i.e. 60% with higher catches and lower conservation; and 65% as an intermediate level. These three options are referred to as ‘tuning levels’: 0.60, 0.65 and
0.72. All of these levels, despite their differences in conservation and catch
outcomes, are guided by the precautionary principle.
At the 67th meeting of the IWC in 2018, tuning levels also played a role. I
observed how Iceland was accused of applying ‘conservative’ tuning levels for
its whaling quota which were deemed to be unsustainable. Iceland, however,
countered this accusation by referring to the tuning levels of the Scientific
Committee which it adheres to. We see therefore that although the Scientific
Committee did indeed provide for these tuning levels, their application is a
matter of political (and arguably emotional) decisions.
Others, however, place the focus of the IWC on the conservation of whales and
not so much on their utilisation and the development of the whaling industry or
whale resource. At the core of this argument stands the contextual consideration of
the whaling convention. It is argued that since the whaling industry is no longer of
such influence as at the time of the ICRW’s conclusion, the political, social and
ultimately legal contexts have changed. Paired with the overall public discourse on
environmental protection, the IWC has thus shifted to become a more conservationoriented organisation than one dealing with the management of whaling. And here
lies the crux of the issue: since there is, in this regard, not a right or wrong way to
interpret the Convention, there is no way to resolve this dispute. Several attempts
have been made to ‘normalise’ or ‘modernise’ the IWC—to find means and ways to
overcome this rift. But up to this day, these attempts have failed.
Instead, the IWC has sharpened its conservation-oriented agenda, much to the
dismay of Japan and other whaling countries. Since it is necessary to change the
Schedule based on a three-three-quarter majority, Japan has continuously attempted
to get states to join the Commission and support its cause. To this end, there is
evidence that Japan has ‘weaponised’ its overseas development aid for countries in
the Caribbean and South Pacific, meaning that funds to support local projects were
paid in return for a country joining the IWC and voting in favour of Japan’s
pro-whaling stance. The degree to which this has happened is difficult to assess,
but that fact that it has indeed happened is indisputable.
7 At the same time, more and
more countries have joined the IWC that either have no whaling history and/or that
are explicitly anti-whaling. In how far rich anti-whaling countries have used political
or economic means to lure other states to join the Commission has, at least to my
knowledge, not been researched so far. Since the convention itself does not contain a
mechanism to deal with such a development—after all, the drafters of the convention
could not foresee what would happen—the Commission has reached a stage which
7 Miller and Dolšak (2007).
5.3 The International Whaling Commission, Whaling and Whales
97
0.72. All of these levels, despite their differences in conservation and catch
outcomes, are guided by the precautionary principle.
At the 67th meeting of the IWC in 2018, tuning levels also played a role. I
observed how Iceland was accused of applying ‘conservative’ tuning levels for
its whaling quota which were deemed to be unsustainable. Iceland, however,
countered this accusation by referring to the tuning levels of the Scientific
Committee which it adheres to. We see therefore that although the Scientific
Committee did indeed provide for these tuning levels, their application is a
matter of political (and arguably emotional) decisions.
Others, however, place the focus of the IWC on the conservation of whales and
not so much on their utilisation and the development of the whaling industry or
whale resource. At the core of this argument stands the contextual consideration of
the whaling convention. It is argued that since the whaling industry is no longer of
such influence as at the time of the ICRW’s conclusion, the political, social and
ultimately legal contexts have changed. Paired with the overall public discourse on
environmental protection, the IWC has thus shifted to become a more conservationoriented organisation than one dealing with the management of whaling. And here
lies the crux of the issue: since there is, in this regard, not a right or wrong way to
interpret the Convention, there is no way to resolve this dispute. Several attempts
have been made to ‘normalise’ or ‘modernise’ the IWC—to find means and ways to
overcome this rift. But up to this day, these attempts have failed.
Instead, the IWC has sharpened its conservation-oriented agenda, much to the
dismay of Japan and other whaling countries. Since it is necessary to change the
Schedule based on a three-three-quarter majority, Japan has continuously attempted
to get states to join the Commission and support its cause. To this end, there is
evidence that Japan has ‘weaponised’ its overseas development aid for countries in
the Caribbean and South Pacific, meaning that funds to support local projects were
paid in return for a country joining the IWC and voting in favour of Japan’s
pro-whaling stance. The degree to which this has happened is difficult to assess,
but that fact that it has indeed happened is indisputable.
7 At the same time, more and
more countries have joined the IWC that either have no whaling history and/or that
are explicitly anti-whaling. In how far rich anti-whaling countries have used political
or economic means to lure other states to join the Commission has, at least to my
knowledge, not been researched so far. Since the convention itself does not contain a
mechanism to deal with such a development—after all, the drafters of the convention
could not foresee what would happen—the Commission has reached a stage which
7 Miller and Dolšak (2007).
5.3 The International Whaling Commission, Whaling and Whales
97