Japan is still cooperating with the IWC, especially with its Scientific Committee, it is
not in breach of the cooperation requirement set out in the UNCLOS. One possibility
that might arise is that a notification of Japan occurs under the Pelly Amendment
under US law. This would mean that economic sanctions might be imposed by the
US in order to force Japan to abandon its whaling activities (see Sect. 5.3.7). Under
the Trump Administration this is highly unlikely since also other administrations that
have followed stricter environmental principles have thus far abstained from such
notification.
With Japan’s withdrawal from the IWC, an outspoken pro-whaling country has
left the Commission. With it, also one of the most solvent contributors to the
Commission has left, too, particularly with regard to Japan’s contributions to the
Scientific Committee. In how far this will affect the work of the IWC is difficult to
foresee. One way or another, however, the IWC will have to scale down its work in
some way. Where within the Commission this scaling down will occur would be
purely speculative at this point. What is more interesting is the question what will
happen to the so-called ‘sustainable use group’ in the Commission. After all, quite a
large number of countries—around 25—including Norway, Iceland, the Russian
Federation, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Antigua & Barbuda, Liberia or Senegal,
have now lost a powerful and financially capable ally. Particularly for Caribbean and
African states, this might lead to the question in how far membership without Japan
is still a feasible and economic option. Therefore, it would not come as a surprise if
some of these countries would leave the Commission as well, particularly since
without Japan, the most powerful voice for sustainable use has been silenced. In this
way, the question of dysfunctionality would somewhat resolve itself: from a conservation perspective, the IWC would be perfectly functional without the ‘dissenting’
voices of sustainable use countries. Therefore, if more sustainable use countries were
to leave the Commission, the IWC would become a rather well-functioning conservation organisation, irrespective of whether it set out to be such an organisation from
the very beginning or not. In the longer run, however, his would hurt the IWC since
potentially more and more whaling would occur outside of its auspices, inevitably
leading to decreasing effectiveness and an overall decline in international legitimacy.
The developments in the IWC would not affect other regimes. The CMS and its
Agreements, the Antarctic sealing convention, the EU Seal Regime, the Polar Bear
Regime and others would remain in place and would continue to exist unabatedly. If
the IWC were to extend its mandate to include small cetaceans, however, it would be
particularly the CMS and its Agreements which would further deepen its cooperative
ties with the IWC. Also potential conflict with NAMMCO might arise as to the
increasingly overlapping mandates of both organisations. However, since also
conservation-oriented members of the IWC have not agreed to an extension of its
mandate, this is rather unlikely, albeit not impossible.
The only regime that might be more directly affected by the developments in the
IWC is CITES. Also in the past, decisions in the IWC affected CITES and vice versa.
In fact, some of the actors that are present at the IWC and at CITES meetings are the
same. Instead of the IWC, it might be CITES which would become the battleground
between pro-sustainable use and anti-sustainable use countries. While, as we have
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9 The Future of International Marine Mammal Law
not in breach of the cooperation requirement set out in the UNCLOS. One possibility
that might arise is that a notification of Japan occurs under the Pelly Amendment
under US law. This would mean that economic sanctions might be imposed by the
US in order to force Japan to abandon its whaling activities (see Sect. 5.3.7). Under
the Trump Administration this is highly unlikely since also other administrations that
have followed stricter environmental principles have thus far abstained from such
notification.
With Japan’s withdrawal from the IWC, an outspoken pro-whaling country has
left the Commission. With it, also one of the most solvent contributors to the
Commission has left, too, particularly with regard to Japan’s contributions to the
Scientific Committee. In how far this will affect the work of the IWC is difficult to
foresee. One way or another, however, the IWC will have to scale down its work in
some way. Where within the Commission this scaling down will occur would be
purely speculative at this point. What is more interesting is the question what will
happen to the so-called ‘sustainable use group’ in the Commission. After all, quite a
large number of countries—around 25—including Norway, Iceland, the Russian
Federation, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Antigua & Barbuda, Liberia or Senegal,
have now lost a powerful and financially capable ally. Particularly for Caribbean and
African states, this might lead to the question in how far membership without Japan
is still a feasible and economic option. Therefore, it would not come as a surprise if
some of these countries would leave the Commission as well, particularly since
without Japan, the most powerful voice for sustainable use has been silenced. In this
way, the question of dysfunctionality would somewhat resolve itself: from a conservation perspective, the IWC would be perfectly functional without the ‘dissenting’
voices of sustainable use countries. Therefore, if more sustainable use countries were
to leave the Commission, the IWC would become a rather well-functioning conservation organisation, irrespective of whether it set out to be such an organisation from
the very beginning or not. In the longer run, however, his would hurt the IWC since
potentially more and more whaling would occur outside of its auspices, inevitably
leading to decreasing effectiveness and an overall decline in international legitimacy.
The developments in the IWC would not affect other regimes. The CMS and its
Agreements, the Antarctic sealing convention, the EU Seal Regime, the Polar Bear
Regime and others would remain in place and would continue to exist unabatedly. If
the IWC were to extend its mandate to include small cetaceans, however, it would be
particularly the CMS and its Agreements which would further deepen its cooperative
ties with the IWC. Also potential conflict with NAMMCO might arise as to the
increasingly overlapping mandates of both organisations. However, since also
conservation-oriented members of the IWC have not agreed to an extension of its
mandate, this is rather unlikely, albeit not impossible.
The only regime that might be more directly affected by the developments in the
IWC is CITES. Also in the past, decisions in the IWC affected CITES and vice versa.
In fact, some of the actors that are present at the IWC and at CITES meetings are the
same. Instead of the IWC, it might be CITES which would become the battleground
between pro-sustainable use and anti-sustainable use countries. While, as we have
190
9 The Future of International Marine Mammal Law