192
8 Bioeconomy Lessons from Biofuel Policies …
biofuels’ drawbacks and promote them uncritically provides a clear illustration of
that divide.
In the end, how transnational is the agency of those involved in biofuel governance? Arguably, it is somewhat transnational, but not much. The biofuels case
seems to corroborate the Neo-Marxist and Neo-Gramscian authors’ argument that
there are global classes with similar approaches, views, and policy beliefs, but operating primarily within state contexts (Cox 1987; Gill 1991). This observation is not
to deny the emergence of an increasing number of transnational agents such as large
NGOs and multinational corporations. However, these have not been the key agents of
biofuels governance. Concerning ideas, material capabilities, and institutions alike,
most seem to stem from the national-state level—or supra-national, in the EU case.
Since biofuels have mainly been a state-led agenda, transnational actors have played
in conformity with this and mostly acted within national contexts—even if occasionally in more than one. As such, their agency may have been multinational, but
not transnational.
3 Even if the views and policy beliefs they hold can be considered
transnational, their actions, for the most part, have not.
8.3.3 Inferences: Agency Patterns in Biofuels Promotion
This comparative assessment has shown that those countries not only have had similar
approaches to biofuel development, policy choices, and sets of main winners and
losers, but also a consistent pattern of dominating views and agent types. The case
studies also provide evidence to the claim that institutional outcomes are strictly
dependent on who holds the dominant positions among advocacy coalitions and in
policy-making. It seems fair to argue that Brazil has obtained some minor but still
positive results in smallholder inclusion mainly because representative social movements found their way to policy-making. Inversely, the lack of success with jatropha
in India seems to owe largely to the exclusion of local actors from decision-making.
In a way, India and Indonesia have displayed a more top-down domestic biofuel
governance along the lines of administrative rationalism, based on state authority
and formal (scientific) expertise. In contrast, the Brazilian approach displayed more
signs of democratic participation (see Dryzek 2005).
There has been a clear tendency for dominant coalitions to pursue biofuel production strategies that increase their access to resources while hampering weaker actors.
This approach seems partly motivated by policy beliefs that suggests it as the right
way to go, but there is more to it. Their dominant approaches have also included
shortsightedness, negligence, or ignorance about the needs of others, as in the case
of rural dwellers and “wastelands.” Finally, to an extent, it is also a purposeful act to
undermine their opponents’ strength—this latter rationale becoming more relevant
when there is an adversarial coalition promoting a competing approach, as in the
case of Brazil.
3 See Robinson and Harris (2000) for an in-depth discussion on this differentiation.
8 Bioeconomy Lessons from Biofuel Policies …
biofuels’ drawbacks and promote them uncritically provides a clear illustration of
that divide.
In the end, how transnational is the agency of those involved in biofuel governance? Arguably, it is somewhat transnational, but not much. The biofuels case
seems to corroborate the Neo-Marxist and Neo-Gramscian authors’ argument that
there are global classes with similar approaches, views, and policy beliefs, but operating primarily within state contexts (Cox 1987; Gill 1991). This observation is not
to deny the emergence of an increasing number of transnational agents such as large
NGOs and multinational corporations. However, these have not been the key agents of
biofuels governance. Concerning ideas, material capabilities, and institutions alike,
most seem to stem from the national-state level—or supra-national, in the EU case.
Since biofuels have mainly been a state-led agenda, transnational actors have played
in conformity with this and mostly acted within national contexts—even if occasionally in more than one. As such, their agency may have been multinational, but
not transnational.
3 Even if the views and policy beliefs they hold can be considered
transnational, their actions, for the most part, have not.
8.3.3 Inferences: Agency Patterns in Biofuels Promotion
This comparative assessment has shown that those countries not only have had similar
approaches to biofuel development, policy choices, and sets of main winners and
losers, but also a consistent pattern of dominating views and agent types. The case
studies also provide evidence to the claim that institutional outcomes are strictly
dependent on who holds the dominant positions among advocacy coalitions and in
policy-making. It seems fair to argue that Brazil has obtained some minor but still
positive results in smallholder inclusion mainly because representative social movements found their way to policy-making. Inversely, the lack of success with jatropha
in India seems to owe largely to the exclusion of local actors from decision-making.
In a way, India and Indonesia have displayed a more top-down domestic biofuel
governance along the lines of administrative rationalism, based on state authority
and formal (scientific) expertise. In contrast, the Brazilian approach displayed more
signs of democratic participation (see Dryzek 2005).
There has been a clear tendency for dominant coalitions to pursue biofuel production strategies that increase their access to resources while hampering weaker actors.
This approach seems partly motivated by policy beliefs that suggests it as the right
way to go, but there is more to it. Their dominant approaches have also included
shortsightedness, negligence, or ignorance about the needs of others, as in the case
of rural dwellers and “wastelands.” Finally, to an extent, it is also a purposeful act to
undermine their opponents’ strength—this latter rationale becoming more relevant
when there is an adversarial coalition promoting a competing approach, as in the
case of Brazil.
3 See Robinson and Harris (2000) for an in-depth discussion on this differentiation.