6.3 Agency in Biofuel Governance in India
139
Actions on this area [thus] become further legitimized. It also gives us one more reason to
do it. In short, the international context creates the space for us to reframe the argument for
things we want to do anyway. (Personal interview)
Second, dominant actors have maintained the colonial terminology of “wastelands”
to downplay their existing uses and thus legitimize attempts to “put them to use”
(Baka 2014). Third, it has tactically used the energy poverty argument even though
the biofuel policy has no instruments targeting it (see Planning Commission 2003;
MNRE 2009). Fourth, it has labeled jatropha as a “smallholder crop” suitable for
“pro-poor development”, even though those who have come up with this mainstream
strategy, developed it, and carried it out are neither smallholders nor poor. Indian
smallholders and rural poor have age-old agricultural traditions, with a vast amount
of traditional knowledge and material resources. That includes social practices as well
as locally bred seeds, adjusted to India’s agro-climatic conditions and controlled by
rural communities. Yet none of those were meaningfully explored as “smallholder
crops for pro-poor development.”
Scientists, in turn, have often helped buttress mainstream discourses—a role scientists frequently play in policy advocacy (Sabatier and Zafonte 2001). Researchers
have supported the Indian biofuels agenda in various ways, such as by providing
(over)estimations of jatropha productivity (e.g., Leduc et al. 2009), praising the
advantages of biofuel utilization (e.g., Jain and Sharma 2010), or making overly
optimistic assessments of large-scale feedstock cultivation without recognizing its
drawbacks (e.g., Chauhan et al. 2007). Given that most government authorities and
policy-makers already subscribe to this perspective, the target audience seems to be
rather the broader scientific community and perhaps foreign or international actors,
in an attempt to garner resources from abroad or simply as a way to portray India’s
potentials for success.
Finally, at the implementation level, the persuasion of smallholders and rural
communities about the supposed advantages of growing jatropha has also been
crucial. Tactics have included, for instance, pro-jatropha theatrical presentations in
rural areas, its promotion through local teachers in schools, and co-optation of local
leaders and authorities.
5 This discursive engagement has been complemented by
using structural power to list jatropha for public credit with major lenders such as
the State Bank of India, alongside instrumental power to provide the financial and
material capabilities that small farmers generally lack.
India’s large-scale biodiesel agenda has so far failed much more due to incorrect
assumptions about jatropha and lack of price viability (sometimes compromising an
understanding between government and industry) than to successful political opposition in the realm of agency or policy advocacy. Although NGOs have launched
campaigns criticizing India’s biofuel policy, this has hardly made a dent in the dominant agenda. Indicative of this is that none of the minor policy changes the biofuels
agenda has experienced are related to the social and environmental issues raised
5 These tactics were mentioned in an internal, unpublished report of a Delhi-based private research
institute funded by the government promoting jatropha cultivation among smallholders in Andhra
Pradesh. In its own terminology, the goal was to “rope in” as many smallholders as possible.
139
Actions on this area [thus] become further legitimized. It also gives us one more reason to
do it. In short, the international context creates the space for us to reframe the argument for
things we want to do anyway. (Personal interview)
Second, dominant actors have maintained the colonial terminology of “wastelands”
to downplay their existing uses and thus legitimize attempts to “put them to use”
(Baka 2014). Third, it has tactically used the energy poverty argument even though
the biofuel policy has no instruments targeting it (see Planning Commission 2003;
MNRE 2009). Fourth, it has labeled jatropha as a “smallholder crop” suitable for
“pro-poor development”, even though those who have come up with this mainstream
strategy, developed it, and carried it out are neither smallholders nor poor. Indian
smallholders and rural poor have age-old agricultural traditions, with a vast amount
of traditional knowledge and material resources. That includes social practices as well
as locally bred seeds, adjusted to India’s agro-climatic conditions and controlled by
rural communities. Yet none of those were meaningfully explored as “smallholder
crops for pro-poor development.”
Scientists, in turn, have often helped buttress mainstream discourses—a role scientists frequently play in policy advocacy (Sabatier and Zafonte 2001). Researchers
have supported the Indian biofuels agenda in various ways, such as by providing
(over)estimations of jatropha productivity (e.g., Leduc et al. 2009), praising the
advantages of biofuel utilization (e.g., Jain and Sharma 2010), or making overly
optimistic assessments of large-scale feedstock cultivation without recognizing its
drawbacks (e.g., Chauhan et al. 2007). Given that most government authorities and
policy-makers already subscribe to this perspective, the target audience seems to be
rather the broader scientific community and perhaps foreign or international actors,
in an attempt to garner resources from abroad or simply as a way to portray India’s
potentials for success.
Finally, at the implementation level, the persuasion of smallholders and rural
communities about the supposed advantages of growing jatropha has also been
crucial. Tactics have included, for instance, pro-jatropha theatrical presentations in
rural areas, its promotion through local teachers in schools, and co-optation of local
leaders and authorities.
5 This discursive engagement has been complemented by
using structural power to list jatropha for public credit with major lenders such as
the State Bank of India, alongside instrumental power to provide the financial and
material capabilities that small farmers generally lack.
India’s large-scale biodiesel agenda has so far failed much more due to incorrect
assumptions about jatropha and lack of price viability (sometimes compromising an
understanding between government and industry) than to successful political opposition in the realm of agency or policy advocacy. Although NGOs have launched
campaigns criticizing India’s biofuel policy, this has hardly made a dent in the dominant agenda. Indicative of this is that none of the minor policy changes the biofuels
agenda has experienced are related to the social and environmental issues raised
5 These tactics were mentioned in an internal, unpublished report of a Delhi-based private research
institute funded by the government promoting jatropha cultivation among smallholders in Andhra
Pradesh. In its own terminology, the goal was to “rope in” as many smallholders as possible.