4 The ISO/IEC Standardization of Simon and Speck
77
but the editors refused to address the comments about small block sizes. Following
a heated discussion in the meeting itself, they announced that they would remove all
variants of Simon and Speck with block size smaller than 128-bits.
Berlin, Germany (October 2017)
The so-called design rationale was circulated together with the 2nd PDAM asking
again the national bodies to approve or disapprove this project within 8 weeks.
This time, the results were that 15 countries voted to approve the draft (some with
comments), and 7 voted to disapprove. This vote, while still not consensual, at least
met the 66% threshold allowing the secretariat to deem such vote consensus.
The so-called design rationale and the problems that arise from it were analyzed
in Sect. 4.3 and most of these comments were also submitted as part of the National
Bodies (NBs) justifications for disapproval. The editors refused to address these
comments, and provided the following standard answer to comments from NBs:
The editors regret that [Country X] feels that there is insufficient design criteria provided
for SIMON and SPECK in order to determine their inclusion in ISO/IEC 29192-2. . . . No
further design rationale will be provided by the editors for SIMON and SPECK. The
editors stand behind their position that all the documents previously referenced as a part
of this Disposition of Comments do indeed provide sufficient information to determine that
SIMON and SPECK are indeed secure.
A particular focus was put in this meeting on how the number of rounds was
chosen for the algorithms. The NSA editors argued that Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are a
misunderstanding and that
Any native English speaker would immediately understand what we were trying to say in
the design rationale.
When asked to elaborate about this decision for the sake of the non-native English
speakers in the room, they simply refused. Furthermore, the editors also refused to
answer the following two questions posed to them:
• When releasing the algorithms in 2013, was the NSA aware of all
attacks that were later published by the academic community against these
algorithms?
• Is the NSA aware of additional attacks, beyond those already discovered
and published by the academic community?
Their refusal to answer these questions, together with the insufficient quality
of the design rationale, was enough to demonstrate that “sustained opposition to
substantial issues” still existed, and it was decided that a 3rd PDAM should be
circulated.
Wuhan, China (April 2018)
The 3rd PDAM was circulated on December 2017, again asking for the support
of national bodies within 8 weeks (until February 2018). This time, 14 countries
77
but the editors refused to address the comments about small block sizes. Following
a heated discussion in the meeting itself, they announced that they would remove all
variants of Simon and Speck with block size smaller than 128-bits.
Berlin, Germany (October 2017)
The so-called design rationale was circulated together with the 2nd PDAM asking
again the national bodies to approve or disapprove this project within 8 weeks.
This time, the results were that 15 countries voted to approve the draft (some with
comments), and 7 voted to disapprove. This vote, while still not consensual, at least
met the 66% threshold allowing the secretariat to deem such vote consensus.
The so-called design rationale and the problems that arise from it were analyzed
in Sect. 4.3 and most of these comments were also submitted as part of the National
Bodies (NBs) justifications for disapproval. The editors refused to address these
comments, and provided the following standard answer to comments from NBs:
The editors regret that [Country X] feels that there is insufficient design criteria provided
for SIMON and SPECK in order to determine their inclusion in ISO/IEC 29192-2. . . . No
further design rationale will be provided by the editors for SIMON and SPECK. The
editors stand behind their position that all the documents previously referenced as a part
of this Disposition of Comments do indeed provide sufficient information to determine that
SIMON and SPECK are indeed secure.
A particular focus was put in this meeting on how the number of rounds was
chosen for the algorithms. The NSA editors argued that Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are a
misunderstanding and that
Any native English speaker would immediately understand what we were trying to say in
the design rationale.
When asked to elaborate about this decision for the sake of the non-native English
speakers in the room, they simply refused. Furthermore, the editors also refused to
answer the following two questions posed to them:
• When releasing the algorithms in 2013, was the NSA aware of all
attacks that were later published by the academic community against these
algorithms?
• Is the NSA aware of additional attacks, beyond those already discovered
and published by the academic community?
Their refusal to answer these questions, together with the insufficient quality
of the design rationale, was enough to demonstrate that “sustained opposition to
substantial issues” still existed, and it was decided that a 3rd PDAM should be
circulated.
Wuhan, China (April 2018)
The 3rd PDAM was circulated on December 2017, again asking for the support
of national bodies within 8 weeks (until February 2018). This time, 14 countries