6 Maritime Counter-Proliferation of Weapons …
101
international agreements explicitly prohibited the sale or shipment of Scud missiles
or WMD-related materials. Accordingly, there was no authority to seize these items,
and the So San was released with its cargo and allowed to continue to sail.
15
As the United States recognised the gap of international law to prohibit the transfer
of weapons and missiles, it launched a cooperation initiative with several other states
to interdict the transference and export of WMD and its related materials from or to
the proliferation concern entity. At first, the PSI began with ten members, including
Japan, and thereafter, it increased to 17 founding members. These states played a
central role in the PSI as the ‘Core Group’ for a specific term (which was abolished
in 2005). Now, over 100 countries have expressed the support of the principles and
purpose of the PSI and cooperatively joined in its activities.
16
The strategy of the PSI is expressed in the Statement of Interdiction Principles for
the Proliferation Security Initiative. In Paragraph 1 of the Statement of Interdiction
Principles, the purpose of the PSI is to ‘undertake effective measures, either alone
or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD,
their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors
of proliferation concern’.
17
The Statement has no binding effect as a legal instrument, and so the PSI relies
on voluntary policy measures among the coalition members initiated by the United
States. International security policies for military and weapon systems have been
discussed as concepts of disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation. Multilateral Treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling,
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) were concluded
within the framework of those three concepts.
In this way, the PSI is located in the new strategy of ‘counter-proliferation’
beyond the traditional scope of international security policy. The term ‘counterproliferation’ is symbolised by eight Ds: Dissuasion, disarmament, diplomacy,
denial, defusing, deterrence, defence, and destruction.
18 Counter-proliferation is
a new concept because it includes forcible measures to reduce the effect of the
proliferation of WMD, even in cases where preventive measures of non-proliferation
fail.
Counter-proliferation includes multi-level of measures from disarmament or
diplomatic negotiations to the use of force as a final means, such as the agreement
between the United States and North Korea in 1994 and armed attack against Iraq
15 Becker, supra note 2, pp. 152–153.
16 See HP of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/dns/n_s_ne/pag
e24_000720.html (as of 31 October, 2019), and Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2019,
p. 395, at https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_Full.pdf (as of 31 October,
2019).
17 Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, at https://www.psi-online.
info/psi-info-en/botschaft/-/2077920 (as of 31 October, 2019).
18 H. Banzai, “The Proliferation Security Initiative and International Law of the Sea: A Japanese
Lawyer’s Perspective,” in Journal of East Asia and International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2010), pp. 10–
11.
101
international agreements explicitly prohibited the sale or shipment of Scud missiles
or WMD-related materials. Accordingly, there was no authority to seize these items,
and the So San was released with its cargo and allowed to continue to sail.
15
As the United States recognised the gap of international law to prohibit the transfer
of weapons and missiles, it launched a cooperation initiative with several other states
to interdict the transference and export of WMD and its related materials from or to
the proliferation concern entity. At first, the PSI began with ten members, including
Japan, and thereafter, it increased to 17 founding members. These states played a
central role in the PSI as the ‘Core Group’ for a specific term (which was abolished
in 2005). Now, over 100 countries have expressed the support of the principles and
purpose of the PSI and cooperatively joined in its activities.
16
The strategy of the PSI is expressed in the Statement of Interdiction Principles for
the Proliferation Security Initiative. In Paragraph 1 of the Statement of Interdiction
Principles, the purpose of the PSI is to ‘undertake effective measures, either alone
or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD,
their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors
of proliferation concern’.
17
The Statement has no binding effect as a legal instrument, and so the PSI relies
on voluntary policy measures among the coalition members initiated by the United
States. International security policies for military and weapon systems have been
discussed as concepts of disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation. Multilateral Treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling,
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) were concluded
within the framework of those three concepts.
In this way, the PSI is located in the new strategy of ‘counter-proliferation’
beyond the traditional scope of international security policy. The term ‘counterproliferation’ is symbolised by eight Ds: Dissuasion, disarmament, diplomacy,
denial, defusing, deterrence, defence, and destruction.
18 Counter-proliferation is
a new concept because it includes forcible measures to reduce the effect of the
proliferation of WMD, even in cases where preventive measures of non-proliferation
fail.
Counter-proliferation includes multi-level of measures from disarmament or
diplomatic negotiations to the use of force as a final means, such as the agreement
between the United States and North Korea in 1994 and armed attack against Iraq
15 Becker, supra note 2, pp. 152–153.
16 See HP of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/dns/n_s_ne/pag
e24_000720.html (as of 31 October, 2019), and Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2019,
p. 395, at https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_Full.pdf (as of 31 October,
2019).
17 Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, at https://www.psi-online.
info/psi-info-en/botschaft/-/2077920 (as of 31 October, 2019).
18 H. Banzai, “The Proliferation Security Initiative and International Law of the Sea: A Japanese
Lawyer’s Perspective,” in Journal of East Asia and International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2010), pp. 10–
11.