locale’ was used while the English translation made use of the term ‘local indigenous’. While it seems clear which population is made reference to, we do see here
differences in the terminology which are quite significant. In the Norwegian text, the
denominator of indigeneity did not occur while in the Russian version it did.
Whether this had any direct impact on the applicability of the regime cannot be
said at this stage and also the literature, which is sparse to begin with, does not make
reference to this issue at all.
Be that as it may, despite the fact that the agreement covered areas that did not fall
under the direct jurisdiction of a nation state, times were changing in the 1970s and
countries started to apply the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones, which
was manifested in the 1982 UNCLOS. Although the agreement did not have an
expiry date, it became void when the UNCLOS was adopted since Norway and the
Soviet Union, along with other states, established the EEZ as customary international law. The control over the marine resources occurring within that limit thus
rests with the nation states and the need for international cooperation became
obsolete.
Although the tides were turning in the 1970s, Norway remained firmly committed
to the conservation and utilisation of seals, based on scientific advice. In 1971, it
therefore entered into a second agreement, this time with the long-time sealing
country Canada. Canada developed an international reputation as ruthlessly
decimating harp and hooded seal populations in the North Atlantic, particularly
because of its large-scale, commercial seal hunts in Newfoundland and Quebec.
Especially throughout the 1960s and 1970s international resistance had developed
against these hunts, which were considered to be detrimental to the seal populations
and inherently cruel. Particularly the latter narrative would find its way into policymaking in the European Union, which we will get to know later on in the book. It
was especially Canada’s seal hunts, which contributed greatly to the emergence of
the anti-sealing movement and the associated establishment of a public discourse
that no longer accepts seals as an exploitable resource. Organisations such as the
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) emerged out of resistance against
Canadian sealing.
15 Also Greenpeace and other organisations made use of the harp
seal, and particularly its ‘whitecoat’ pups, to raise money, despite the fact that the
harp seal has never been on the IUCN’s endangered species list. In an interview from
1978, Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd founder Paul Watson underlined that “the seal
is very easy to exploit as an image [. . .] which portray(s) a baby seal with the tears
coming out of its eyes.”
16 Without needing to delve more deeply into this issue at
this stage—we will learn more about the roles of NGO in Chap. 7—suffice it to say
that Canada was and still is a primary actor in large-scale seal hunts, resisting
international pressure and counteracting a strong discourse against sealing.
Despite changing discourse, in July 1971 Norway and Canada entered into the
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway on
15 Barry (2005).
16 Frum (1978).
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6 The International Legal Framework for Seals
differences in the terminology which are quite significant. In the Norwegian text, the
denominator of indigeneity did not occur while in the Russian version it did.
Whether this had any direct impact on the applicability of the regime cannot be
said at this stage and also the literature, which is sparse to begin with, does not make
reference to this issue at all.
Be that as it may, despite the fact that the agreement covered areas that did not fall
under the direct jurisdiction of a nation state, times were changing in the 1970s and
countries started to apply the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones, which
was manifested in the 1982 UNCLOS. Although the agreement did not have an
expiry date, it became void when the UNCLOS was adopted since Norway and the
Soviet Union, along with other states, established the EEZ as customary international law. The control over the marine resources occurring within that limit thus
rests with the nation states and the need for international cooperation became
obsolete.
Although the tides were turning in the 1970s, Norway remained firmly committed
to the conservation and utilisation of seals, based on scientific advice. In 1971, it
therefore entered into a second agreement, this time with the long-time sealing
country Canada. Canada developed an international reputation as ruthlessly
decimating harp and hooded seal populations in the North Atlantic, particularly
because of its large-scale, commercial seal hunts in Newfoundland and Quebec.
Especially throughout the 1960s and 1970s international resistance had developed
against these hunts, which were considered to be detrimental to the seal populations
and inherently cruel. Particularly the latter narrative would find its way into policymaking in the European Union, which we will get to know later on in the book. It
was especially Canada’s seal hunts, which contributed greatly to the emergence of
the anti-sealing movement and the associated establishment of a public discourse
that no longer accepts seals as an exploitable resource. Organisations such as the
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) emerged out of resistance against
Canadian sealing.
15 Also Greenpeace and other organisations made use of the harp
seal, and particularly its ‘whitecoat’ pups, to raise money, despite the fact that the
harp seal has never been on the IUCN’s endangered species list. In an interview from
1978, Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd founder Paul Watson underlined that “the seal
is very easy to exploit as an image [. . .] which portray(s) a baby seal with the tears
coming out of its eyes.”
16 Without needing to delve more deeply into this issue at
this stage—we will learn more about the roles of NGO in Chap. 7—suffice it to say
that Canada was and still is a primary actor in large-scale seal hunts, resisting
international pressure and counteracting a strong discourse against sealing.
Despite changing discourse, in July 1971 Norway and Canada entered into the
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway on
15 Barry (2005).
16 Frum (1978).
140
6 The International Legal Framework for Seals