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13 Water Resource Assets Management Reform
the State Council is both the highest administrative organ in the country and the
exercising agency of water resources ownership rights (Yang 2013). Therefore, the
water resources ownership rights and water administrative power are within one
agency.
Furthermore, the state ownership rights of water resources are weakened and
blurred in China. At present, there is no legal definition that clarifies the ownership
and owners of water resources. There is also no clear boundary between the state
and local governments that clarifies the exercise and benefits of the state ownership
rights of the water resources.
Therefore, the 2013 Decision on Some Key Issues to Fully Deepen Reform
(Central Committee of CPC 2013; henceforth called the “2013 Decision”) decided
to “improve the natural resource assets property rights system and regulation on the
uses and purposes system by integrating, clarifying, and registering natural ecological
space including water flow, etc. to formulate a “clear holding, clear rights, and responsibility, effective management” natural resource assets property rights system and to
improve the state’s natural resource assets management institution. This unifies the
exercise of public ownership rights and natural resources supervision and management in an institution that integrates the exercise of the responsibility of terrestrial
space regulation on usage and purpose.”
13.2 General Framework
In China, the property rights of water resources were only developed at the end
of the 1990s. Therefore, it is not surprising that China had an unclear water rights
system. The concept of free resources has not changed fundamentally, and natural
resources entered the market free or at a low price. Moreover, the traditional management of resources highly depends on administrative instruments; the free allocation of
resources only benefits an individual unit but harms the state (Wang 2002). However,
the lasting institutional problems in natural resources’ management, such as departmental management and interest conflicts and a management conflict between the
upper and lower levels, have not been solved (He and Zhu 1996).
To deal with the loss of and weakening of ownership of natural resources
since the 1990s, some researchers in China suggested developing a value-based
natural resource assets management system (Qian 1996). The natural resource assets
management system outlined in the 2013 Decision is regarded as a solution to these
issues.
After the issuance of the 2013 Decision, several supporting policy documents have
been formulated to promote the reform, as discussed in the following sections. These
documents form a general framework for the water resource assets management
reform.
13 Water Resource Assets Management Reform
the State Council is both the highest administrative organ in the country and the
exercising agency of water resources ownership rights (Yang 2013). Therefore, the
water resources ownership rights and water administrative power are within one
agency.
Furthermore, the state ownership rights of water resources are weakened and
blurred in China. At present, there is no legal definition that clarifies the ownership
and owners of water resources. There is also no clear boundary between the state
and local governments that clarifies the exercise and benefits of the state ownership
rights of the water resources.
Therefore, the 2013 Decision on Some Key Issues to Fully Deepen Reform
(Central Committee of CPC 2013; henceforth called the “2013 Decision”) decided
to “improve the natural resource assets property rights system and regulation on the
uses and purposes system by integrating, clarifying, and registering natural ecological
space including water flow, etc. to formulate a “clear holding, clear rights, and responsibility, effective management” natural resource assets property rights system and to
improve the state’s natural resource assets management institution. This unifies the
exercise of public ownership rights and natural resources supervision and management in an institution that integrates the exercise of the responsibility of terrestrial
space regulation on usage and purpose.”
13.2 General Framework
In China, the property rights of water resources were only developed at the end
of the 1990s. Therefore, it is not surprising that China had an unclear water rights
system. The concept of free resources has not changed fundamentally, and natural
resources entered the market free or at a low price. Moreover, the traditional management of resources highly depends on administrative instruments; the free allocation of
resources only benefits an individual unit but harms the state (Wang 2002). However,
the lasting institutional problems in natural resources’ management, such as departmental management and interest conflicts and a management conflict between the
upper and lower levels, have not been solved (He and Zhu 1996).
To deal with the loss of and weakening of ownership of natural resources
since the 1990s, some researchers in China suggested developing a value-based
natural resource assets management system (Qian 1996). The natural resource assets
management system outlined in the 2013 Decision is regarded as a solution to these
issues.
After the issuance of the 2013 Decision, several supporting policy documents have
been formulated to promote the reform, as discussed in the following sections. These
documents form a general framework for the water resource assets management
reform.