440
19 Review and Outlook
and promote the industrialization of the water sector; and to promote water resources
saving and protection (National Planning Commission 1997). As such, the policy
was to increase water investment and to develop the sector through industrialization.
Although much effort was exerted in preparing this policy, a massive flood in 1998
was to drive major policy changes, and as such the Water Sector Industrialization
Policy was not well-implemented. However, its objective of increasing investment
in the water sector was met.
The 1990s was a good time for the water sector in terms of development. By recognizing that water resources development was lagging behind economic development,
and driven by the overall economic reform agenda, the sector developed quickly to
catch up. This was achieved through increased investment, including investments
from a broader range of financial sources, and through improved sectoral efficiency
and the internal collection of tariffs, which allowed for maintaining operations and
enlarging the sector. During the period from 1992–1996, water infrastructure investment increased by 25.2% annually. As a result, the daily water supply capacity
increased by 20 million m
3 , and the overall water supply capacity exceeded 520
billion m
3 (Niu 1997b). In 1996, the water sector total income reached 97.96 billion
RMB, 3.9 times what it was in 1992 (Niu 1997a).
However, in the 1990s, water was not only about investment and construction of
water projects. After 20 years of fast development, China’s view of the water–human
relationship was to undergo a major transformation as a result of the Yangtze River
experiencing one of the largest floods of the past century.
19.3.3 1998–2009: Redefining the Water–Human
Relationship
In 1998, the third largest basin-wide flood of the twentieth century occurred along
the Yangtze River, resulting in the river breaking the main level. The flood inundated
more than 1 million ha of cultivated land in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi provinces,
and broke 1,705 dikes. The flood directly affected more than 2.3 million people and
resulted in 1,432 deaths (Qian 1998b). After the flood, the national leadership became
acutely aware of the importance of water resources development, as well as existing
weaknesses within China’s water sector. In 1998, Decisions on Some Key Problems
Related to Agriculture and Rural Works, issued at the 3rd Plenary Session of the
15th Central Committee of the CPC, required that “water resources development
shall mobilize the resources of the whole society” and that among problems to be
addressed, “the most pressing is to increase investment to harness major rivers and
lakes to increase flood-control ability” (15th Central Committee of CPC 1998).
The 1998 Yangtze Flood was in part a symptom of the poor state of the water
sector in the late 1990s. Another symptom was the 1997 drying up of the Yellow
River, which experienced the longest dry-up of its main channel since 1972. This
kind of dry-up was more serious in the inland rivers in Northwest China, resulting
in severe ecological problems.
19 Review and Outlook
and promote the industrialization of the water sector; and to promote water resources
saving and protection (National Planning Commission 1997). As such, the policy
was to increase water investment and to develop the sector through industrialization.
Although much effort was exerted in preparing this policy, a massive flood in 1998
was to drive major policy changes, and as such the Water Sector Industrialization
Policy was not well-implemented. However, its objective of increasing investment
in the water sector was met.
The 1990s was a good time for the water sector in terms of development. By recognizing that water resources development was lagging behind economic development,
and driven by the overall economic reform agenda, the sector developed quickly to
catch up. This was achieved through increased investment, including investments
from a broader range of financial sources, and through improved sectoral efficiency
and the internal collection of tariffs, which allowed for maintaining operations and
enlarging the sector. During the period from 1992–1996, water infrastructure investment increased by 25.2% annually. As a result, the daily water supply capacity
increased by 20 million m
3 , and the overall water supply capacity exceeded 520
billion m
3 (Niu 1997b). In 1996, the water sector total income reached 97.96 billion
RMB, 3.9 times what it was in 1992 (Niu 1997a).
However, in the 1990s, water was not only about investment and construction of
water projects. After 20 years of fast development, China’s view of the water–human
relationship was to undergo a major transformation as a result of the Yangtze River
experiencing one of the largest floods of the past century.
19.3.3 1998–2009: Redefining the Water–Human
Relationship
In 1998, the third largest basin-wide flood of the twentieth century occurred along
the Yangtze River, resulting in the river breaking the main level. The flood inundated
more than 1 million ha of cultivated land in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi provinces,
and broke 1,705 dikes. The flood directly affected more than 2.3 million people and
resulted in 1,432 deaths (Qian 1998b). After the flood, the national leadership became
acutely aware of the importance of water resources development, as well as existing
weaknesses within China’s water sector. In 1998, Decisions on Some Key Problems
Related to Agriculture and Rural Works, issued at the 3rd Plenary Session of the
15th Central Committee of the CPC, required that “water resources development
shall mobilize the resources of the whole society” and that among problems to be
addressed, “the most pressing is to increase investment to harness major rivers and
lakes to increase flood-control ability” (15th Central Committee of CPC 1998).
The 1998 Yangtze Flood was in part a symptom of the poor state of the water
sector in the late 1990s. Another symptom was the 1997 drying up of the Yellow
River, which experienced the longest dry-up of its main channel since 1972. This
kind of dry-up was more serious in the inland rivers in Northwest China, resulting
in severe ecological problems.