haber. Yes, he argued, the
process had been used to produce munitions, but the Americans had used it
too, so one was not favouring Germany here. Instead, emphasis should be on
the use of the process in agriculture and its ‘benefit for mankind’. During the
summer a preliminary vote produced three members who backed Haber’s
nomination, Klason, Ǻke Ekstrand and H.G. Söderbaum. But because the
process was still secret, the motion was opposed and failed. At a full committee meeting on 02 September 1918, disagreement regarding Haber continued. Hammarsten argued that sufficient information to make a sound
decision was simply not available to the committee. Klason’s argument that
an award to Haber would be politically neutral because the process had
helped both sides was rightly rejected because in truth it hadn’t. And as far as
agriculture was concerned the case was hardly proven, the evidence so far
suggested all it had done was to prolong the horrors of war. For ‘reasons of
expediency’ therefore, and with no mention of gas warfare, Hammarsten
recommended against awarding the 1918 prize to Haber. But his reasoning
failed to gain support and other members—all of whom had close ties to
German science—voted with Klason to propose Haber. The final vote was
seven to Haber, two against and one absentee. The Academy met on 12
November 1918, the day after the sudden signing of the Armistice.
Hammarsten as chairman of the Chemistry Committee was entrusted by the
Academy to guarantee impartiality and to observe its statutes. He deemed
that the time was not yet politically right to award the prize to Haber and his
voice had to be respected above the majority vote of his committee. Because
14 Robert’s War 1914–1918
309