2
1 Introduction: The Nature of Biophysics
biguously and must be logically self-consistent. The ‘best models’ cover the widest
range of natural events, with the least number of propositions.
Scientifically answering certain questions may be difficult, such as the end of
a string of whys. In addition, because our physical instruments are finite, there
may always be gaps in our knowledge. And, because logical systems with an
infinite number of elements may have unprovable propositions (a form of Gödel’s
Theorem), the ‘laws of nature’ may themselves be unlimited and even evolving.
If so, happily, there will always be more to do in our quest to understand and to
develop.
1.2 Conceptual Models of Nature
Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler!
— Albert Einstein
We are a species driven, in part, by ‘curiosity’. Curiosity leads to exploration,
exploration to a form of understanding, understanding to an ability to effectively
anticipate, manage, and develop our environment. The elaboration of such intellectual processes seems quite natural in evolution, as such abilities give a distinct
advantage over those life forms with lesser talents in this direction.
Central to the process of understanding is the creation of a ‘model’ to reflect
a set of related observations. A conceptual model of nature synthesizes a set of
observations into a mental structure which incorporates a predictive scheme. The
relationships in a physical model are required not to be contradictory, and to form
an economical way of consolidating and connecting facts.
If a model is based on an underlying logical and causal connections between
observed events, then the model becomes a ‘theory’. Theories of nature give the
user a framework on which to evaluate and plan ahead. The Babylonians, Greeks,
and Mayans were able to predict lunar eclipses using careful records showing
periodicity. As impressive and useful as these predictions were, the scheme was
not yet a theory of lunar eclipses. No underlying causal connections were given.
Those who imagined that a lunar eclipse could be generated by the shadow of a
giant bird who periodically intercepted the Moon’s light had a theory, albeit a flighty
and easily falsifiable one. Aristarchus, who thought of the Earth as a spherical body
blocking sunlight as the Sun, Earth, and Moon moved on determined paths, had a
better theory, not only because it agreed with observations, but it could also make
correct predictions of events other than lunar eclipses.
We judge theories based on the agreement of their predictions with observations
and their relative simplicity. If a competing theory makes the same predictions in
the realm of initial application but has fewer constructs and/or wider applicability,
we say it is a more ‘refined theory’. We are attracted to a more refined theory, as
it has the advantage of being easier to keep in mind, and it might give us more
1 Introduction: The Nature of Biophysics
biguously and must be logically self-consistent. The ‘best models’ cover the widest
range of natural events, with the least number of propositions.
Scientifically answering certain questions may be difficult, such as the end of
a string of whys. In addition, because our physical instruments are finite, there
may always be gaps in our knowledge. And, because logical systems with an
infinite number of elements may have unprovable propositions (a form of Gödel’s
Theorem), the ‘laws of nature’ may themselves be unlimited and even evolving.
If so, happily, there will always be more to do in our quest to understand and to
develop.
1.2 Conceptual Models of Nature
Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler!
— Albert Einstein
We are a species driven, in part, by ‘curiosity’. Curiosity leads to exploration,
exploration to a form of understanding, understanding to an ability to effectively
anticipate, manage, and develop our environment. The elaboration of such intellectual processes seems quite natural in evolution, as such abilities give a distinct
advantage over those life forms with lesser talents in this direction.
Central to the process of understanding is the creation of a ‘model’ to reflect
a set of related observations. A conceptual model of nature synthesizes a set of
observations into a mental structure which incorporates a predictive scheme. The
relationships in a physical model are required not to be contradictory, and to form
an economical way of consolidating and connecting facts.
If a model is based on an underlying logical and causal connections between
observed events, then the model becomes a ‘theory’. Theories of nature give the
user a framework on which to evaluate and plan ahead. The Babylonians, Greeks,
and Mayans were able to predict lunar eclipses using careful records showing
periodicity. As impressive and useful as these predictions were, the scheme was
not yet a theory of lunar eclipses. No underlying causal connections were given.
Those who imagined that a lunar eclipse could be generated by the shadow of a
giant bird who periodically intercepted the Moon’s light had a theory, albeit a flighty
and easily falsifiable one. Aristarchus, who thought of the Earth as a spherical body
blocking sunlight as the Sun, Earth, and Moon moved on determined paths, had a
better theory, not only because it agreed with observations, but it could also make
correct predictions of events other than lunar eclipses.
We judge theories based on the agreement of their predictions with observations
and their relative simplicity. If a competing theory makes the same predictions in
the realm of initial application but has fewer constructs and/or wider applicability,
we say it is a more ‘refined theory’. We are attracted to a more refined theory, as
it has the advantage of being easier to keep in mind, and it might give us more