deeply-rooted moral standard.
2 Again, this would consequently stem from political
rather than moral or even ecological or animal welfare considerations.
An interesting case in point is the case of Brazil, which has taken up a strict
no-use stance within the IWC—best exemplified by the recent Brazil-led IWC
Florianópolis Declaration of 2018. Brazil was one of the first states to join the
IWC when it ratified the ICRW in 1950. It subsequently left the Commission in
1966 and then rejoined in 1974. Prior to its leaving the IWC, the country was a rather
inactive member and on several occasions did not even join the meetings. Upon
leaving the IWC, Brazil started to engage in large-scale minke whaling in the South
Atlantic, killing several hundred whales per year, despite not having whaled for
several hundred years. Only in the 1970s the country started to take an interest in
environmental issues. Up to then, Brazil was considered a ‘pirate whaling’ nation
that did not follow international rules. After rejoining the IWC, Brazil worked hard
to rid itself of the ‘pirate’ stigma and started to develop an outspoken anti-whaling
policy, for instance by promoting whale sanctuaries as a conservation tool. Yet, only
from the 1990s onwards, it started to fully align itself with anti-whaling countries. At
the 2018 meeting, Brazil’s anti-whaling stance also translated in abstaining from a
vote on the new ASW quota. Whether this means that in the future it will also
principally oppose ASW remains to be seen. At the meeting, however, it became
clear that Brazil is taking a lead in the so-called South American ‘Buenos Aires
Group’ and increasingly pushes towards more conservation of whales. At the same
time, Brazil advances the idea of non-lethal use of whales in the form of whale
watching. Not surprisingly, the proposed South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary is very
much in Brazil’s interest.
On the other side of the spectrum we find countries such as Japan, Canada,
Norway or Iceland. As has become clear in the foregoing chapters, Japan has pushed
the pro-whaling agenda for many decades. But beyond that, Japan has always had a
pro-use agenda towards marine living resources. Its involvement in the Bering Sea
fur seal hunts and its long-standing history of whaling both in its coastal regions and
in the Pacific and Southern Oceans stands exemplary in this regard.
Japan’s overall science-based approach has marked its contributions to the IWC,
justifying its commercial hunt for whales. At the same time, it has also supported
conservation efforts, yet as long as its own scientific findings were in support of such
measures. However, contrary to other countries, Japan’s overall approach to the
IWC has been marked by its own national interest. The attempted establishment of
the ‘small-type coastal whaling’ category in support of its coastal minke whaling
activities are but one example. A blanket ban on commercial whaling was therefore
opposing Japan’s IWC policy in a two-fold manner: first, it was not built on scientific
findings in its entirety; second, it would undermine its national interest of continuing
to whale. This view on the moratorium was expressed already from the late 1970s
onwards when the decision to impose a zero catch quota drew nearer. Once the
moratorium was finally adopted, Japan worked tirelessly to overturn it, either by
2 Sellheim (2016).
8.3 State Behaviour
179
2 Again, this would consequently stem from political
rather than moral or even ecological or animal welfare considerations.
An interesting case in point is the case of Brazil, which has taken up a strict
no-use stance within the IWC—best exemplified by the recent Brazil-led IWC
Florianópolis Declaration of 2018. Brazil was one of the first states to join the
IWC when it ratified the ICRW in 1950. It subsequently left the Commission in
1966 and then rejoined in 1974. Prior to its leaving the IWC, the country was a rather
inactive member and on several occasions did not even join the meetings. Upon
leaving the IWC, Brazil started to engage in large-scale minke whaling in the South
Atlantic, killing several hundred whales per year, despite not having whaled for
several hundred years. Only in the 1970s the country started to take an interest in
environmental issues. Up to then, Brazil was considered a ‘pirate whaling’ nation
that did not follow international rules. After rejoining the IWC, Brazil worked hard
to rid itself of the ‘pirate’ stigma and started to develop an outspoken anti-whaling
policy, for instance by promoting whale sanctuaries as a conservation tool. Yet, only
from the 1990s onwards, it started to fully align itself with anti-whaling countries. At
the 2018 meeting, Brazil’s anti-whaling stance also translated in abstaining from a
vote on the new ASW quota. Whether this means that in the future it will also
principally oppose ASW remains to be seen. At the meeting, however, it became
clear that Brazil is taking a lead in the so-called South American ‘Buenos Aires
Group’ and increasingly pushes towards more conservation of whales. At the same
time, Brazil advances the idea of non-lethal use of whales in the form of whale
watching. Not surprisingly, the proposed South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary is very
much in Brazil’s interest.
On the other side of the spectrum we find countries such as Japan, Canada,
Norway or Iceland. As has become clear in the foregoing chapters, Japan has pushed
the pro-whaling agenda for many decades. But beyond that, Japan has always had a
pro-use agenda towards marine living resources. Its involvement in the Bering Sea
fur seal hunts and its long-standing history of whaling both in its coastal regions and
in the Pacific and Southern Oceans stands exemplary in this regard.
Japan’s overall science-based approach has marked its contributions to the IWC,
justifying its commercial hunt for whales. At the same time, it has also supported
conservation efforts, yet as long as its own scientific findings were in support of such
measures. However, contrary to other countries, Japan’s overall approach to the
IWC has been marked by its own national interest. The attempted establishment of
the ‘small-type coastal whaling’ category in support of its coastal minke whaling
activities are but one example. A blanket ban on commercial whaling was therefore
opposing Japan’s IWC policy in a two-fold manner: first, it was not built on scientific
findings in its entirety; second, it would undermine its national interest of continuing
to whale. This view on the moratorium was expressed already from the late 1970s
onwards when the decision to impose a zero catch quota drew nearer. Once the
moratorium was finally adopted, Japan worked tirelessly to overturn it, either by
2 Sellheim (2016).
8.3 State Behaviour
179