12
K. Zou
down a number of important legal principles for safeguarding the common heritage
of mankind and the legitimate maritime rights and interests of all States.
41
In 1972, the Chinese delegation expressed the view that the international regime
should not regulate only the seabed exploration and exploitation activities. If the
regulatory scope of the international seabed area were only limited to the development
of seabed mineral resources, it would not conform to the interests of the developing
countries, nor to the concept of the common heritage of mankind.
42 Later on, when
the international regime for the deep seabed was finally formed, China shifted its
original position so as to support the newly established regime for the deep seabed
only.
While criticizing the superpowers, China considered that the “parallel system
of exploitation” put forward by one superpower to be a bad idea.
43 Later on, China
changed its stand and did not oppose the establishment of the parallel system both as a
compromise and as a provisional arrangement provided that the necessary technology
and resources for the Authority and the Enterprise were guaranteed.
44
The Chinese delegation was dissatisfied with the final arrangement for the legal
regime of deep seabed mining.
Resolution II of the Conference, governing preparatory investment in pioneer activities
relating to polymetallic nodules, has done too much in the way of meeting the demands of a
few industrialized nations and given them and their companies some privileges and priorities.
We consider that inappropriate. 45
In the early 1970s, China had no intention of itself exploring deep seabed mineral
resources, and it had no capability to carry on any deep seabed exploration even if it
had the intention to do so during that time because its economy was on the verge of
collapse. Only after China had carried out its economic reforms and introduced its
“open-door” policy in 1978 did this become feasible.
Despite some deficiencies, in its eye, in the LOS Convention, China upholds the
principles and norms of the Convention as well as most of its clauses. China regards
this international treaty as the representative of the new law of the sea as opposed to
the so-called old law of the sea, represented by the four Geneva Conventions on the
law of the sea adopted in 1958 when PRC was still outside the UN system and had
no chance to participate in the deliberations of these conventions.
41 Mr. Han Xu, 191st Meeting, Plenary Meetings, 9 December 1982, in United Nations, Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, Vol. XVII, 1984, at 102.
42 Xia Pu on Ocean International Regime, 27 July 1972, reprinted in Peking University Law Department (ed.), Collected Materials on the Law of the Sea (Beijing: People’s Press, 1974) (in Chinese),
35–36.
43 See See Mr. Lin Ching, 76th Meeting of the Plenary Meetings, 17 September 1976, in United
Nations, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, Vol. VI, 1977,
at 26.
44 See Mr. Ke Zaishuo, 114th Meeting of the Plenary Meetings, 26 April 1979, in United Nations,
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, Vol. XI, 1980, at 22.
45 Mr. Han Xu, supra note 41, at 102.
K. Zou
down a number of important legal principles for safeguarding the common heritage
of mankind and the legitimate maritime rights and interests of all States.
41
In 1972, the Chinese delegation expressed the view that the international regime
should not regulate only the seabed exploration and exploitation activities. If the
regulatory scope of the international seabed area were only limited to the development
of seabed mineral resources, it would not conform to the interests of the developing
countries, nor to the concept of the common heritage of mankind.
42 Later on, when
the international regime for the deep seabed was finally formed, China shifted its
original position so as to support the newly established regime for the deep seabed
only.
While criticizing the superpowers, China considered that the “parallel system
of exploitation” put forward by one superpower to be a bad idea.
43 Later on, China
changed its stand and did not oppose the establishment of the parallel system both as a
compromise and as a provisional arrangement provided that the necessary technology
and resources for the Authority and the Enterprise were guaranteed.
44
The Chinese delegation was dissatisfied with the final arrangement for the legal
regime of deep seabed mining.
Resolution II of the Conference, governing preparatory investment in pioneer activities
relating to polymetallic nodules, has done too much in the way of meeting the demands of a
few industrialized nations and given them and their companies some privileges and priorities.
We consider that inappropriate. 45
In the early 1970s, China had no intention of itself exploring deep seabed mineral
resources, and it had no capability to carry on any deep seabed exploration even if it
had the intention to do so during that time because its economy was on the verge of
collapse. Only after China had carried out its economic reforms and introduced its
“open-door” policy in 1978 did this become feasible.
Despite some deficiencies, in its eye, in the LOS Convention, China upholds the
principles and norms of the Convention as well as most of its clauses. China regards
this international treaty as the representative of the new law of the sea as opposed to
the so-called old law of the sea, represented by the four Geneva Conventions on the
law of the sea adopted in 1958 when PRC was still outside the UN system and had
no chance to participate in the deliberations of these conventions.
41 Mr. Han Xu, 191st Meeting, Plenary Meetings, 9 December 1982, in United Nations, Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, Vol. XVII, 1984, at 102.
42 Xia Pu on Ocean International Regime, 27 July 1972, reprinted in Peking University Law Department (ed.), Collected Materials on the Law of the Sea (Beijing: People’s Press, 1974) (in Chinese),
35–36.
43 See See Mr. Lin Ching, 76th Meeting of the Plenary Meetings, 17 September 1976, in United
Nations, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, Vol. VI, 1977,
at 26.
44 See Mr. Ke Zaishuo, 114th Meeting of the Plenary Meetings, 26 April 1979, in United Nations,
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, Vol. XI, 1980, at 22.
45 Mr. Han Xu, supra note 41, at 102.