even though industrial detail was vague viz, Haber’s talk at the Scientific
Union meeting in 1910, submission of the BASF patents in both Europe and
the USA between 1909–1911, the subsequent battles in the German courts,
Bernthsen’s talk at the Congress of Applied Chemistry in New York City in
1912, the extensive detail of how to achieve ammonia synthesis revealed by
Haber-Le Rossignol in Z. Elektrochem, the Journal of Industrial and
Engineering Chemistry, and The Times, Eng. Supplement, 28 May 1913, the
Manuals of Chemical Technology in 1915 (pp. 53–55) where the new
ammonia process was discussed, and of course Haber’s Hurter Memorial
Lecture at Liverpool in 1913 which finally announced both the successful
industrialization of the process and Germany’s ability to produce all the
hydrogen she needed from her vast coal reserves. Even so, the German
nitrogen industry was clearly not on a war footing at the outbreak of WW1—
a common accusation made by the Allies after the war—and their understanding of the evidence was undoubtedly hampered by the BASF’s secrecy,
diverted by all the tensions in Europe at the time, and confounded by the
unexpected ability of German industry to modify and incorporate the new
technology so soon after the outbreak of war. It wasn’t until 09 May 1915 at
the battle of Aubers Ridge that the Allies were confronted with the problem
that Germany had immediately recognized after the battle of the Marne. The
failure of Aubers Ridge was put down simply to a lack of high explosive shells.
The Times in May 1915 reported the concerns of the British
Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir John French …‘We had not enough
high explosives to lower the enemy’s parapets to the ground … The want of an
unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal bar to our success.’ Just as in
Germany, the Allies own ‘shell crisis’ led to the re-organisation of munitions
production putting the country firmly on a war footing. Lloyd George was
made Minister of Munitions in the newly formed Imperial Munitions Board.
A huge new factory was set up at Gretna on the English/Scottish border to
produce ‘cordite’. An idle factory in Silvertown on the north bank of the
Thames in the Borough of Newham was pressed into service to manufacture
TNT, and British Commonwealth countries were organised to supply
munitions for the remainder of the war. It may not have been coincidence
that French air attacks on Oppau began just a few weeks after the failure at
Aubers Ridge.
In retrospect, the Allies understanding of Germany’s fixed nitrogen capability was predicated on her conventional technologies. They were ignorant
regarding the detail of the new technology of ammonia synthesis and of
course knew nothing of the industrial genius of Carl Bosch. The stranglehold
of the British and Commonwealth navies therefore, would have given them
13 Haber and the Chemist’s War 1914–18
253
Union meeting in 1910, submission of the BASF patents in both Europe and
the USA between 1909–1911, the subsequent battles in the German courts,
Bernthsen’s talk at the Congress of Applied Chemistry in New York City in
1912, the extensive detail of how to achieve ammonia synthesis revealed by
Haber-Le Rossignol in Z. Elektrochem, the Journal of Industrial and
Engineering Chemistry, and The Times, Eng. Supplement, 28 May 1913, the
Manuals of Chemical Technology in 1915 (pp. 53–55) where the new
ammonia process was discussed, and of course Haber’s Hurter Memorial
Lecture at Liverpool in 1913 which finally announced both the successful
industrialization of the process and Germany’s ability to produce all the
hydrogen she needed from her vast coal reserves. Even so, the German
nitrogen industry was clearly not on a war footing at the outbreak of WW1—
a common accusation made by the Allies after the war—and their understanding of the evidence was undoubtedly hampered by the BASF’s secrecy,
diverted by all the tensions in Europe at the time, and confounded by the
unexpected ability of German industry to modify and incorporate the new
technology so soon after the outbreak of war. It wasn’t until 09 May 1915 at
the battle of Aubers Ridge that the Allies were confronted with the problem
that Germany had immediately recognized after the battle of the Marne. The
failure of Aubers Ridge was put down simply to a lack of high explosive shells.
The Times in May 1915 reported the concerns of the British
Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir John French …‘We had not enough
high explosives to lower the enemy’s parapets to the ground … The want of an
unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal bar to our success.’ Just as in
Germany, the Allies own ‘shell crisis’ led to the re-organisation of munitions
production putting the country firmly on a war footing. Lloyd George was
made Minister of Munitions in the newly formed Imperial Munitions Board.
A huge new factory was set up at Gretna on the English/Scottish border to
produce ‘cordite’. An idle factory in Silvertown on the north bank of the
Thames in the Borough of Newham was pressed into service to manufacture
TNT, and British Commonwealth countries were organised to supply
munitions for the remainder of the war. It may not have been coincidence
that French air attacks on Oppau began just a few weeks after the failure at
Aubers Ridge.
In retrospect, the Allies understanding of Germany’s fixed nitrogen capability was predicated on her conventional technologies. They were ignorant
regarding the detail of the new technology of ammonia synthesis and of
course knew nothing of the industrial genius of Carl Bosch. The stranglehold
of the British and Commonwealth navies therefore, would have given them
13 Haber and the Chemist’s War 1914–18
253