6.4 Conclusions
141
the production chain was revealed to be uneconomic and unviable. Clearly, despite
the official discourse on climate change mitigation and rural development needs, the
Indian strategy’s main aim has been to quickly build (renewable) energy supplies.
Nevertheless, this pursuit has been without sufficient consideration of the rural poor’s
needs and interests or even to the performance of the crop selected to be planted over
more than 11 million hectares.
Third, these strategies stem from the dominance of a coalition of state and agribusiness actors that have concretized their policy beliefs without meaningful political
opposition. Sugarcane was chosen as an ethanol feedstock not merely because it
already had an established production infrastructure, sector-oriented policies and
technologies (as in some apolitical path dependency), but also due to its powerful
lobby to capture this new biofuel market. Meanwhile, the government has adopted
a centralized, top-down approach to rural development—a form of administrative
rationalism (see Dryzek 2005)—and drawn policies solely based on formal and
recognized expertise, without meaningful stakeholder consultation. Critics, in turn,
have failed to coordinate themselves as a coalition and to advocate effectively for an
alternative agenda.
Finally, as in the Brazilian case, more systemic causes can be found in the
distributive outcomes and social impacts these biofuel production patterns create.
This (re)distribution refers, in particular, to the transfer of legal or de facto control
over land and freshwater resources from local communities to the private sector or
the state. Such a pathway not only meets the policy beliefs of the dominant coalition,
but it also increases their material capabilities at the expense of already impoverished
rural populations. These weaker actors thus become even weaker, and their capacity
to influence governance is reduced even further. Moreover, with the expansion of
production systems where smallholders are subordinate to private or state-controlled
companies that keep all decision-making and value-added to themselves, not only
are structural inequalities reproduced and maintained, but smallholders also lose
autonomy. Their room or ability to pursue alternative production patterns based on
their views becomes ever smaller. Figure 6.3 synthesizes these dynamics.
6.4.2 Alternatives
Equitable biofuel production strategies would require, first, respecting customary
land rights and the local use of resources from the so-called “wastelands.” If there is
such tremendous pressure for land in India, it stands to reason that 11 million hectares
can hardly be entirely unused and available. Such land conflicts could be avoided
by complementing satellite mapping with assessments on the ground for adequate
planning. Second, biofuel policies can require mixed food and feedstock cultivation
for safeguarding local economic and food security.
Third, precise equity requirements would likely improve the quality of smallholder inclusion: collective representation at contract negotiation to increase farmers’
141
the production chain was revealed to be uneconomic and unviable. Clearly, despite
the official discourse on climate change mitigation and rural development needs, the
Indian strategy’s main aim has been to quickly build (renewable) energy supplies.
Nevertheless, this pursuit has been without sufficient consideration of the rural poor’s
needs and interests or even to the performance of the crop selected to be planted over
more than 11 million hectares.
Third, these strategies stem from the dominance of a coalition of state and agribusiness actors that have concretized their policy beliefs without meaningful political
opposition. Sugarcane was chosen as an ethanol feedstock not merely because it
already had an established production infrastructure, sector-oriented policies and
technologies (as in some apolitical path dependency), but also due to its powerful
lobby to capture this new biofuel market. Meanwhile, the government has adopted
a centralized, top-down approach to rural development—a form of administrative
rationalism (see Dryzek 2005)—and drawn policies solely based on formal and
recognized expertise, without meaningful stakeholder consultation. Critics, in turn,
have failed to coordinate themselves as a coalition and to advocate effectively for an
alternative agenda.
Finally, as in the Brazilian case, more systemic causes can be found in the
distributive outcomes and social impacts these biofuel production patterns create.
This (re)distribution refers, in particular, to the transfer of legal or de facto control
over land and freshwater resources from local communities to the private sector or
the state. Such a pathway not only meets the policy beliefs of the dominant coalition,
but it also increases their material capabilities at the expense of already impoverished
rural populations. These weaker actors thus become even weaker, and their capacity
to influence governance is reduced even further. Moreover, with the expansion of
production systems where smallholders are subordinate to private or state-controlled
companies that keep all decision-making and value-added to themselves, not only
are structural inequalities reproduced and maintained, but smallholders also lose
autonomy. Their room or ability to pursue alternative production patterns based on
their views becomes ever smaller. Figure 6.3 synthesizes these dynamics.
6.4.2 Alternatives
Equitable biofuel production strategies would require, first, respecting customary
land rights and the local use of resources from the so-called “wastelands.” If there is
such tremendous pressure for land in India, it stands to reason that 11 million hectares
can hardly be entirely unused and available. Such land conflicts could be avoided
by complementing satellite mapping with assessments on the ground for adequate
planning. Second, biofuel policies can require mixed food and feedstock cultivation
for safeguarding local economic and food security.
Third, precise equity requirements would likely improve the quality of smallholder inclusion: collective representation at contract negotiation to increase farmers’