also accusations of spying and sabotage within Germany by those favouring
British interests. The meeting in Berlin between the Prussian Ministry of
War, the Reich Office of Interior and the Foreign Office ended without
agreement however and the matter was referred to the German General
Headquarters at Charleville. But the case for internment they felt was a
practical necessity for it would prevent spying and anti-German activity,
deprive the British army and navy of manpower and potentially provide an
opportunity for the use of important internees as ‘bargaining chips’. All of
these considerations were reinforced by public opinion which in the early
days of the war saw a sustained shift from anti-Russian to anti-English
(British) feeling driven by the German press. Only one newspaper (Vortwärts)
took a stand against internment, the press otherwise being deluged with
letters from ‘outraged’ citizens demanding a stiff response from the German
Government to the ‘abuses’ suffered by Germans in the UK. But public anger
seems to have been confined largely to the major cities in Germany. In
Hamburg, Stuttgart and Cologne there was palpable dislike of the ‘English’,
and in Berlin police reports for the week ending 02 November 1914 reported
an upsurge in Anglophobia, but in the countryside, opinions were less
agitated.
12
But very soon the case for internment became overwhelming. There were
fewer than 2,000 British men eligible for arrest in Germany at the outbreak of
war, far too few to disturb the German war effort, but along with aspects of
pragmatism and public opinion, propaganda too demanded that there was
much political capital to be made from their internment. Internment would
clearly boost public support for the war and demonstrate Britain’s vulnerability to legitimate retaliation for its treatment of German citizens in the
UK.
13 The British government’s continued obstinacy over the exchange of
her own subjects would allow Germany to throw a poor light on her consideration of their human rights and the role of international law. But in an
act of blatant propaganda, Germany further decided that she would not
proceed directly to internment but be best seen as having to be forced into it
by issuing an ultimatum to the British government which demanded that
unless all German citizens interned in Britain were released by 05 November
1914, British citizens between seventeen and fifty five years old in Germany
would be correspondingly interned. On October 31st the German general
staff issued instructions to prepare for the mass arrest, and as the British failed
to respond to her ultimatum, Germany, ‘reluctantly’ of course, began her
internment of British nationals on the morning of 06 November 1914.
The German action brought to an end a period of profound uncertainty
for British nationals such as Robert. Ever since the outbreak of war they had
278
D. Sheppard
British interests. The meeting in Berlin between the Prussian Ministry of
War, the Reich Office of Interior and the Foreign Office ended without
agreement however and the matter was referred to the German General
Headquarters at Charleville. But the case for internment they felt was a
practical necessity for it would prevent spying and anti-German activity,
deprive the British army and navy of manpower and potentially provide an
opportunity for the use of important internees as ‘bargaining chips’. All of
these considerations were reinforced by public opinion which in the early
days of the war saw a sustained shift from anti-Russian to anti-English
(British) feeling driven by the German press. Only one newspaper (Vortwärts)
took a stand against internment, the press otherwise being deluged with
letters from ‘outraged’ citizens demanding a stiff response from the German
Government to the ‘abuses’ suffered by Germans in the UK. But public anger
seems to have been confined largely to the major cities in Germany. In
Hamburg, Stuttgart and Cologne there was palpable dislike of the ‘English’,
and in Berlin police reports for the week ending 02 November 1914 reported
an upsurge in Anglophobia, but in the countryside, opinions were less
agitated.
12
But very soon the case for internment became overwhelming. There were
fewer than 2,000 British men eligible for arrest in Germany at the outbreak of
war, far too few to disturb the German war effort, but along with aspects of
pragmatism and public opinion, propaganda too demanded that there was
much political capital to be made from their internment. Internment would
clearly boost public support for the war and demonstrate Britain’s vulnerability to legitimate retaliation for its treatment of German citizens in the
UK.
13 The British government’s continued obstinacy over the exchange of
her own subjects would allow Germany to throw a poor light on her consideration of their human rights and the role of international law. But in an
act of blatant propaganda, Germany further decided that she would not
proceed directly to internment but be best seen as having to be forced into it
by issuing an ultimatum to the British government which demanded that
unless all German citizens interned in Britain were released by 05 November
1914, British citizens between seventeen and fifty five years old in Germany
would be correspondingly interned. On October 31st the German general
staff issued instructions to prepare for the mass arrest, and as the British failed
to respond to her ultimatum, Germany, ‘reluctantly’ of course, began her
internment of British nationals on the morning of 06 November 1914.
The German action brought to an end a period of profound uncertainty
for British nationals such as Robert. Ever since the outbreak of war they had
278
D. Sheppard