through military conquest? From then on, Russia was ‘up for it’, and ‘it’ could
be provided—if necessary—by the simmering cauldron of the Balkans.
Trouble in the Balkans was nothing new. Here, Europe met the East and
in doing so it generated a volatile ethnic mix viz, a Christian Slavic majority
and a Muslim minority. Between 1912 and 1913 a series of wars between the
major nations in the area saw a redistribution of territories and eventually a
fragile peace, but nothing had really been settled and tensions remained
high. The collection of small nations that had found themselves under
Turkish or Austro-Hungarian rule for many years stirred themselves in
nationalistic fervour, and while they sought their own individual voice and
self-determination, the majority were nevertheless united in identifying
themselves as pan-Slavic peoples, with Russia as their chief ally. She in turn
was keen to encourage a belief in the Russian people as the Slav’s natural
protectors, and this was a convenience by means by which Russia could
intervene in the Balkans to regain a degree of lost prestige—if she so wished.
Meanwhile, continuing German expansion was ‘ratcheting up’ tension
between herself and Great Britain. Even within Germany tension was high.
The desire for concrete political reforms expressed by the people in the 1912
elections was ignored by the conservative ruling classes. Instead, they seized
upon demonstrations of national strength as a tactic to rally popular support
against a rising tide of socialist sentiment.
18 Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg
came to believe that Germany’s only hope of avoiding civil unrest lay in a
short, sharp war, or even a European-wide conflict if it resolved Germany’s
political woes.
19 To this end, and with France and Russia in mind, Germany
had her ‘Schlieffen Plan’, devised by former Army Chief of Staff Alfred von
Schlieffen and carefully crafted to deal with a two-front war scenario. Firstly,
if provoked, she would conquer France within five weeks on a ‘western front’
before Russia—whose military frailty against Japan in 1905 had already been
noted in Berlin—could effectively mobilise for war on an ‘eastern front’
(estimated to take six weeks). Once France was despatched, Russia would be
addressed. By 1913 Europe was a tinderbox of emotion reflected in a network
of poorly thought out alliances between powerful nations eager to confront
one-another to resolve internal socio-political problems. With tensions high
and plans already laid, sooner or later some spark would inflame the tinder
and set in motion a mindless mechanical prosecution of the obligations in the
treaties. Europe didn’t have long to wait for her spark. By little Peter Walter’s
first birthday the continent would be aflame.
12 Berlin 1911–1914
233
be provided—if necessary—by the simmering cauldron of the Balkans.
Trouble in the Balkans was nothing new. Here, Europe met the East and
in doing so it generated a volatile ethnic mix viz, a Christian Slavic majority
and a Muslim minority. Between 1912 and 1913 a series of wars between the
major nations in the area saw a redistribution of territories and eventually a
fragile peace, but nothing had really been settled and tensions remained
high. The collection of small nations that had found themselves under
Turkish or Austro-Hungarian rule for many years stirred themselves in
nationalistic fervour, and while they sought their own individual voice and
self-determination, the majority were nevertheless united in identifying
themselves as pan-Slavic peoples, with Russia as their chief ally. She in turn
was keen to encourage a belief in the Russian people as the Slav’s natural
protectors, and this was a convenience by means by which Russia could
intervene in the Balkans to regain a degree of lost prestige—if she so wished.
Meanwhile, continuing German expansion was ‘ratcheting up’ tension
between herself and Great Britain. Even within Germany tension was high.
The desire for concrete political reforms expressed by the people in the 1912
elections was ignored by the conservative ruling classes. Instead, they seized
upon demonstrations of national strength as a tactic to rally popular support
against a rising tide of socialist sentiment.
18 Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg
came to believe that Germany’s only hope of avoiding civil unrest lay in a
short, sharp war, or even a European-wide conflict if it resolved Germany’s
political woes.
19 To this end, and with France and Russia in mind, Germany
had her ‘Schlieffen Plan’, devised by former Army Chief of Staff Alfred von
Schlieffen and carefully crafted to deal with a two-front war scenario. Firstly,
if provoked, she would conquer France within five weeks on a ‘western front’
before Russia—whose military frailty against Japan in 1905 had already been
noted in Berlin—could effectively mobilise for war on an ‘eastern front’
(estimated to take six weeks). Once France was despatched, Russia would be
addressed. By 1913 Europe was a tinderbox of emotion reflected in a network
of poorly thought out alliances between powerful nations eager to confront
one-another to resolve internal socio-political problems. With tensions high
and plans already laid, sooner or later some spark would inflame the tinder
and set in motion a mindless mechanical prosecution of the obligations in the
treaties. Europe didn’t have long to wait for her spark. By little Peter Walter’s
first birthday the continent would be aflame.
12 Berlin 1911–1914
233