30
S. Sakamoto
Development of Chunxiao Oil and Gas Field in Accordance with Chinese Law’.
36
From China’s version of the English title, it is evident that this understanding does
not fall into the category of joint development in the classical sense. At the same
time, China could be seen as having virtually conceded the Japan-claimed median
line, at least in so far as this understanding refers to the currently existing Shirakaba
gas field. Such reference seems to imply that China should abstain from claiming
sovereign rights beyond a hypothetical median line.
In spite of the existence of the without prejudice clause in the Agreement, the
absence of common English texts for those understandings possibly pertains to differences in the respective views of the two parties. At least, it represents the fragile aspect
of this agreement.
Reaching such an agreement on joint development was undoubtedly a long and
winding road for both Japan and China. While this agreement is an achievement
founded on prudent political decisions and a consequence of four years of formidable
negotiations between the parties, Japan and China commenced negotiations of the
implementing agreement in July 2010, however, China unilaterally announced the
postponement of the second round of negotiations. Still, the East China Sea is a sea
of conflict; not of peace.
Under such circumstances, China accelerated its development activities of natural
resources in the East China Sea, and Japan has confirmed that there are 16 structures
in total on the Chinese side of the geographical equidistance line between Japan
and China.
37 The Government of Japan issued in strong terms its demand for China
to halt its unilateral activities in the East China Sea and its efforts to create faits
accomplis. Japan continues to seek the prompt resumption of discussions on the
2008 Agreement and its early implementation.
38 Article 83 of UNCLOS provides
that “Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the State concerned, in a
spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.” In the arbitration regarding
the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Guyana and Suriname in 2007,
the Arbitral Tribunal ruled that “Guyana also violated its obligation to make every
effort to enter into provisional arrangements by its conduct leading up to the CGX
incident, Guyana had been preparing exploratory drilling for some time before the
incident, and should have, in a spirit of cooperation, informed Suriname directly
36 The content is as follows: “Chinese enterprises welcome the participation of Japanese legal persons
in the development of the existing oil and gas field in Chunxiao in accordance with the relevant
laws of China governing cooperation with foreign enterprises in the exploration and exploitation of
offshore petroleum resources.”
37 Available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/page3e_000356.html (last accessed 25 December
2019).
38 Available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken1e_000011.html (last accessed 25
December 2019).
S. Sakamoto
Development of Chunxiao Oil and Gas Field in Accordance with Chinese Law’.
36
From China’s version of the English title, it is evident that this understanding does
not fall into the category of joint development in the classical sense. At the same
time, China could be seen as having virtually conceded the Japan-claimed median
line, at least in so far as this understanding refers to the currently existing Shirakaba
gas field. Such reference seems to imply that China should abstain from claiming
sovereign rights beyond a hypothetical median line.
In spite of the existence of the without prejudice clause in the Agreement, the
absence of common English texts for those understandings possibly pertains to differences in the respective views of the two parties. At least, it represents the fragile aspect
of this agreement.
Reaching such an agreement on joint development was undoubtedly a long and
winding road for both Japan and China. While this agreement is an achievement
founded on prudent political decisions and a consequence of four years of formidable
negotiations between the parties, Japan and China commenced negotiations of the
implementing agreement in July 2010, however, China unilaterally announced the
postponement of the second round of negotiations. Still, the East China Sea is a sea
of conflict; not of peace.
Under such circumstances, China accelerated its development activities of natural
resources in the East China Sea, and Japan has confirmed that there are 16 structures
in total on the Chinese side of the geographical equidistance line between Japan
and China.
37 The Government of Japan issued in strong terms its demand for China
to halt its unilateral activities in the East China Sea and its efforts to create faits
accomplis. Japan continues to seek the prompt resumption of discussions on the
2008 Agreement and its early implementation.
38 Article 83 of UNCLOS provides
that “Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the State concerned, in a
spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.” In the arbitration regarding
the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Guyana and Suriname in 2007,
the Arbitral Tribunal ruled that “Guyana also violated its obligation to make every
effort to enter into provisional arrangements by its conduct leading up to the CGX
incident, Guyana had been preparing exploratory drilling for some time before the
incident, and should have, in a spirit of cooperation, informed Suriname directly
36 The content is as follows: “Chinese enterprises welcome the participation of Japanese legal persons
in the development of the existing oil and gas field in Chunxiao in accordance with the relevant
laws of China governing cooperation with foreign enterprises in the exploration and exploitation of
offshore petroleum resources.”
37 Available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/page3e_000356.html (last accessed 25 December
2019).
38 Available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken1e_000011.html (last accessed 25
December 2019).