processes leading to collective decision-making in managing and governing
groundwater resources.
5 Institutions: Towards Integration of Groundwater
Management and Governance
Ostrom (1990) “design principles” in the management of common pool resources
such as aquifers make a clear reference to resource pool, the local scale of operation
and sustained co-operation among users of the resource. The design principles are:
Table 3 Narrowing the gap between management and governance—a broad-based template for
actions
Broad parameters for
sustainable groundwater
management
Major challenges in
developing and/or sustaining
the parameter of management
The most important element
that defines groundwater
governance in addressing the
challenge
Efficient groundwater
usage defined by
optimal extraction for
different uses
Inherent complexity of
groundwater settings, lack of
data and information, the
externality of energy and the
poor understanding of
energy-groundwater
relationships
Information and data at
appropriate scales, a finer
understanding of groundwater
and energy and defining
groundwater efficiency as a
measure of aquifer
productivity rather than water
productivity
Equitable distribution
leading to fair and just
supply of groundwater
The complicity of land and
water rights; priorities of
groundwater usage—economic
(irrigation) returns take
precedence over social
(drinking water) and ecological
(base flows) returns
Political commitment along
with robust legal provisions
that enable a protection of
social water right over
economic ones
Community-level
decision through formal
institutions
Breakdown of co-ordination
among stakeholders; weak
decision support due to lack of
data, facilitation and conflict
resolution
Institutional support—
decentralized support by public
agencies dealing with
groundwater and legislation
that mainly addresses
externalities of free riding the
benefits of community-led
decentralized decisionsby
formal governance institutions
Sustainable economic
returns while ensuring
environment security
Misplaced subsidy, uncertain
markets and skewed returns
(crops requiring more water
generally fetch higher and
steady returns)
Reforms in markets and market
support, especially to farmers
14
H. Kulkarni et al.
groundwater resources.
5 Institutions: Towards Integration of Groundwater
Management and Governance
Ostrom (1990) “design principles” in the management of common pool resources
such as aquifers make a clear reference to resource pool, the local scale of operation
and sustained co-operation among users of the resource. The design principles are:
Table 3 Narrowing the gap between management and governance—a broad-based template for
actions
Broad parameters for
sustainable groundwater
management
Major challenges in
developing and/or sustaining
the parameter of management
The most important element
that defines groundwater
governance in addressing the
challenge
Efficient groundwater
usage defined by
optimal extraction for
different uses
Inherent complexity of
groundwater settings, lack of
data and information, the
externality of energy and the
poor understanding of
energy-groundwater
relationships
Information and data at
appropriate scales, a finer
understanding of groundwater
and energy and defining
groundwater efficiency as a
measure of aquifer
productivity rather than water
productivity
Equitable distribution
leading to fair and just
supply of groundwater
The complicity of land and
water rights; priorities of
groundwater usage—economic
(irrigation) returns take
precedence over social
(drinking water) and ecological
(base flows) returns
Political commitment along
with robust legal provisions
that enable a protection of
social water right over
economic ones
Community-level
decision through formal
institutions
Breakdown of co-ordination
among stakeholders; weak
decision support due to lack of
data, facilitation and conflict
resolution
Institutional support—
decentralized support by public
agencies dealing with
groundwater and legislation
that mainly addresses
externalities of free riding the
benefits of community-led
decentralized decisionsby
formal governance institutions
Sustainable economic
returns while ensuring
environment security
Misplaced subsidy, uncertain
markets and skewed returns
(crops requiring more water
generally fetch higher and
steady returns)
Reforms in markets and market
support, especially to farmers
14
H. Kulkarni et al.
