and Oceans (DFO) did not substantiate the claim of a dwindling seal population. The
issue of economic necessity is, once again, not empirically testable and it is doubtful
whether the claim stems from independent sources. The Declaration notes that
merely 5% of the annual income in sealing communities stem from sealing. This
is oversimplified, at best. My own field research in sealing communities in Newfoundland has shown that it very much depends on the year in which the contribution
of sealing is measured. Commercial sealers are first and foremost fishers, meaning
that their annual income comprises of revenues stemming from fishing and sealing.
In simple terms we can say that if the markets for fish are bad and the markets for seal
products are good, the annual contribution of sealing becomes much larger. Vice
versa, it can, indeed, only amount to 5%. A general claim of ascribing commercial
sealing a lack of economic necessity leaves out market fluctuations and, additionally,
leaves out other needs, such as cultural and social needs. Lastly, the claim of 42% of
seals being skinned while conscious is a gross misinterpretation of veterinary data
and appears to be rooted in the desire to justify a EU-wide trade ban based on
emotional responses to such claim. Also the European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA) concluded in a report on animal welfare aspects of seal hunting that the
number brought forth in the Declaration did not correspond to scientific findings.
31
Irrespective of the problematic claims in the Declaration, which nobody appeared
to have ‘fact-checked’, the Commission initiated the legislative process for the
adoption of a trade ban on seal products. At first, the process focused on the animal
welfare aspects of sealing and the EFSA was tasked to provide an overview of the
findings of veterinary studies and of other materials not collected by itself that would
allow for an idea of how (in)humane commercial sealing was. The EFSA concluded
that even though in most instances seals are killed swiftly, humane killing does not
always occur. Yet it abstained putting a number on this claim. One important
recommendation the EFSA put forth was the requirement for the three-step-process—stunning, checking, bleeding—to improve the animal welfare aspects of
sealing. This corresponded to the findings of the IVWG and the Canadian MMR
followed this request in 2009. Shortly after the report from the EFSA, a Danish
consultancy firm, COWI, took over the task of conducting an impact assessment on
different policy options. Throughout the report, which was released in 2008,
32
several policy options were tested as regards their environmental, economic and
social impacts. As the least detrimental option for the local population was considered a labelling system that would clearly mark those seal products stemming from
hunts with high animal welfare standards vis-à-vis those for which these standards
cannot be proved. This system, COWI concluded, would also improve the image of
seal hunting in the world. A total trade ban was considered to be the most detrimental
option for Inuit and non-Inuit sealers alike, because buyers would not be able to
distinguish between Inuit and non-Inuit products despite the existence of an Inuit
exemption.
31 EFSA (2007), p. 46.
32 COWI (2008).
6.7 The European Union as the Forerunner of the New Paradigm
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