13.4 Conclusion and Outlook
289
13.4 Conclusion and Outlook
The reform of the management of water resource assets is a kind of property rights
policy with Chinese characteristics. It stems from the property rights system in China,
which is different from most countries and regions in the world.
The reform of the management of water resource assets has just started and will
not be completed soon. Even in the countries and states with publicly owned water
resources, such as California and Australia, the ownership rights and its holder are
not clarified and on a registry. However, China has quickly enacted reforms after it
proposed them in 2013.
The fundamental role of the reform of the management of water resource assets is
to separate property rights and management powers and further separate ownership
rights and usufructuary rights by developing and exercising ownership rights.
To some extent, as discussed in the previous sections, the reform is simple as it
divides public powers and private rights, develops ownership rights, and enriches
usufructuary rights. However, the reform has had a significant impact on resource
development and use. The significant strengthening of the state ownership rights and
their benefits implied that the owner can profit from resource taxes and fee levying,
increasing the potential benefits for a usufructuary rights transfer from the owner.
The enriched usufructuary rights provide more options to allocate water resources
through the market mechanism.
In terms of institutional reform, the reform somewhat clarifies the natural
resources property rights holder and manager. However, the MNR is an administrative department and an organ of the State Council. Its purpose of exercising ownership
rights on behalf of the state may conflict with its management function, as well as that
of the State Council. Therefore, it might be better if an independent agency directly
reporting to NPC is set up. This issue also exists in the relationships between central
and local bodies. At present, the system is designed so that the central government
entrusts functions to the local government, reflecting equal property rights entrusted
in the market. However, the relationship between the central and local governments
is that of administrative leadership in China, rather an equal property rights relationship. Lastly, with the simplification of the management of water resource functions,
it will be challenging to achieving the integrated management of resources among
sectors and agencies for water resources with multiple functions.
References
Central Committee of CPC. (2013). Decision on some key issues to fully deepen reform.
He, X., & Zhu, G. (1996). Mineral resources asset management and assessment. Geological
Technology Economics and Management, 1, 1–6.
MWR et al. (2018). Opinion on paying for water resources use system reform.
MWR, MLR. (2016). Notice to issue water flow rights clarification piloting plan.
289
13.4 Conclusion and Outlook
The reform of the management of water resource assets is a kind of property rights
policy with Chinese characteristics. It stems from the property rights system in China,
which is different from most countries and regions in the world.
The reform of the management of water resource assets has just started and will
not be completed soon. Even in the countries and states with publicly owned water
resources, such as California and Australia, the ownership rights and its holder are
not clarified and on a registry. However, China has quickly enacted reforms after it
proposed them in 2013.
The fundamental role of the reform of the management of water resource assets is
to separate property rights and management powers and further separate ownership
rights and usufructuary rights by developing and exercising ownership rights.
To some extent, as discussed in the previous sections, the reform is simple as it
divides public powers and private rights, develops ownership rights, and enriches
usufructuary rights. However, the reform has had a significant impact on resource
development and use. The significant strengthening of the state ownership rights and
their benefits implied that the owner can profit from resource taxes and fee levying,
increasing the potential benefits for a usufructuary rights transfer from the owner.
The enriched usufructuary rights provide more options to allocate water resources
through the market mechanism.
In terms of institutional reform, the reform somewhat clarifies the natural
resources property rights holder and manager. However, the MNR is an administrative department and an organ of the State Council. Its purpose of exercising ownership
rights on behalf of the state may conflict with its management function, as well as that
of the State Council. Therefore, it might be better if an independent agency directly
reporting to NPC is set up. This issue also exists in the relationships between central
and local bodies. At present, the system is designed so that the central government
entrusts functions to the local government, reflecting equal property rights entrusted
in the market. However, the relationship between the central and local governments
is that of administrative leadership in China, rather an equal property rights relationship. Lastly, with the simplification of the management of water resource functions,
it will be challenging to achieving the integrated management of resources among
sectors and agencies for water resources with multiple functions.
References
Central Committee of CPC. (2013). Decision on some key issues to fully deepen reform.
He, X., & Zhu, G. (1996). Mineral resources asset management and assessment. Geological
Technology Economics and Management, 1, 1–6.
MWR et al. (2018). Opinion on paying for water resources use system reform.
MWR, MLR. (2016). Notice to issue water flow rights clarification piloting plan.