58
3 Governance: Solving or Reproducing Inequalities
entrepreneurship literature (Weik 2011), it is useful in this respect to refer to Sabatier’s
(1988) concept of policy beliefs. He has argued that conflicts in policy-making and
governance do not owe simply to opposing self-interests, but rather to differences
in perceptions, ideas, and visions of how to go about certain issues (Sabatier 1988).
This understanding does not rule out self-interest as a potential motivation. However,
it acknowledges that its role, when present, is played not apart from but enmeshed
in a subjective patchwork of conceptions, preferences, and views that, together, will
compose certain policy-related beliefs rather than others.
Institutional entrepreneurs thus come to the fore as skilled individuals or collective
actors targeting policies, norms, or concepts that surround them (Leca et al. 2008;
Garud et al. 2007; Battilana 2006). They may engage in norm entrepreneurship,
trying to create new or to shift existing norms and social understandings, possibly
to their benefit (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Such norms can have determinant
effects on governance as they shape how decision-making takes place, order priorities, and select among possible pathways (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Conca
2006; Bastos Lima and Persson 2020). However, entrepreneurs may also target more
tangible elements seeking a policy change. Usually, this means a major (or radical, or
paradigmatic) policy change, which goes beyond incremental modifications (Sabatier
and Weible 2007; Meijerink and Huitema 2010).
Finally, there is the question of the means and strategies used to create, replace,
modify, or eliminate institutions. As reviewed by Weik (2011), it is well established in
the literature that institutional entrepreneurs: (i) mobilize material resources (Battilana 2006; Garud et al. 2007; Levy and Scully 2007); (ii) mobilize other actors (Fligstein 2001; Garud et al. 2007; Leca et al. 2008); and (iii) create meaning (Garud et al.
2007; Rao and Giorgi 2006; Zilber 2007). These strategies are very much interrelated,
as entrepreneurs may mobilize other actors to expand their material capabilities. The
mobilization of other actors may, in turn, depend on creating meaning for them, i.e.,
on framing issues and marketing solutions in a compelling way (Leca et al. 2008).
The specifics will vary in each case (see Huitema et al. 2011). What is clear is that,
first, institutional entrepreneurs seldom succeed alone; they typically find allies and
build coalitions (Fligstein 2001; Leca et al. 2008; see also Sabatier 1988). Second,
change needs a direction, and alternatives are more likely to become credible and
win support after being tested. In other words, it is essential to conceive consistent
alternatives and demonstrate their performance (for instance, through pilot projects)
(Huitema et al. 2011). Third, it is useful to detect and exploit windows of opportunity when institutional change may be (more) feasible (Kingdon 1995; Meijerink and
Huitema 2010). Fourth, it is useful to “shop” for—and eventually manipulate—fora
and decision-making venues to bypass resistance and have the best circumstances to
advance one’s claims, framings, and views (Huitema et al. 2011).
Thus, if the success of agency can be measured as the extent to which one’s views,
preferences and policy-related beliefs are represented, institutionalized, influence
decision-making, and eventually affect the course of development, then agency can
be broadly understood as the strategic use of power in governance. The following
section explores this concept in further detail.
3 Governance: Solving or Reproducing Inequalities
entrepreneurship literature (Weik 2011), it is useful in this respect to refer to Sabatier’s
(1988) concept of policy beliefs. He has argued that conflicts in policy-making and
governance do not owe simply to opposing self-interests, but rather to differences
in perceptions, ideas, and visions of how to go about certain issues (Sabatier 1988).
This understanding does not rule out self-interest as a potential motivation. However,
it acknowledges that its role, when present, is played not apart from but enmeshed
in a subjective patchwork of conceptions, preferences, and views that, together, will
compose certain policy-related beliefs rather than others.
Institutional entrepreneurs thus come to the fore as skilled individuals or collective
actors targeting policies, norms, or concepts that surround them (Leca et al. 2008;
Garud et al. 2007; Battilana 2006). They may engage in norm entrepreneurship,
trying to create new or to shift existing norms and social understandings, possibly
to their benefit (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Such norms can have determinant
effects on governance as they shape how decision-making takes place, order priorities, and select among possible pathways (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Conca
2006; Bastos Lima and Persson 2020). However, entrepreneurs may also target more
tangible elements seeking a policy change. Usually, this means a major (or radical, or
paradigmatic) policy change, which goes beyond incremental modifications (Sabatier
and Weible 2007; Meijerink and Huitema 2010).
Finally, there is the question of the means and strategies used to create, replace,
modify, or eliminate institutions. As reviewed by Weik (2011), it is well established in
the literature that institutional entrepreneurs: (i) mobilize material resources (Battilana 2006; Garud et al. 2007; Levy and Scully 2007); (ii) mobilize other actors (Fligstein 2001; Garud et al. 2007; Leca et al. 2008); and (iii) create meaning (Garud et al.
2007; Rao and Giorgi 2006; Zilber 2007). These strategies are very much interrelated,
as entrepreneurs may mobilize other actors to expand their material capabilities. The
mobilization of other actors may, in turn, depend on creating meaning for them, i.e.,
on framing issues and marketing solutions in a compelling way (Leca et al. 2008).
The specifics will vary in each case (see Huitema et al. 2011). What is clear is that,
first, institutional entrepreneurs seldom succeed alone; they typically find allies and
build coalitions (Fligstein 2001; Leca et al. 2008; see also Sabatier 1988). Second,
change needs a direction, and alternatives are more likely to become credible and
win support after being tested. In other words, it is essential to conceive consistent
alternatives and demonstrate their performance (for instance, through pilot projects)
(Huitema et al. 2011). Third, it is useful to detect and exploit windows of opportunity when institutional change may be (more) feasible (Kingdon 1995; Meijerink and
Huitema 2010). Fourth, it is useful to “shop” for—and eventually manipulate—fora
and decision-making venues to bypass resistance and have the best circumstances to
advance one’s claims, framings, and views (Huitema et al. 2011).
Thus, if the success of agency can be measured as the extent to which one’s views,
preferences and policy-related beliefs are represented, institutionalized, influence
decision-making, and eventually affect the course of development, then agency can
be broadly understood as the strategic use of power in governance. The following
section explores this concept in further detail.