concerns with Berlin’s bureaucracy, which in turn greatly expanded
Germany’s dependence on ‘his’ synthetic ammonia. As a result, he became
fabulously wealthy.
33 The description of WW1 as the ‘chemists war’ was of
course due in part to the role of ‘fixation’, and had Haber confined himself to
Germany’s nitrate problem history might have looked more kindly upon him.
After all, a nation would be expected to defend herself by conventionally
permitted means, and mass slaughter via the progeny of the likes of Oppau
and Leuna was then—as today—‘de rigueur’. Even early in the war,
knowledgeable individuals appreciated the importance of ‘Haber’s’ discovery
and marveled at the rapidity of its industrialisation. W. J. Landis, the director
of the American Cyanamide Company, wrote in 1915 that ‘too much honour
cannot be shown to those courageous chemists who have succeeded in placing this
process on a commercial working basis …’, and two years later during a debate
on nitrogen in the British House of Commons, Sir William Pierce said that
the Haber-Bosch process ‘… is one of the greatest achievements of the German
intellects during the war … It is really a wonderful achievemen.’
34 But Haber’s
privileged position on the nitrate commission also gave him a clinical
understanding of the perilous position of Germany in the early months of the
war, and as a result he immediately placed himself and the resources
35 of the
KWI Institute at the service of the nation. It was his work here in support of
the war effort that led to him being reviled as the ‘father of chemical warfare’,
for the irritant and toxic gasses investigated, developed and deployed under
his direction were the second, highly emotive, and deeply despised component of the ‘chemists war’.
This text is not the place to provide a critical analysis of gas warfare in
WW1. To dwell upon the controversial aspects of its provenance and questions of international law
36 arising from its application would be inappropriate, for such issues have been fully accounted for elsewhere.
37 But what is
inescapable, is that Fritz Haber was intimately and enthusiastically involved in
Germany’s development and application of the technology. Even so, and in
retrospect, his gas warfare had little strategic impact. Towards the end of the
war chemical weapons were largely ineffective against well trained and
well-equipped troops. Throughout the war fatal casualties were low, around
3%. Only about 2% were permanently invalided and most troops were fit for
duty again within six weeks. But these stark statistics hardly convey the horror
of being gassed, where men died slowly and in agony, for—unlike ‘conventional’ wounds—little was available to ease their condition. These observations were in direct contradiction to Haber’s early opinion of gas warfare
however, which he felt was far more ‘humane’, in that death would occur
rapidly either by the gas itself or through a ‘clean kill’ as troops were driven
256
D. Sheppard
Germany’s dependence on ‘his’ synthetic ammonia. As a result, he became
fabulously wealthy.
33 The description of WW1 as the ‘chemists war’ was of
course due in part to the role of ‘fixation’, and had Haber confined himself to
Germany’s nitrate problem history might have looked more kindly upon him.
After all, a nation would be expected to defend herself by conventionally
permitted means, and mass slaughter via the progeny of the likes of Oppau
and Leuna was then—as today—‘de rigueur’. Even early in the war,
knowledgeable individuals appreciated the importance of ‘Haber’s’ discovery
and marveled at the rapidity of its industrialisation. W. J. Landis, the director
of the American Cyanamide Company, wrote in 1915 that ‘too much honour
cannot be shown to those courageous chemists who have succeeded in placing this
process on a commercial working basis …’, and two years later during a debate
on nitrogen in the British House of Commons, Sir William Pierce said that
the Haber-Bosch process ‘… is one of the greatest achievements of the German
intellects during the war … It is really a wonderful achievemen.’
34 But Haber’s
privileged position on the nitrate commission also gave him a clinical
understanding of the perilous position of Germany in the early months of the
war, and as a result he immediately placed himself and the resources
35 of the
KWI Institute at the service of the nation. It was his work here in support of
the war effort that led to him being reviled as the ‘father of chemical warfare’,
for the irritant and toxic gasses investigated, developed and deployed under
his direction were the second, highly emotive, and deeply despised component of the ‘chemists war’.
This text is not the place to provide a critical analysis of gas warfare in
WW1. To dwell upon the controversial aspects of its provenance and questions of international law
36 arising from its application would be inappropriate, for such issues have been fully accounted for elsewhere.
37 But what is
inescapable, is that Fritz Haber was intimately and enthusiastically involved in
Germany’s development and application of the technology. Even so, and in
retrospect, his gas warfare had little strategic impact. Towards the end of the
war chemical weapons were largely ineffective against well trained and
well-equipped troops. Throughout the war fatal casualties were low, around
3%. Only about 2% were permanently invalided and most troops were fit for
duty again within six weeks. But these stark statistics hardly convey the horror
of being gassed, where men died slowly and in agony, for—unlike ‘conventional’ wounds—little was available to ease their condition. These observations were in direct contradiction to Haber’s early opinion of gas warfare
however, which he felt was far more ‘humane’, in that death would occur
rapidly either by the gas itself or through a ‘clean kill’ as troops were driven
256
D. Sheppard