‘Whaling Olympics’. The basis for the assumption lies in yet another assumption,
namely that the IWC would, first, set stringent quotas and, second, would allow
whaling merely for specific domestic markets. This means that countries that do not
have the required skill or economic capacities would enter into bilateral contracts
with economically more powerful whaling nations so that they can provide them
with a certain amount of whale meat.
If this scenario were to take place, it would appear almost inevitable that Japan
would rejoin the Commission since it would be interested in jointly managing global
commons. Although Japan has always followed its own national interest in the
Commission, it has also been a champion of cooperation as regards whale management. There would be no reason for Japan not to join the IWC anymore once limited
commercial whaling would be possible.
If the moratorium were to be lifted, this would probably send ripple effects
throughout the entire landscape of international marine mammal law and the law
of the sea. The reason is that this would mean a de facto recognition of marine
mammals as a legitimate food source by the international community. Depending on
the status of food security, also other regions might start to consider seals or polar
bears as food. Therefore, quite possibly regimes such as the EU Seal Regime or
CITES would be subjected to increasing pressure from the public. However, while
these regimes are rather tightly regulated and enforceable, the situation is different
concerning the regimes for small cetaceans. It is possible that in particular
ACCOBAMS and ASCOBANS might suffer from this development since there is
potential for increasingly unsustainable use of cetaceans. After all, these regimes are,
first, much lesser known than the IWC, CITES and EU Seal Regime and, second,
there are no ways to enforce them. This is especially so if range states, but not
member states, to these regimes conduct larger scale hunts for small cetaceans.
In order to counteract the potential for unsustainable hunts it would therefore be
up to the national governments to enforce rules for sustainable use. In order to push
this approach, new non-binding, ‘soft law’ agreements could be taken that combine
conservation and sustainable use, but which leave it up to the nation states to enforce
them. The benefit of soft law agreements over legally binding ones is that they do not
carry obligations, but set out normative standards and codes of practice. This would
provide for new and innovative ways to integrate different views on marine mammal
conservation and utilisation to be applied. Presumably, this would not occur on a
global scale, but rather at regional levels.
However, in order to regulate marine mammal conservation even in light of a
lifting of the moratorium, it is also possible that different states enter into ‘smaller’
agreements for their management. This might occur on a species basis or a regional
basis. The blueprint for such agreements might stem from the already existing
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs). At the same time it
would not be surprising if the IWC were to see an increase in membership, particularly by those states potentially wishing to engage in whaling to provide food.
Indonesia and Canada might be two of such countries. While the former has never
been a member of the IWC, but still conducts whaling for great whales, the latter left
the IWC due to the impending moratorium. With the moratorium lifted, Canada
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9 The Future of International Marine Mammal Law
namely that the IWC would, first, set stringent quotas and, second, would allow
whaling merely for specific domestic markets. This means that countries that do not
have the required skill or economic capacities would enter into bilateral contracts
with economically more powerful whaling nations so that they can provide them
with a certain amount of whale meat.
If this scenario were to take place, it would appear almost inevitable that Japan
would rejoin the Commission since it would be interested in jointly managing global
commons. Although Japan has always followed its own national interest in the
Commission, it has also been a champion of cooperation as regards whale management. There would be no reason for Japan not to join the IWC anymore once limited
commercial whaling would be possible.
If the moratorium were to be lifted, this would probably send ripple effects
throughout the entire landscape of international marine mammal law and the law
of the sea. The reason is that this would mean a de facto recognition of marine
mammals as a legitimate food source by the international community. Depending on
the status of food security, also other regions might start to consider seals or polar
bears as food. Therefore, quite possibly regimes such as the EU Seal Regime or
CITES would be subjected to increasing pressure from the public. However, while
these regimes are rather tightly regulated and enforceable, the situation is different
concerning the regimes for small cetaceans. It is possible that in particular
ACCOBAMS and ASCOBANS might suffer from this development since there is
potential for increasingly unsustainable use of cetaceans. After all, these regimes are,
first, much lesser known than the IWC, CITES and EU Seal Regime and, second,
there are no ways to enforce them. This is especially so if range states, but not
member states, to these regimes conduct larger scale hunts for small cetaceans.
In order to counteract the potential for unsustainable hunts it would therefore be
up to the national governments to enforce rules for sustainable use. In order to push
this approach, new non-binding, ‘soft law’ agreements could be taken that combine
conservation and sustainable use, but which leave it up to the nation states to enforce
them. The benefit of soft law agreements over legally binding ones is that they do not
carry obligations, but set out normative standards and codes of practice. This would
provide for new and innovative ways to integrate different views on marine mammal
conservation and utilisation to be applied. Presumably, this would not occur on a
global scale, but rather at regional levels.
However, in order to regulate marine mammal conservation even in light of a
lifting of the moratorium, it is also possible that different states enter into ‘smaller’
agreements for their management. This might occur on a species basis or a regional
basis. The blueprint for such agreements might stem from the already existing
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs). At the same time it
would not be surprising if the IWC were to see an increase in membership, particularly by those states potentially wishing to engage in whaling to provide food.
Indonesia and Canada might be two of such countries. While the former has never
been a member of the IWC, but still conducts whaling for great whales, the latter left
the IWC due to the impending moratorium. With the moratorium lifted, Canada
192
9 The Future of International Marine Mammal Law