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close as possible to old-generation EMV cards/readers are such that a DB protocol,
following the designs we saw in Sect. 7.3, is simply un-adoptable out of the box.
7.6.3 Specialist Implementations and Slow Adoption
On the one hand, PKES with relay-protection are finally becoming commercial—
arguably due to relay attacks being exploited by fraudsters in the automotive sector.
On the other hand, in DB-enhanced EMV contactless protocols (à la PaySafe), a
dishonest party already has a tangible incentive to mount a distance-fraud attack;—a
purchase receipt carries an intrinsic proof that the card was in the range of the reader.
Yet, EMV with relay-protection is not widely deployed and, indeed, the markets do
not appear to call for protocols to be enhanced with full DB-protection yet.
Should such DB frauds appear in practice, would we then see fully-fledged DB
solutions being implemented for commercial purposes? Or, will the 5th generation
of mobile networks (5G) and its increased spectrum and higher bands lead to the
true rise of DB technology in the ubiquitous systems of the 2020s, and raise new
DB research questions?
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
G. Avoine et al.
close as possible to old-generation EMV cards/readers are such that a DB protocol,
following the designs we saw in Sect. 7.3, is simply un-adoptable out of the box.
7.6.3 Specialist Implementations and Slow Adoption
On the one hand, PKES with relay-protection are finally becoming commercial—
arguably due to relay attacks being exploited by fraudsters in the automotive sector.
On the other hand, in DB-enhanced EMV contactless protocols (à la PaySafe), a
dishonest party already has a tangible incentive to mount a distance-fraud attack;—a
purchase receipt carries an intrinsic proof that the card was in the range of the reader.
Yet, EMV with relay-protection is not widely deployed and, indeed, the markets do
not appear to call for protocols to be enhanced with full DB-protection yet.
Should such DB frauds appear in practice, would we then see fully-fledged DB
solutions being implemented for commercial purposes? Or, will the 5th generation
of mobile networks (5G) and its increased spectrum and higher bands lead to the
true rise of DB technology in the ubiquitous systems of the 2020s, and raise new
DB research questions?
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.