340
15 Agricultural Water Management in Northern China
stakeholders. In China, only after WUA development and a split of field-level functions from public agencies be achieved, can boundaries be clarified. And only with
clear boundaries at the field-level can a clear linkage be developed. In terms of
infrastructure, major projects shall be the responsibility of public agencies, who
can mobilize large amounts of resources. By comparison, field-level and small-scale
projects can be conducted by WUAs and farmers with greater efficiency.
Self-regulation is an effective way to improve field-level agricultural water
resources management in the small-farming system as well as improving groundwater management in China. In order to solve management failure resulting from
fewer water resources managers and many water users, self-regulation of smallfarming systems and groundwater use was introduced in the 1990s. After a 10-year
pilot, it was demonstrated that can be a very useful instrument and helps alleviate
the management burden on public agencies.
Incentive policy is more effective than governmental orders in agricultural water
resources management, although both are required to improve standards. Under the
transition from a planned economy to a market economy in China, incentive-based
policy has shown its advantages in terms of easy-implementing, low cost, and effectiveness. Water rights are more effective than planned water use. Water certificates
and tickets easily solve the problems of water waste.
Out-of-sector incentives provide essential support for agricultural water resources
management. Compared with other sectors in the economy, it could not operate
sustainably without this backing. In China, a range of types of support have been
provided, including financing, pricing, subsidies, and special funding. In some
provinces, special energy pricing policies are implemented.
It is difficult to coordinate policies that have different objectives. Water pricing
experiences and lessons in China highlight that when pricing in agricultural water
resources management is a strategic rather than economic issue, then water pricing
cannot fully follow most economic theories. A single pricing reform could not be
implemented with success. This indicates that it is extremely difficult to design a
single policy for an issue which is not contradicted by other policies.
Lastly, macro-control of regional water use should be implemented in northern
China. Groundwater depletion and ecological flow occupation are both the results of
out-of-control water use in rivers basin and aquifers. Without high-level control where
agricultural water resources management is concerned, the tragedy of common-pool
resources cannot be avoided.
References
Bei, L. (2008). The Research on running mechanism and performance of participatory on irrigation
management in Hetao Irrigation Districts. Master Thesis. Inner Mongolia Agricultural University,
Hohhot, China.
Carlow, R. (2009). Irrigation development and water rights reform in China. International Journal
of Water Resources Development, 25(2), 227–248.
15 Agricultural Water Management in Northern China
stakeholders. In China, only after WUA development and a split of field-level functions from public agencies be achieved, can boundaries be clarified. And only with
clear boundaries at the field-level can a clear linkage be developed. In terms of
infrastructure, major projects shall be the responsibility of public agencies, who
can mobilize large amounts of resources. By comparison, field-level and small-scale
projects can be conducted by WUAs and farmers with greater efficiency.
Self-regulation is an effective way to improve field-level agricultural water
resources management in the small-farming system as well as improving groundwater management in China. In order to solve management failure resulting from
fewer water resources managers and many water users, self-regulation of smallfarming systems and groundwater use was introduced in the 1990s. After a 10-year
pilot, it was demonstrated that can be a very useful instrument and helps alleviate
the management burden on public agencies.
Incentive policy is more effective than governmental orders in agricultural water
resources management, although both are required to improve standards. Under the
transition from a planned economy to a market economy in China, incentive-based
policy has shown its advantages in terms of easy-implementing, low cost, and effectiveness. Water rights are more effective than planned water use. Water certificates
and tickets easily solve the problems of water waste.
Out-of-sector incentives provide essential support for agricultural water resources
management. Compared with other sectors in the economy, it could not operate
sustainably without this backing. In China, a range of types of support have been
provided, including financing, pricing, subsidies, and special funding. In some
provinces, special energy pricing policies are implemented.
It is difficult to coordinate policies that have different objectives. Water pricing
experiences and lessons in China highlight that when pricing in agricultural water
resources management is a strategic rather than economic issue, then water pricing
cannot fully follow most economic theories. A single pricing reform could not be
implemented with success. This indicates that it is extremely difficult to design a
single policy for an issue which is not contradicted by other policies.
Lastly, macro-control of regional water use should be implemented in northern
China. Groundwater depletion and ecological flow occupation are both the results of
out-of-control water use in rivers basin and aquifers. Without high-level control where
agricultural water resources management is concerned, the tragedy of common-pool
resources cannot be avoided.
References
Bei, L. (2008). The Research on running mechanism and performance of participatory on irrigation
management in Hetao Irrigation Districts. Master Thesis. Inner Mongolia Agricultural University,
Hohhot, China.
Carlow, R. (2009). Irrigation development and water rights reform in China. International Journal
of Water Resources Development, 25(2), 227–248.