322
15 Agricultural Water Management in Northern China
development must be “mainly self-dependent and aided by the government.” The
document put the onus on the farmer and an increase in labor input. Any increase in
investment was to be sourced through an agricultural development fund and water
resources development special fund, from the collection of water tariffs, and by
encouraging individuals to invest in field-level irrigation infrastructure according
to the principle of “whoever invests, whoever constructs, whoever own, whoever
manages, whoever benefits.”
In 1997, according to the Water Sector Industrialization Policy, the water resources
development fund was set up. The fund was collected from related governmental
tariffs and funds, and used in particular for water resources development, mainly on
major projects.
Therefore, before 2000, agricultural water resources management investment
consisted of two parts: government funding was mainly invested in important
and large-scale irrigation projects, while field-level projects were mainly financed
by farmers’ labor input. Under the aegis of national social and economic policy
in the 1990s, it is clear that the government was beginning to promote marketoriented reform of the water sector, including the field of agricultural water resources
management.
15.4.2.2 2000–2005
In 2000, the Notice of Conducting Rural Taxation and Fee Reform Pilot canceled the
labor accumulation system in order to reduce farmers’ labor burden and prevent
the free use of rural labor. As a result, responsibility for field-level irrigation
infrastructure became a problem.
In 2004, Opinions on Some Policies on Promoting to Increase Farmer’s Incomes
called for rural and agricultural infrastructure development to be strengthened further.
The proportion of national investment dedicated to agriculture and rural areas should
be increased. The investment structure should be adjusted to increase funding for
medium and small-scale infrastructure projects, including water-saving and drinking
water supply schemes. In 2004, Notices on Some Problems of Using Part of Land
Premiums on Agricultural Land Development by the State Council required governments to use no less than 15% land premiums in land reclamation, basic agricultural
cultivated land construction, and improvement of agricultural production conditions.
Following the cancelation of labor input in rural taxation and fee reform, therefore,
although the government tried to increase public funding, financial support for fieldlevel irrigation infrastructure decreased. This impacted not only grain yields but
also the ability to improve comprehensive agricultural production. The figures for
agricultural water use and grain yield in these years represented this impact: during
1990–2012, the only decrease both in agricultural water use and grain yield occurred
between 2000 and 2004 in China (Figs. 15.1 and 15.2).
15 Agricultural Water Management in Northern China
development must be “mainly self-dependent and aided by the government.” The
document put the onus on the farmer and an increase in labor input. Any increase in
investment was to be sourced through an agricultural development fund and water
resources development special fund, from the collection of water tariffs, and by
encouraging individuals to invest in field-level irrigation infrastructure according
to the principle of “whoever invests, whoever constructs, whoever own, whoever
manages, whoever benefits.”
In 1997, according to the Water Sector Industrialization Policy, the water resources
development fund was set up. The fund was collected from related governmental
tariffs and funds, and used in particular for water resources development, mainly on
major projects.
Therefore, before 2000, agricultural water resources management investment
consisted of two parts: government funding was mainly invested in important
and large-scale irrigation projects, while field-level projects were mainly financed
by farmers’ labor input. Under the aegis of national social and economic policy
in the 1990s, it is clear that the government was beginning to promote marketoriented reform of the water sector, including the field of agricultural water resources
management.
15.4.2.2 2000–2005
In 2000, the Notice of Conducting Rural Taxation and Fee Reform Pilot canceled the
labor accumulation system in order to reduce farmers’ labor burden and prevent
the free use of rural labor. As a result, responsibility for field-level irrigation
infrastructure became a problem.
In 2004, Opinions on Some Policies on Promoting to Increase Farmer’s Incomes
called for rural and agricultural infrastructure development to be strengthened further.
The proportion of national investment dedicated to agriculture and rural areas should
be increased. The investment structure should be adjusted to increase funding for
medium and small-scale infrastructure projects, including water-saving and drinking
water supply schemes. In 2004, Notices on Some Problems of Using Part of Land
Premiums on Agricultural Land Development by the State Council required governments to use no less than 15% land premiums in land reclamation, basic agricultural
cultivated land construction, and improvement of agricultural production conditions.
Following the cancelation of labor input in rural taxation and fee reform, therefore,
although the government tried to increase public funding, financial support for fieldlevel irrigation infrastructure decreased. This impacted not only grain yields but
also the ability to improve comprehensive agricultural production. The figures for
agricultural water use and grain yield in these years represented this impact: during
1990–2012, the only decrease both in agricultural water use and grain yield occurred
between 2000 and 2004 in China (Figs. 15.1 and 15.2).