2 Japan and the Law of the Sea: Key Historical …
19
In view of the failure of the Second Conference in 1960, the rule of general international law
on the extent of the territorial sea remains what it was before the Conference, i.e., the rule
of three nautical miles; and the question of jurisdiction within the fishing zone extending
beyond the limit of the territorial sea was left unsettled. 8
At the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea held from 1973 to 1982,
however, a proposal for a 12 nautical mile territorial limit gained the support of many
countries. It was within this context that Japan enacted in 1977 the Law on Territorial
Waters, and set its territorial limit to 12 nautical miles. The reason Japan abandoned
its previous 3 nautical mile territorial limit claim before the Third Conference drew
to a close has to do with its pressing need to protect its fishermen against foreign
fishing fleets operating in waters close to Japan.
9 By 1996, Japan and the People’s
Republic of China (China) had acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS).
10 UNCLOS allows coastal States to establish an Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) beyond and adjacent to their territorial sea of 12 nautical
miles, up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured. Given the foregoing, one has to admit that the Japanese
Government was not able to offer opposition against the new development of the law
of the sea.
2.2 Japan’s Response to Piracy
At the same time, however, Japan has contributed to the codification of the law of the
sea, especially in relation to piracy. At the League of Nations Codification Conference of 1925, Mr. Michikazu Matsuda, the then Director-General of the Treaties
Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was elected as Chairperson of the
Subcommittee on piracy, and the so-called ‘Matsuda Draft’ was submitted in 1926.
In spite of that, the League of Nations Council drove the subcommittee to suspend its
work, as the Council did not consider the codification of the law of piracy a priority.
Incidentally, the Matsuda Draft stipulated the requirement of ‘private ends’ (Article
1) and the involvement of private vessels (Article 3) to both be structural elements
of the international crime of piracy.
11
The Harvard Draft Convention and Comment on Piracy states the following:
The reason for the startling lack of international case authority and modern state practice is
apparent, as soon as one remembers that large scale piracy disappeared long ago and that
8 Ibid., pp. 136–137.When Mauritania extended its territorial sea to 12 miles from the coast according
to its Law No. 67,023 of 21 January 1967, the Government of Japan transmitted its Note Verbale
of 24 April 1967, expressing the opposition to the unilateral extension on the part of Mauritania of
its territorial waters. Ibid., p. 141.
9 Kuribayashi (2001).
10 UNCLOS came into force for Japan and China on 20 July 1996 and 7 July 1996, respectively.
11 See Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention and Comment on Piracy, Comment
on Article 3, AJIL, Vol. 26 (Supplement 1932), p. 873.
19
In view of the failure of the Second Conference in 1960, the rule of general international law
on the extent of the territorial sea remains what it was before the Conference, i.e., the rule
of three nautical miles; and the question of jurisdiction within the fishing zone extending
beyond the limit of the territorial sea was left unsettled. 8
At the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea held from 1973 to 1982,
however, a proposal for a 12 nautical mile territorial limit gained the support of many
countries. It was within this context that Japan enacted in 1977 the Law on Territorial
Waters, and set its territorial limit to 12 nautical miles. The reason Japan abandoned
its previous 3 nautical mile territorial limit claim before the Third Conference drew
to a close has to do with its pressing need to protect its fishermen against foreign
fishing fleets operating in waters close to Japan.
9 By 1996, Japan and the People’s
Republic of China (China) had acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS).
10 UNCLOS allows coastal States to establish an Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) beyond and adjacent to their territorial sea of 12 nautical
miles, up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured. Given the foregoing, one has to admit that the Japanese
Government was not able to offer opposition against the new development of the law
of the sea.
2.2 Japan’s Response to Piracy
At the same time, however, Japan has contributed to the codification of the law of the
sea, especially in relation to piracy. At the League of Nations Codification Conference of 1925, Mr. Michikazu Matsuda, the then Director-General of the Treaties
Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was elected as Chairperson of the
Subcommittee on piracy, and the so-called ‘Matsuda Draft’ was submitted in 1926.
In spite of that, the League of Nations Council drove the subcommittee to suspend its
work, as the Council did not consider the codification of the law of piracy a priority.
Incidentally, the Matsuda Draft stipulated the requirement of ‘private ends’ (Article
1) and the involvement of private vessels (Article 3) to both be structural elements
of the international crime of piracy.
11
The Harvard Draft Convention and Comment on Piracy states the following:
The reason for the startling lack of international case authority and modern state practice is
apparent, as soon as one remembers that large scale piracy disappeared long ago and that
8 Ibid., pp. 136–137.When Mauritania extended its territorial sea to 12 miles from the coast according
to its Law No. 67,023 of 21 January 1967, the Government of Japan transmitted its Note Verbale
of 24 April 1967, expressing the opposition to the unilateral extension on the part of Mauritania of
its territorial waters. Ibid., p. 141.
9 Kuribayashi (2001).
10 UNCLOS came into force for Japan and China on 20 July 1996 and 7 July 1996, respectively.
11 See Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention and Comment on Piracy, Comment
on Article 3, AJIL, Vol. 26 (Supplement 1932), p. 873.