concept which is the subject of much academic debate. But I have argued elsewhere
that the three pivotal components of globalization create “transcending networks”
that reshape urban systems and urban space at the global, national, and subnational
levels (McGee 2002). The first two of these components include the creation of new
and more rapid forms of transport and communication and the development of more
penetrative global circuits of capital operating in the service, production, and
consumption sectors. A third component is provided by a neo-liberal ideology that
elevates the market system to a condition of god-like purity and seeks to privilege the
private sector by deregulating international and national regulatory environments
(Peck 2010). In this situation is found an increasing decentralization of political
power from the nation state to lower levels (Brenner 2004, 2006) and an emphasis
upon “local participation” and “local governance” that reduces the financial burden
of national governments. Increasingly, the nation states of developing Asian countries have embraced these precepts of “neo-liberalism” as providing the most
successful route toward creating a modern developed state. Ironically, it may be
argued that this liaison with globalization has led to the decline of the “developmental state” in those countries that have embraced globalization most overtly.
There are exceptions, of course. Within Asia it may be argued that states such as
China, Vietnam, and Japan have selectively embraced these globalization forces.
Even Singapore and Malaysia, which have accepted the major elements of globalization, still exert a great deal of state control over the economy. But this has not
prevented the emergence of mega-urban regions. It would thus seem that there is an
inexorable trend toward the creation of mega-urban regions.
This acceptance of globalization involves the recognition that these “transcending
networks” that articulate flows of information, capital, commodities, and people are
restructuring urban space in a way that emphasizes the emergence of global transaction networks particularly focused on mega-urban regions. In particular, I want to
focus on Castells (1996) arguments that this is creating a situation, where these
“spaces of flows” would come to dominate existing politico-territorial space and
create many problems of governance and social fragmentation. In this paper, I want
to argue that this growth in the economic and political power of mega-urban regions
is occurring at the same time where it is creating many socioeconomic disparities at
the intra mega-urban region level. I want to elaborate how this process has emerged
as a major fracture zone between the “global hinterworlds” of major mega-urban
cores and “local hinterlands” of mega-urban regions (Taylor 2001).
Another consequence of the “globalization perspective” is that mega-urban
regions are misrepresented in global discourse as an organic social entity. In fact,
it is the core cities of these mega-urban regions that are assumed to somehow
represent the mega-urban region at large despite the fact that in many cases a very
small proportion of the population of mega-urban regions reside in the core cities. As
Sassen (2001, 2006) and Taylor (2004) have shown, this is because of the importance of the role of the larger cities in the “producer services” sector often closely
interlinked with multinational companies based in the global cities of New York,
London, and Tokyo. In fact, it may be argued that the urbanization process,
particularly as it plays out at the level of the large urban region, is not just a passive
20
T. G. McGee and K. Mori
that the three pivotal components of globalization create “transcending networks”
that reshape urban systems and urban space at the global, national, and subnational
levels (McGee 2002). The first two of these components include the creation of new
and more rapid forms of transport and communication and the development of more
penetrative global circuits of capital operating in the service, production, and
consumption sectors. A third component is provided by a neo-liberal ideology that
elevates the market system to a condition of god-like purity and seeks to privilege the
private sector by deregulating international and national regulatory environments
(Peck 2010). In this situation is found an increasing decentralization of political
power from the nation state to lower levels (Brenner 2004, 2006) and an emphasis
upon “local participation” and “local governance” that reduces the financial burden
of national governments. Increasingly, the nation states of developing Asian countries have embraced these precepts of “neo-liberalism” as providing the most
successful route toward creating a modern developed state. Ironically, it may be
argued that this liaison with globalization has led to the decline of the “developmental state” in those countries that have embraced globalization most overtly.
There are exceptions, of course. Within Asia it may be argued that states such as
China, Vietnam, and Japan have selectively embraced these globalization forces.
Even Singapore and Malaysia, which have accepted the major elements of globalization, still exert a great deal of state control over the economy. But this has not
prevented the emergence of mega-urban regions. It would thus seem that there is an
inexorable trend toward the creation of mega-urban regions.
This acceptance of globalization involves the recognition that these “transcending
networks” that articulate flows of information, capital, commodities, and people are
restructuring urban space in a way that emphasizes the emergence of global transaction networks particularly focused on mega-urban regions. In particular, I want to
focus on Castells (1996) arguments that this is creating a situation, where these
“spaces of flows” would come to dominate existing politico-territorial space and
create many problems of governance and social fragmentation. In this paper, I want
to argue that this growth in the economic and political power of mega-urban regions
is occurring at the same time where it is creating many socioeconomic disparities at
the intra mega-urban region level. I want to elaborate how this process has emerged
as a major fracture zone between the “global hinterworlds” of major mega-urban
cores and “local hinterlands” of mega-urban regions (Taylor 2001).
Another consequence of the “globalization perspective” is that mega-urban
regions are misrepresented in global discourse as an organic social entity. In fact,
it is the core cities of these mega-urban regions that are assumed to somehow
represent the mega-urban region at large despite the fact that in many cases a very
small proportion of the population of mega-urban regions reside in the core cities. As
Sassen (2001, 2006) and Taylor (2004) have shown, this is because of the importance of the role of the larger cities in the “producer services” sector often closely
interlinked with multinational companies based in the global cities of New York,
London, and Tokyo. In fact, it may be argued that the urbanization process,
particularly as it plays out at the level of the large urban region, is not just a passive
20
T. G. McGee and K. Mori