without adequate safeguards, may lead to short-term enhancement in water security,
but often induce stress on river ecosystems and local biodiversity too. In turn, some
of these stressors increase a country’s vulnerability to new threats too. Countries
with a history of high investments in water infrastructure do not necessarily show
any enhanced resilience to threats to their river ecosystems–indicating the fragility
of their water security. Lack of similar investments to address biodiversity and other
threats has contributed to previously unrecognized threats (Vörösmarty et al. 2010).
It is now well recognized that the idea of water security extends beyond the
conventional means of relying on building infrastructure for enhancing it. Instead, it
needs to integrate other multiple dimensions associated with biodiversity, human
health, equity, etc. (Palmer 2010). This growing understanding defines water
security as ‘an acceptable level of water-related risks to humans and ecosystems,
coupled with the availability of water of sufficient quantity and quality to support
livelihoods, national security, human health, and ecosystem services’ (Bakker 2012:
914).
This expanded and multidimensional scope of water security warrants rethinking
by nations about their respective water resources development strategies and governance arrangements. It may be particularly challenging in a country like India
where water governance is not a federal subject but lies in the provincial domain.
With the dominant executive power concentrated with the states, the country’s
national water security depends on its federal governance arrangements. We provide an assessment of India’s current water security scenario below to discuss the
role of federal governance and how it is placed to address these challenges.
2.1 How Water-Secure is India?
If the conventional notion of quantity-based assessment is considered, India may not
sound as precarious as it is perceived. Falkenmark Stress Indicator projections made
by Central Water Commission (CWC 2019) place India in ‘water scarce’ category in
2051; it will be ‘water stressed’ much later. This is, however, an indicator of per
capita availability of water resources and not usable resources. It is not an indicator of
the actual risk. The World Resources Institute’s (WRI) Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas, a
more comprehensive assessment, with a set of 13 indicators, puts India in ‘extremely
high’ category (WRI 2019). In its most recent ranking, India is placed at 13th spot
among countries most vulnerable to water risks.
1
A more serious risk for India is attached to the quality of water and its access to
the population. Depleting groundwater levels as well as polluted water bodies and
rivers is exposing its populations to variety of contaminations with adverse impacts
1
Some of these metrics cannot give an accurate sense of the risks. Due to the large size of India,
and the extreme variations of topography, climate and water availability over space, the assessments of security need to be at a disaggregated scale. National-level assessments hide many
vulnerabilities and also opportunities for addressing the risks.
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S. Chokkakula and P. Prajapati
but often induce stress on river ecosystems and local biodiversity too. In turn, some
of these stressors increase a country’s vulnerability to new threats too. Countries
with a history of high investments in water infrastructure do not necessarily show
any enhanced resilience to threats to their river ecosystems–indicating the fragility
of their water security. Lack of similar investments to address biodiversity and other
threats has contributed to previously unrecognized threats (Vörösmarty et al. 2010).
It is now well recognized that the idea of water security extends beyond the
conventional means of relying on building infrastructure for enhancing it. Instead, it
needs to integrate other multiple dimensions associated with biodiversity, human
health, equity, etc. (Palmer 2010). This growing understanding defines water
security as ‘an acceptable level of water-related risks to humans and ecosystems,
coupled with the availability of water of sufficient quantity and quality to support
livelihoods, national security, human health, and ecosystem services’ (Bakker 2012:
914).
This expanded and multidimensional scope of water security warrants rethinking
by nations about their respective water resources development strategies and governance arrangements. It may be particularly challenging in a country like India
where water governance is not a federal subject but lies in the provincial domain.
With the dominant executive power concentrated with the states, the country’s
national water security depends on its federal governance arrangements. We provide an assessment of India’s current water security scenario below to discuss the
role of federal governance and how it is placed to address these challenges.
2.1 How Water-Secure is India?
If the conventional notion of quantity-based assessment is considered, India may not
sound as precarious as it is perceived. Falkenmark Stress Indicator projections made
by Central Water Commission (CWC 2019) place India in ‘water scarce’ category in
2051; it will be ‘water stressed’ much later. This is, however, an indicator of per
capita availability of water resources and not usable resources. It is not an indicator of
the actual risk. The World Resources Institute’s (WRI) Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas, a
more comprehensive assessment, with a set of 13 indicators, puts India in ‘extremely
high’ category (WRI 2019). In its most recent ranking, India is placed at 13th spot
among countries most vulnerable to water risks.
1
A more serious risk for India is attached to the quality of water and its access to
the population. Depleting groundwater levels as well as polluted water bodies and
rivers is exposing its populations to variety of contaminations with adverse impacts
1
Some of these metrics cannot give an accurate sense of the risks. Due to the large size of India,
and the extreme variations of topography, climate and water availability over space, the assessments of security need to be at a disaggregated scale. National-level assessments hide many
vulnerabilities and also opportunities for addressing the risks.
168
S. Chokkakula and P. Prajapati