9.2 Unraveling the Politics of Bioeconomy Governance
207
have sometimes included social or environmental requirements, such as incorporating
smallholders or avoiding deforestation. Although this has sometimes backfired, in
other cases—notably that of Brazil’s social fuel seal on biodiesel (see Chap. 5)—
those requirements were crucial to improving the outcomes. In either case, public
policies have been the primary determinant of the sustainability performance of
bioeconomy promotion through biofuel value chains.
In contrast, an absence of rules in a lean, neoliberal framework has characterized
international biofuel governance. Its norms have included: (i) an uncritical assumption that biofuels should be produced through conventional agriculture and on a
large scale; (ii) the need to promote them as internationally traded commodities;
and, implicitly, (iii) an understanding that multilateral rules on biofuels should be
kept to a minimum, usually limiting themselves to technical standardization, thus
allowing countries to freely pursue their agendas irrespective of the global impacts
they might have.
Based on these norms, state and non-state actors from major producer countries
have set up many new organizations (e.g., the Global Bioenergy Partnership, the
International Biofuels Forum) as well as working groups within pre-existing agencies
(e.g., IEA Bioenergy) to promote cooperation and also deployment in non-member
countries. Meanwhile, more inclusive fora such as UN agencies have been vocal
and engaged on biofuel sustainability issues, but “non-decisions” have prevailed
due to the refusal of major producers to agree on any international rules that could
limit their agendas. This broadly permissive institutional setting is in stark contrast
with the concerns expressed internationally in scientific and policy circles (see FAO
et al. 2011; HLPE 2013b). Such an international vacuum of rules has been particularly crucial to developing countries. They experience most food insecurity and land
grabbing issues, and foreign investments drive most of their biofuel expansion (see
Chap. 4; see also Schoneveld 2010; Smith 2010; German et al. 2011). Furthermore,
the absence of an international regime has led to unilateral sustainability policymaking filling the regulatory gap via extraterritorial control over supply chains.
However, besides its much more limited applicability, this arrangement exacerbates
political power inequalities as producer countries become subject to sustainability
rules without having a say in their making (Bastos Lima and Gupta 2014).
More broadly, three underlying norms have constrained bioeconomy governance
and limited the potentials of value-web development. First, the involvement of weaker
actors such as smallholders or low-income countries has been a prevailing norm,
almost a development mission, based implicitly or explicitly on such ideas as participation, social inclusion, and empowerment. However, that has been limited to an
economic understanding of these concepts. Weaker actors are included but usually
not their views, interests, or preferences. Inclusion and exclusion are seen as a
black-or-white dichotomy; it is assumed that inclusion is good and exclusion is
bad, that inclusion always reduces inequalities, and that the excluded always want
to be included (Hospes and Clancy 2011). Hence, there is supposedly no need to
conduct any meaningful consultation. However, not only does this overlook the risks
of adverse incorporation, but it also leads to top-down strategies where dominant
actors impose their views and rules on weaker ones under uneven power relations.
207
have sometimes included social or environmental requirements, such as incorporating
smallholders or avoiding deforestation. Although this has sometimes backfired, in
other cases—notably that of Brazil’s social fuel seal on biodiesel (see Chap. 5)—
those requirements were crucial to improving the outcomes. In either case, public
policies have been the primary determinant of the sustainability performance of
bioeconomy promotion through biofuel value chains.
In contrast, an absence of rules in a lean, neoliberal framework has characterized
international biofuel governance. Its norms have included: (i) an uncritical assumption that biofuels should be produced through conventional agriculture and on a
large scale; (ii) the need to promote them as internationally traded commodities;
and, implicitly, (iii) an understanding that multilateral rules on biofuels should be
kept to a minimum, usually limiting themselves to technical standardization, thus
allowing countries to freely pursue their agendas irrespective of the global impacts
they might have.
Based on these norms, state and non-state actors from major producer countries
have set up many new organizations (e.g., the Global Bioenergy Partnership, the
International Biofuels Forum) as well as working groups within pre-existing agencies
(e.g., IEA Bioenergy) to promote cooperation and also deployment in non-member
countries. Meanwhile, more inclusive fora such as UN agencies have been vocal
and engaged on biofuel sustainability issues, but “non-decisions” have prevailed
due to the refusal of major producers to agree on any international rules that could
limit their agendas. This broadly permissive institutional setting is in stark contrast
with the concerns expressed internationally in scientific and policy circles (see FAO
et al. 2011; HLPE 2013b). Such an international vacuum of rules has been particularly crucial to developing countries. They experience most food insecurity and land
grabbing issues, and foreign investments drive most of their biofuel expansion (see
Chap. 4; see also Schoneveld 2010; Smith 2010; German et al. 2011). Furthermore,
the absence of an international regime has led to unilateral sustainability policymaking filling the regulatory gap via extraterritorial control over supply chains.
However, besides its much more limited applicability, this arrangement exacerbates
political power inequalities as producer countries become subject to sustainability
rules without having a say in their making (Bastos Lima and Gupta 2014).
More broadly, three underlying norms have constrained bioeconomy governance
and limited the potentials of value-web development. First, the involvement of weaker
actors such as smallholders or low-income countries has been a prevailing norm,
almost a development mission, based implicitly or explicitly on such ideas as participation, social inclusion, and empowerment. However, that has been limited to an
economic understanding of these concepts. Weaker actors are included but usually
not their views, interests, or preferences. Inclusion and exclusion are seen as a
black-or-white dichotomy; it is assumed that inclusion is good and exclusion is
bad, that inclusion always reduces inequalities, and that the excluded always want
to be included (Hospes and Clancy 2011). Hence, there is supposedly no need to
conduct any meaningful consultation. However, not only does this overlook the risks
of adverse incorporation, but it also leads to top-down strategies where dominant
actors impose their views and rules on weaker ones under uneven power relations.