3 The United Nations Convention …
59
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and from America’s opposition
towards China. We may assume that these provisions are contrary to the established
practices of the international community and insist on the position and action of
Freedom of Navigation that there is no need to obtain an advance permission or give
notice to the coastal State for a warship’s innocent passage in the territorial sea.
The third challenge is about the jurisdiction over security matters in the contiguous
zone. The USA holds that the provision of (Article 13) of Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and China’s authority to exercise powers within
its contiguous zone for the purpose of preventing or punishing infringement of its
security is contrary to the established practices of many States and claims that the
provision of China on preventing or punishing infringement of its security is not
conforming to the rules of the UNCLOS.
60
The fourth challenge is in relation to China’s island and reef construction and
military deployment in the South China Sea especially in Nansha. The USA considers
that China’s construction activities on its occupied Nansha islands and reefs damage
surrounding marine environment, especially militarization of the construction project
of China in Nansha islands and reefs after the completion of land reclamation projects
seriously threaten other States’ navigation safety. Meanwhile, the USA holds that
China cannot claim more sea areas under its jurisdiction according to its occupied
Nansha islands and reefs because there are different and opposite views on the status
of Nansha islands and reefs. In addition, the USA Department of State published
a report entitled Limits in the Sea-China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea
(No. 143) on December 5, 2014
61 and holds that China should define more clearly
the nature of the dotted line of the South China Sea and the legal status of waters
within such line.
62
The fifth challenge is in relation to the binding force of the South China Sea Arbitration Award. Some countries led by the USA consider that China should comply
with the Final Award of the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal (July 12, 2016) as
that award of the arbitral tribunal is binding upon China and hence China must abide
by it.
63
60 There are five states (Cambodia, China, Sudan, Syria and Vietnam) in the international community
claiming jurisdiction over security matters in the contiguous zone. See Pedrozo (2018).
61 See Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, United States
Department of State, Limits in the Sea, China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, December
5, 2014.
62 For details on the rebuttal against the report of Limits in the Sea of the USA Department of State,
see Jia (2016). For details on the dotted line of South China Sea, see Gao and Jia (2014). Also see
Gao and Jia (2013), Keyuan (2001).
63 For details on the comprehensive rebuttal against the South China Sea Arbitration Award, see
Chinese Society of International Law, The South China Sea Arbitration Awards: A Critical Study,
Foreign Languages Press, 2018 Edition, pp. 1–395.
59
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and from America’s opposition
towards China. We may assume that these provisions are contrary to the established
practices of the international community and insist on the position and action of
Freedom of Navigation that there is no need to obtain an advance permission or give
notice to the coastal State for a warship’s innocent passage in the territorial sea.
The third challenge is about the jurisdiction over security matters in the contiguous
zone. The USA holds that the provision of (Article 13) of Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and China’s authority to exercise powers within
its contiguous zone for the purpose of preventing or punishing infringement of its
security is contrary to the established practices of many States and claims that the
provision of China on preventing or punishing infringement of its security is not
conforming to the rules of the UNCLOS.
60
The fourth challenge is in relation to China’s island and reef construction and
military deployment in the South China Sea especially in Nansha. The USA considers
that China’s construction activities on its occupied Nansha islands and reefs damage
surrounding marine environment, especially militarization of the construction project
of China in Nansha islands and reefs after the completion of land reclamation projects
seriously threaten other States’ navigation safety. Meanwhile, the USA holds that
China cannot claim more sea areas under its jurisdiction according to its occupied
Nansha islands and reefs because there are different and opposite views on the status
of Nansha islands and reefs. In addition, the USA Department of State published
a report entitled Limits in the Sea-China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea
(No. 143) on December 5, 2014
61 and holds that China should define more clearly
the nature of the dotted line of the South China Sea and the legal status of waters
within such line.
62
The fifth challenge is in relation to the binding force of the South China Sea Arbitration Award. Some countries led by the USA consider that China should comply
with the Final Award of the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal (July 12, 2016) as
that award of the arbitral tribunal is binding upon China and hence China must abide
by it.
63
60 There are five states (Cambodia, China, Sudan, Syria and Vietnam) in the international community
claiming jurisdiction over security matters in the contiguous zone. See Pedrozo (2018).
61 See Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, United States
Department of State, Limits in the Sea, China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, December
5, 2014.
62 For details on the rebuttal against the report of Limits in the Sea of the USA Department of State,
see Jia (2016). For details on the dotted line of South China Sea, see Gao and Jia (2014). Also see
Gao and Jia (2013), Keyuan (2001).
63 For details on the comprehensive rebuttal against the South China Sea Arbitration Award, see
Chinese Society of International Law, The South China Sea Arbitration Awards: A Critical Study,
Foreign Languages Press, 2018 Edition, pp. 1–395.