would place extra modes of protection for each seal within them in place. This meant
that these regions could be closed from sealing for a specific time period of the year,
making it illegal to hunt seals despite the overall opening times for sealing. On top of
these stringent measures, three Seal Reserves were established under the CCAS,
which prohibit any sealing activities around the South Orkney Islands, in the
Southwestern Ross Sea and in the waters between Edisto Inlet, Cape Hallett and
Helm Point in Eastern Antarctica.
At the time of adoption of the CCAS, Antarctic sealing de facto no longer played
a role. Therefore, the enabling of sealing under the CCAS was rather a matter of
possibility than of responding to actual commercial needs. The same can be said
about the possibility to hunt seals for scientific purposes. Only on one occasion in
1986/87 did the Soviet Union make use of this provision, taking several thousand
crabeater seals, around 100 Weddell seals, 1 elephant seal and an unknown number
of Ross seals. While scientific sealing was permitted, the issue caused significant
unrest amongst the parties of the CCAS, particularly since the Soviet Union did not
act in a transparent manner. As a consequence, a conference on the efficacy of the
CCAS was held in 1988, which saw a tightening of the relationship between the
CCAS and the ATS, particularly with regard to the recently adopted CAMLR
Convention in 1980. The fear of a reopening of large-scale commercial sealing
drove the debates, but ultimately proved to be nothing more than fears only since
the Soviet Union signalled that it would not conduct scientific sealing anymore.
The question therefore arises what the ultimate purpose of the CCAS, in light of
the non-existing seal hunts in the Antarctic, really is. After all, the convention was
concluded without a real existing threat to the species it aims to protect. Two strains
of argument can be applied that would explain its existence: on the one hand, the fact
that a threat to Antarctic seals did not factually exist at the time of its conclusion
makes CCAS ultimately a precautionary regime. Having learnt from the past, it aims
to prevent overexploitation before this overexploitation is actually taking place. In
this regard, while ultimately being rather conservative by focusing only on seals and
not on the Antarctic ecosystem, it is rather progressive since the precautionary
approach as an environmental principle was established only at the 1992 Rio
Conference. On the other hand, its role can be seen as an overall desire in protecting
the pristine Antarctic environment from any threats, making it rather independent
from the Antarctic Treaty itself.
21
Whether or not the CCAS has factually contributed to the protection of seals in
the Antarctic is subject to speculation, particularly since the CAMLR Convention
and the Madrid Protocol have taken over many aspects of ecosystem-based conservation efforts. Spain’s and Pakistan’s expression in 2012 that they would wish to
accede to the convention can therefore rather be interpreted as a signal towards other
ATCPs that they adhere to the ATS in toto rather than a signal of potential sealing
activities in the Antarctic. Unfortunately, I was not able to get official statements
21 Mossop (2013), p. 278.
6.4 The Second Half of the Twentieth Century
143
that these regions could be closed from sealing for a specific time period of the year,
making it illegal to hunt seals despite the overall opening times for sealing. On top of
these stringent measures, three Seal Reserves were established under the CCAS,
which prohibit any sealing activities around the South Orkney Islands, in the
Southwestern Ross Sea and in the waters between Edisto Inlet, Cape Hallett and
Helm Point in Eastern Antarctica.
At the time of adoption of the CCAS, Antarctic sealing de facto no longer played
a role. Therefore, the enabling of sealing under the CCAS was rather a matter of
possibility than of responding to actual commercial needs. The same can be said
about the possibility to hunt seals for scientific purposes. Only on one occasion in
1986/87 did the Soviet Union make use of this provision, taking several thousand
crabeater seals, around 100 Weddell seals, 1 elephant seal and an unknown number
of Ross seals. While scientific sealing was permitted, the issue caused significant
unrest amongst the parties of the CCAS, particularly since the Soviet Union did not
act in a transparent manner. As a consequence, a conference on the efficacy of the
CCAS was held in 1988, which saw a tightening of the relationship between the
CCAS and the ATS, particularly with regard to the recently adopted CAMLR
Convention in 1980. The fear of a reopening of large-scale commercial sealing
drove the debates, but ultimately proved to be nothing more than fears only since
the Soviet Union signalled that it would not conduct scientific sealing anymore.
The question therefore arises what the ultimate purpose of the CCAS, in light of
the non-existing seal hunts in the Antarctic, really is. After all, the convention was
concluded without a real existing threat to the species it aims to protect. Two strains
of argument can be applied that would explain its existence: on the one hand, the fact
that a threat to Antarctic seals did not factually exist at the time of its conclusion
makes CCAS ultimately a precautionary regime. Having learnt from the past, it aims
to prevent overexploitation before this overexploitation is actually taking place. In
this regard, while ultimately being rather conservative by focusing only on seals and
not on the Antarctic ecosystem, it is rather progressive since the precautionary
approach as an environmental principle was established only at the 1992 Rio
Conference. On the other hand, its role can be seen as an overall desire in protecting
the pristine Antarctic environment from any threats, making it rather independent
from the Antarctic Treaty itself.
21
Whether or not the CCAS has factually contributed to the protection of seals in
the Antarctic is subject to speculation, particularly since the CAMLR Convention
and the Madrid Protocol have taken over many aspects of ecosystem-based conservation efforts. Spain’s and Pakistan’s expression in 2012 that they would wish to
accede to the convention can therefore rather be interpreted as a signal towards other
ATCPs that they adhere to the ATS in toto rather than a signal of potential sealing
activities in the Antarctic. Unfortunately, I was not able to get official statements
21 Mossop (2013), p. 278.
6.4 The Second Half of the Twentieth Century
143
