9.2 Unraveling the Politics of Bioeconomy Governance
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hampered further, actors also lose some of their capacity to act. They enjoy less
power to pursue their preferred development paths, advocate for policy, or resist and
counter mainstream discourses. They become less capable in terms of “power to”
and even more susceptible to become victims of “power over” from other, dominant
actors. This connection between outcomes and power, in a way, holds the key to
explaining why certain biofuel production patterns have prevailed, as discussed in
the next section.
9.2.6 Unraveling the Power Spirals
Dimensions of equity, institutional architecture and human agency frequently are
studied in separation from one another. However, this research has shown the importance of recognizing how they are functionally integrated and interconnected in
governance. As argued in Chap. 3, systemic loops link the outcomes of all three
dimensions—adding some complexity to the usual “agent-structure debate,” which
tends to emphasize the institutional milieu and often overlooks the influence of
material dimensions on agency.
Biofuel governance demonstrates that the roots of inequity are often found in
agency. Agency, in turn, frequently has an eye on the allocation and access patterns
the institutions put in place will foster. Powerful actors have been shown to systematically retain most benefits, to secure the most advantageous roles (in governance and
value chains or webs), and to actively keep the underlying foundations of inequality
all in place. Inequity and the worsening of inequalities operate through power feedbacks. These feedbacks strengthen actors who already are in dominant positions
while further undermining the remaining resources and means of action that weaker
actors had so far retained (e.g., communal lands, water access, local forms of organization around their mixed farming systems). In this regard, inclusion has often
meant to politically surrender their alternative development visions and preferences in
exchange for immediate and otherwise unavailable benefits—a Faustian bargain—in
inequitable value chains and exclusive governance arrangements.
The case study chapters detailed how dominant agents utilize both short and long
power feedback loops. Through the former route, agents have directly promoted activities that primarily benefit themselves without recurring to institutional entrepreneurship, i.e., without attempting to change the existing institutional setting. That has
included agribusiness’ unilateral use of material capabilities—or of “power to”—to
expand over others the agri-food-biomass systems it controls. Similarly, the direct
actions or infrastructural warfare (e.g., land invasions, destruction of crop fields,
buildings, or other property) of either agribusiness or peasant movements undermine
each other’s strength and thereby the impacts created by their activities (see Chap. 5;
see also Russo Lopes and Bastos Lima 2020). Meanwhile, long feedback loops,
through the institutional setup, have also been extensively present in the emerging
bioeconomy governance. They involve various forms of institutional entrepreneurship and policy advocacy (e.g., producing public incentives for the preferred forms
215
hampered further, actors also lose some of their capacity to act. They enjoy less
power to pursue their preferred development paths, advocate for policy, or resist and
counter mainstream discourses. They become less capable in terms of “power to”
and even more susceptible to become victims of “power over” from other, dominant
actors. This connection between outcomes and power, in a way, holds the key to
explaining why certain biofuel production patterns have prevailed, as discussed in
the next section.
9.2.6 Unraveling the Power Spirals
Dimensions of equity, institutional architecture and human agency frequently are
studied in separation from one another. However, this research has shown the importance of recognizing how they are functionally integrated and interconnected in
governance. As argued in Chap. 3, systemic loops link the outcomes of all three
dimensions—adding some complexity to the usual “agent-structure debate,” which
tends to emphasize the institutional milieu and often overlooks the influence of
material dimensions on agency.
Biofuel governance demonstrates that the roots of inequity are often found in
agency. Agency, in turn, frequently has an eye on the allocation and access patterns
the institutions put in place will foster. Powerful actors have been shown to systematically retain most benefits, to secure the most advantageous roles (in governance and
value chains or webs), and to actively keep the underlying foundations of inequality
all in place. Inequity and the worsening of inequalities operate through power feedbacks. These feedbacks strengthen actors who already are in dominant positions
while further undermining the remaining resources and means of action that weaker
actors had so far retained (e.g., communal lands, water access, local forms of organization around their mixed farming systems). In this regard, inclusion has often
meant to politically surrender their alternative development visions and preferences in
exchange for immediate and otherwise unavailable benefits—a Faustian bargain—in
inequitable value chains and exclusive governance arrangements.
The case study chapters detailed how dominant agents utilize both short and long
power feedback loops. Through the former route, agents have directly promoted activities that primarily benefit themselves without recurring to institutional entrepreneurship, i.e., without attempting to change the existing institutional setting. That has
included agribusiness’ unilateral use of material capabilities—or of “power to”—to
expand over others the agri-food-biomass systems it controls. Similarly, the direct
actions or infrastructural warfare (e.g., land invasions, destruction of crop fields,
buildings, or other property) of either agribusiness or peasant movements undermine
each other’s strength and thereby the impacts created by their activities (see Chap. 5;
see also Russo Lopes and Bastos Lima 2020). Meanwhile, long feedback loops,
through the institutional setup, have also been extensively present in the emerging
bioeconomy governance. They involve various forms of institutional entrepreneurship and policy advocacy (e.g., producing public incentives for the preferred forms