3. It had no contingency for failure, nor retreat, nor any consideration of
improved enemy logistics.
4. Indeed, Belgium almost destroyed the Schlieffen plan single handedly. The
railway system across northern France and Belgium was a vital component in
the plan, but the Belgians had long prepared to sabotage their own system to
slow down the advance if Germany were ever to attack them. If it were not
for the large number of failures of the explosives they used, they may well
have achieved that. The same railway system also rapidly brought the British
Expeditionary Force (BEF) to northern France in time to meet the Germans
entering French territory (at Mons). The Germans could not believe they
were fighting ‘Tommies’ only days after the declaration of war! From,
Michael Portillo, Railways of the Great War, BBC Productions, broadcast 04–
08 August 2014.
5. Authors differ here, this author has used a figure quoted by J. E. Coates, in
his 1934 appreciation of Haber. (J.E. Coates, ‘The Haber Memorial Lecture’,
J. Chem. Soc., 1642–1672, (1939)). Coates was a contemporary of Haber and
his recollections were closer to the time.
6. Dietrich Stoltzenberg, Fritz Haber. Chemist, Noble Laureate, German, Jew.
Chemical Heritage Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, (2004), p. 130, his
reference no. 11.
7. The railway system around Paris had been designed to move troops quickly
through the city and to its perimeter. The troops assembled by Joffre were
rapidly deployed using this system. From Portillo, op. cit. (note 4).
8. Both the French and the Germans lost around 250,000 men and the BEF
about 13,000.
9. A very common saying used by Generals on both sides at the start of the war,
Germany relying on her Schlieffen plan and the Allies on the strangulation of
Germany’s nitrate trade. Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, was
unconvinced. He warned the British government that the war would be
decided by ‘the last million men that Britain could throw into battle’.
10. Barely 14,000 tonnes according to Stoltzenberg, op. cit. (note 6), p. 131.
11. From a British perspective this was a bizarre encounter. Why would Cradock
have considered taking on a much superior German squadron? But Cradock
had no confirmation that Spee’s forces were concentrated, believing that in
the vastness of the ocean he might meet one or two enemy craft for which his
squadron was a match. The German guns had a superior range and within
ten minutes of the first German salvo the result was not in doubt. Geoffrey
Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World War, Pen & Sword, (2005).
ISBN-10 1844153002. ISBN-13 9781844153008.
12. Thomas Hager, The Alchemy of Air, Three River Press, New York, (2008),
p. 141.
13 Haber and the Chemist’s War 1914–18
267
improved enemy logistics.
4. Indeed, Belgium almost destroyed the Schlieffen plan single handedly. The
railway system across northern France and Belgium was a vital component in
the plan, but the Belgians had long prepared to sabotage their own system to
slow down the advance if Germany were ever to attack them. If it were not
for the large number of failures of the explosives they used, they may well
have achieved that. The same railway system also rapidly brought the British
Expeditionary Force (BEF) to northern France in time to meet the Germans
entering French territory (at Mons). The Germans could not believe they
were fighting ‘Tommies’ only days after the declaration of war! From,
Michael Portillo, Railways of the Great War, BBC Productions, broadcast 04–
08 August 2014.
5. Authors differ here, this author has used a figure quoted by J. E. Coates, in
his 1934 appreciation of Haber. (J.E. Coates, ‘The Haber Memorial Lecture’,
J. Chem. Soc., 1642–1672, (1939)). Coates was a contemporary of Haber and
his recollections were closer to the time.
6. Dietrich Stoltzenberg, Fritz Haber. Chemist, Noble Laureate, German, Jew.
Chemical Heritage Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, (2004), p. 130, his
reference no. 11.
7. The railway system around Paris had been designed to move troops quickly
through the city and to its perimeter. The troops assembled by Joffre were
rapidly deployed using this system. From Portillo, op. cit. (note 4).
8. Both the French and the Germans lost around 250,000 men and the BEF
about 13,000.
9. A very common saying used by Generals on both sides at the start of the war,
Germany relying on her Schlieffen plan and the Allies on the strangulation of
Germany’s nitrate trade. Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, was
unconvinced. He warned the British government that the war would be
decided by ‘the last million men that Britain could throw into battle’.
10. Barely 14,000 tonnes according to Stoltzenberg, op. cit. (note 6), p. 131.
11. From a British perspective this was a bizarre encounter. Why would Cradock
have considered taking on a much superior German squadron? But Cradock
had no confirmation that Spee’s forces were concentrated, believing that in
the vastness of the ocean he might meet one or two enemy craft for which his
squadron was a match. The German guns had a superior range and within
ten minutes of the first German salvo the result was not in doubt. Geoffrey
Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World War, Pen & Sword, (2005).
ISBN-10 1844153002. ISBN-13 9781844153008.
12. Thomas Hager, The Alchemy of Air, Three River Press, New York, (2008),
p. 141.
13 Haber and the Chemist’s War 1914–18
267