9 Climate Change and Eschatology
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those who claimed to know exactly what is going to happen during the time of the
end. Richard Pratt spoke of a “monomania in the interpretation of biblical prophecy”
(Pratt 1993, n.p.) and set out to challenge this widespread hermeneutical orientation
by exploring the role of Old Testament predictions and investigating their respective
conditionality and fulfillment (Pratt 1993, n.p.). He observed that sometimes future
events conformed to a prophet’s words, but at other times they did not. How is this
to be interpreted?
As a Reformed theologian, Pratt takes seriously the Calvinistic tradition according
to which “God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own
will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pass” (Westminster Confession of Faith of 1647). Hence, what God has once ordained, remains immutable. But
the Reformed tradition of Calvin not only spoke of the immutability of God’s plan
but also of divine providence: “Although in relation to the decree of God, the first
cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence
he often orders them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes.” (Westminster Confession 5.2) Calvin balanced the immutability of God’s decrees with an
acknowledgement of God’s complex involvement in the progression of history. “In
this sense”, writes Pratt, “belief in God’s immutability does not negate the importance of historical contingencies, especially human choice. … For this reason, we
should not be surprised to find that intervening historical contingencies, especially
human reactions, had significant effects on the way predictions were realized.”
Pratt goes on to distinguish between three different kinds of prophetic predictions:
(1) predictions qualified by conditions, (2) predictions qualified by assurances, and
(3) predictions without qualifications.
An example of the first type (predictions qualified by conditions) is Isa 1:19–20:
“If you are ready and obey, you will eat the best produce of the land; but if you resist
and rebel, you will be eaten by the sword.” The conditionality of such a prophecy
is bipolar and goes into two directions. There are also conditional predictions which
are only unipolar such as Isa 7:9: “If you are not faithful, then you will not stand at
all.” The prediction does not spell out what would happen if Israel is faithful, hence,
it aims at one direction only.
As for the second type (predictions qualified by assurances), these prophecies
forbid the people to intervene or pray to God as this would be futile and would not
lead to Him changing his mind. “And they may cry to me, but I will not listen to
them” is an example of this (Jer 11:11b). Or God takes a solemn oath (in the form
of “As I live …” or “As Yahweh lives …”) in order to add weight to his prediction
and to emphasize that the prediction is unequivocal. However, the reason why God
forbade the people to pray or for the prophet to intervene on their behalf, seems to be,
so Pratt, that such interventions had been proven to actually be effective. “Yahweh
forbade prayers in response to some oracles precisely because prayer usually had
the potential of effecting outcomes (Jer 26:19; Jonah 3:10; Amos 7:1–9). Similarly,
Yahweh declared that he would not ‘turn back’ or ‘relent’ from some courses of action
because he normally left those options open (Joel 2:14; Amos 7:3, 6 Jon 3:9).” So
the prohibition to pray or intervene paradoxically implies the tacit and unexpressed
conditionality of these very prophecies. Such conditionality is corroborated by a
177
those who claimed to know exactly what is going to happen during the time of the
end. Richard Pratt spoke of a “monomania in the interpretation of biblical prophecy”
(Pratt 1993, n.p.) and set out to challenge this widespread hermeneutical orientation
by exploring the role of Old Testament predictions and investigating their respective
conditionality and fulfillment (Pratt 1993, n.p.). He observed that sometimes future
events conformed to a prophet’s words, but at other times they did not. How is this
to be interpreted?
As a Reformed theologian, Pratt takes seriously the Calvinistic tradition according
to which “God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own
will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pass” (Westminster Confession of Faith of 1647). Hence, what God has once ordained, remains immutable. But
the Reformed tradition of Calvin not only spoke of the immutability of God’s plan
but also of divine providence: “Although in relation to the decree of God, the first
cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence
he often orders them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes.” (Westminster Confession 5.2) Calvin balanced the immutability of God’s decrees with an
acknowledgement of God’s complex involvement in the progression of history. “In
this sense”, writes Pratt, “belief in God’s immutability does not negate the importance of historical contingencies, especially human choice. … For this reason, we
should not be surprised to find that intervening historical contingencies, especially
human reactions, had significant effects on the way predictions were realized.”
Pratt goes on to distinguish between three different kinds of prophetic predictions:
(1) predictions qualified by conditions, (2) predictions qualified by assurances, and
(3) predictions without qualifications.
An example of the first type (predictions qualified by conditions) is Isa 1:19–20:
“If you are ready and obey, you will eat the best produce of the land; but if you resist
and rebel, you will be eaten by the sword.” The conditionality of such a prophecy
is bipolar and goes into two directions. There are also conditional predictions which
are only unipolar such as Isa 7:9: “If you are not faithful, then you will not stand at
all.” The prediction does not spell out what would happen if Israel is faithful, hence,
it aims at one direction only.
As for the second type (predictions qualified by assurances), these prophecies
forbid the people to intervene or pray to God as this would be futile and would not
lead to Him changing his mind. “And they may cry to me, but I will not listen to
them” is an example of this (Jer 11:11b). Or God takes a solemn oath (in the form
of “As I live …” or “As Yahweh lives …”) in order to add weight to his prediction
and to emphasize that the prediction is unequivocal. However, the reason why God
forbade the people to pray or for the prophet to intervene on their behalf, seems to be,
so Pratt, that such interventions had been proven to actually be effective. “Yahweh
forbade prayers in response to some oracles precisely because prayer usually had
the potential of effecting outcomes (Jer 26:19; Jonah 3:10; Amos 7:1–9). Similarly,
Yahweh declared that he would not ‘turn back’ or ‘relent’ from some courses of action
because he normally left those options open (Joel 2:14; Amos 7:3, 6 Jon 3:9).” So
the prohibition to pray or intervene paradoxically implies the tacit and unexpressed
conditionality of these very prophecies. Such conditionality is corroborated by a